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This thesis investigates the question of whether judicial review of legislation is a 
hindrance to democracy. My main claim is that the existing literature on this topic 
fails to pay adequate regard to the symbolic significance of political institutions, that 
is, the role that legislatures and courts play in the popular imagination. I argue that 
we should not view constitutional systems merely as decision-making mechanisms, 
since a society’s institutional structure will colour its sense of political agency and 
shape the way in which citizens view their relationships with political officials and 
with one another. Different constitutional structures accordingly project different 
visions of constitutionalism and democracy. In particular, I argue, representative 
government should be viewed not merely as a compromise between equality of input 
and quality of output, but as a distinctively valuable form of government in its own 
right. The representative assembly serves as the focal point for public political debate 
and symbolises a commitment to government through an inclusive process of 
deliberation. Legislative supremacy – the practice of accepting the enactments of a 
representative assembly as the decisions of the people as a whole – can therefore 
allow the law to be seen as the output of the political power of a self-governing 
people. Judicial review, on the other hand, will tend to signify a set of boundaries 
around the democratic political process, thus truncating the people’s shared sense of 
self-government.
Lay Summary 
In a number of countries, courts have the power to strike down legislation on the 
grounds that it violates constitutional rights, in effect giving a small number of 
lawyers a veto over the laws passed by elected representatives. Is this practice 
undemocratic? 
Many people think that ‘judicial review’ of legislation is obviously undemocratic, 
since its whole purpose is to provide a brake on what a government supported by the 
majority of the people may legitimately do. But this answer is too quick, since 
democracy does not simply mean following the will of the majority. This criticism 
had led to another response, which says that judicial review is not undemocratic, 
since its role is to protect important components of democracy, such as freedom of 
speech, equal treatment and human rights. 
I agree that things like free speech, equality and the protection of minorities are 
important parts of democracy. But I believe that those who have looked to defend 
judicial review simply on the grounds that it leads to good outcomes miss an 
important part of what a political system does. Political institutions are not merely 
decision-making devices; they are also symbols of the kind of relationships that 
society takes to pertain between citizens. For example, we prefer democracy to 
monarchy not just because we think monarchs will make bad decisions, but because 
monarchy symbolises something that we reject: the idea that some people are born to 
rule over others. Democracy, on the other hand, symbolises respect for the capacities 
of ordinary people to play a role in a kind of collective self-government. So when we 
debate whether a particular institution is democratic, we need to consider not only 
what the institution does, but also what it symbolises. 
This thesis argues that judicial review of legislation damages democracy 
symbolically. By placing the responsibility for policing the boundaries of the 
constitution into the hands of judges, it presents the constitution as a fundamental 
law delineating the limits in which the so-called ‘political branches’ of government 
 
 
operate. It therefore promotes the idea that the democratic agency of the people needs 
to be contained within boundaries that are set by a law that is above or beyond 
politics. This is detrimental to our vision of self-government: a vision in which citizens 
themselves create the law through their own political action. 
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‘Constitutions, like all creations of the human mind 
and human will, have an existence in men’s 
imagination and men’s emotions quite apart from 
their actual use in ordering men’s affairs.’ 
Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols
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1. Introduction: the question of judicial review 
1.1 Framing the Issue 
This thesis investigates what I call the ‘question of judicial review’, that is, the 
question of whether judicial review of legislation is anti-democratic. Bickel famously 
dubbed this issue ‘the counter-majoritarian difficulty’.1 This is an infelicitous phrase, 
since it suggests that judicial review is problematic because it violates 
majoritarianism, or ‘majority rule’. This seems to presuppose a body of people that 
we can identify as ‘the majority’, who are for some reason in a morally privileged 
position so as to have the right to have their views (rather than the views of ‘the 
minority’) decide the way in which the country is governed. Thus framed, the 
difficulty is easy to resolve. No serious thinker advocates majority rule. For instance, 
the twenty-first century’s leading opponent of judicial review has objected to his view 
being thus characterised.2 And even the eighteenth century’s leading proponent of 
direct democracy did not believe that the will of the majority had any distinctive 
moral worth in and of itself.3 Bickel’s phrase distorts the issues really at stake in the 
question of judicial review. 
Democracy is government by the people, not government by the majority. 
Government by the people requires a discursive political process in which everyone 
gets to participate on an equal footing with everyone else. This in turn requires a 
democratic culture, in which each citizen is valued and her capacities nurtured and 
respected. Claims such as these have often been used to justify judicial review, by 
counterposing a society which honours this ideal of equal respect against one in 
which the majority brutely dominates the minority. But this contrast is not the one 
that opponents of judicial review have in mind. I am happy to agree that democracy 
                                                     
1 Alexander Mordecai Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), 
p 16-23. 
2 Jeremy Waldron, ‘A Majority in the Lifeboat’ (2010) 90 Boston University Law Review 1043, 
at 1043, n 1. 
3 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in The Social Contract and Discourse on Political 
Economy (CJ Betts tr and ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), Book IV, chap ii. 
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requires a culture of equal respect for all citizens. But that does not resolve our 
question of institutional design. 
The question of judicial review, at least as I understand it, pits judicial review against 
legislative supremacy. These are not two different theories about who has the moral 
right to see their will inscribed into law (no-one has that!); they are two different ways 
in which a constitution may be designed. Neither is straightforwardly majoritarian, 
nor, indeed, straightforwardly minoritarian. From the point of view of empirical 
political science, the question might actually appear relatively unimportant. 
Numerous empirical studies have suggested that the judiciary tends over time to 
follow the ideology of the legislative and executive political elites. Furthermore, 
legislative policies do not necessarily track popular opinion. The ‘counter-
majoritarian difficulty’ frame fails descriptively as well as normatively.4 
So what is at stake? I suggest that we need to look beyond the empirical, and towards 
the symbolic. Our political institutions are not merely devices for resolving 
disagreements and pursuing shared goals. They are also constitutive features of the 
lifeworld in which citizens’ political identities are constructed. Without political 
institutions, the concept of democracy as political self-rule would be unintelligible. 
Institutions lift us out of a ‘state of nature’ not just materially, but by giving us the 
resources to think of ourselves as occupying what Rousseau called ‘l’état civil’.5 
Ingrained within an institutional scheme is a particular way of envisaging our 
relations with one another, indeed, a way making sense of the world. I therefore 
suggest that the question of judicial review is really about the kind of political world-
view that is projected by different constitutional systems. Do systems of judicial 
review and legislatively supremacy express different conceptions of the relationship 
                                                     
4 See Scott E Lemieux and David J Watkins, ‘Beyond the “Countermajoritarian Difficulty”: 
lessons from contemporary democratic theory’ (2009) 41 Polity 30. 
5 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du Contrat Social (R Grimsley ed, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 
Livre I, chap viii. The standard English translation, ‘civil state’, does not quite capture this 
lifeworld constituting significance. ‘Civil condition’ would perhaps do a better job, although 




between individual citizens and the political community? If so, which conception is 
more attractive from the perspective of a normative theory of democracy? 
1.2 The Scope and Central Argument of the Thesis 
By ‘judicial review’ I mean strong constitutional rights review: the institutional 
practice whereby courts are empowered to strike down or disapply statutes passed 
by the legislature if they are of the view that those statutes violate constitutional 
rights. This power might be held by the ordinary courts, or only by the apex court, or 
by a special constitutional court separate from the civil judicial hierarchy. The 
constitutional rights might be explicitly enumerated in a cardinal document, or they 
might thought of as ‘implicit’ in such a document, or as in the political culture and 
traditions of the community more generally. The key features of judicial review, for 
the purposes of this thesis, is that is undertaken by a body which is understood to be, 
and which understands itself as, a court; that it is reviewing legislation passed by a 
representative assembly; and that the decision of the court is accepted as authoritative, 
and binding not only on the parties before the court, but on the legislature itself. My 
investigation therefore does not cover the so-called ‘new commonwealth model of 
constitutionalism’,6 which allows the legislature to override a finding that legislation 
violates constitutional rights; nor pre-legislative advisory scrutiny, such as that 
carried out by the French Council of State;7 nor constitutional review carried out by a 
non-judicial body, such as takes place in the Finnish Eduskunta.8 
                                                     
6 See Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: theory and practice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
7 See John Bell, ‘What is the Function of the Conseil d’Etat in the Preparation of Legislation?’ 
(2000) 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 661. This is not to be confused with 
the review conducted by the French Constitutional Council, which has a mandatory 
jurisdiction. The Council is itself an interesting case, since it was originally conceived of as a 
form of non-judicial constitutional review (such as would fall outside the scope of this thesis), 
but is now generally recognised as a court practising judicial review. I discuss the 
Constitutional Council below, p 187-91 
8 See Jaakko Husa, The Constitution of Finland: a contextual analysis (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2011), p 78-84. 
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The ‘question of judicial review’ may be straightforwardly defined as the question of 
whether judicial review is a hindrance to democracy. Simply put, my answer to that 
question is ‘yes’. But it is an answer which requires explanation, since my argument 
is that judicial review hinders democracy in a specific way. Judicial review, I claim, 
damages democracy noninstrumentally. To understand this we need to distinguish 
between causing and constituting a value. If you think that pleasure is valuable, then 
you will approve of beautiful paintings, since beautiful paintings cause pleasure. In 
this respect beautiful paintings are of instrumental value. If you think that fine art is 
valuable, then you will also approve of beautiful paintings. But beautiful paintings 
do not cause fine art. They are fine art; or, to put it another way, they constitute fine art 
(we might say they partly constitute fine art, since there is more to fine art than just 
beautiful paintings). Here the value of beautiful paintings is noninstrumental. 
Similarly, I claim, democratic political processes are of noninstrumental value. They 
are constitutive of a certain political way of life, a certain way in which people relate 
to one another, which enhances the lives of those who partake in it. Judicial review, I 
shall argue, dilutes this valuable relationship and thus diminishes democracy’s value. 
It does not follow from this that countries that employ judicial review have no right 
to call themselves democracies, or that countries that practice legislative supremacy 
are eo ipso thriving democracies. The quality of democracy in a country is to be 
measured among many dimensions, of which the formal constitutional structure is 
just one. Furthermore, I do not even mean to say that judicial review is necessarily 
bad for democracy, all-things-considered. It might be the case that (in a particular 
society at a particular point in time) judicial review instrumentally benefits democracy, 
for example by striking down laws that inhibit democratic debate, or, more indirectly, 
by contributing to a process of decline in levels of racial or religious bigotry. 
Nevertheless, if my argument in this thesis is correct, such instrumental benefits must 
be measured against the direct, noninstrumental harm that is caused to democracy 
when questions about the fundamental principles of the constitution are taken out of 
the hands of the representative legislature and placed in the hands of the courts. 
5 
 
I should say a word about what I take the value of democracy to be. We could, and 
indeed often do, call that value simply ‘democracy’, just as we use ‘art’ to refer to a 
practice, the objects produced by that practice and the value constituted by that 
practice and those objects. There is a benefit to such usage: it helps us see that the 
relationship between practice and value is a constitutive, rather than a causal one. But 
it is not helpful in elucidating why democracy is valuable; for this, we need to reach 
for other words. I propose that democracy is valuable because it provides ‘political 
autonomy’. One enjoys political autonomy when one authentically identifies as a 
member of a self-governing political community that respects one’s status as a moral 
agent. Political autonomy enriches one’s life by allowing an extra dimension to one’s 
personhood. It binds one together with others in an ethically significant way, such 
that politics becomes a joint project in which all citizens may take pride. 
We can understand political autonomy as lying between two opposed heteronomies. 
On the one hand, where there is no self-governing community, the law is simply 
imposed upon subjects by those individuals who hold the levers of power. On the 
other hand, where each citizens’ moral agency is not respected, the community 
becomes an oppressive totality. 
These two heteronomies show the respective dangers of an apolitical and an excessively 
political society. In the first case, society is presented as the field of market-oriented 
interactions among private individuals, and politics is taken to have the function of 
balancing interests and pursuing convergent goals. The status of citizen is primarily 
one of bearer of negative rights, as defined by law, which protect the pursuit of 
private interests. In such a society, individuals may enjoy a moral autonomy, but since 
it lacks a sense of politics as a collective activity, the good of political autonomy will 
not be available to them. At the other extreme, society is seen as entirely constituted 
by politics, and the maintenance of society becomes equated with the maintenance of 
an ethical/political consensus. The citizen’s participation in a joint venture is secured 
by her adherence to a shared vision of the community’s collective life. Such a society 
has a clear sense of the political, but it will lack any adequate notion of autonomy; the 
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individual becomes entirely subsumed into the collective. Democracy, then, seeks to 
navigate the course between these two extremes. 
Although the idea of political autonomy plays an important role in this thesis, I do 
not embark on a detailed philosophical exploration of the concept. This is in part for 
the usual reasons of space and time. But a limited scope, philosophically speaking, is 
also called for by the nature of the question I am investigating. For regardless of 
whether one accepts Rawls’ thesis that public reason should be ‘freestanding’ from 
‘conceptions of the good’,9 for practical purposes a certain philosophical ecumenism 
is beneficial where political arguments are concerned. If one is able to make an 
argument on a foundation of broad agreement, then it is not necessary to keep on 
digging deeper. I think that the concept of political autonomy, as I use it, would be 
broadly accepted as valuable by most participants in the judicial review debate. 
Furthermore, although it does not sit detached from ideas of the good in their entirety 
(an impossibility that not even Rawls demands), nor does it rest on any particularly 
specific ideas about what is of ultimate value in life, or whence our basic moral 
obligations derive. When talking about the value of democracy I am referring to a 
particular good in a particular domain; I do not address (except by way of pointing 
out analogies) how this value relates to other goods and other domains. In this respect 
– which is not exactly Rawls’ – my arguments are political, not metaphysical.10 
It is in this spirit that I engage with the three main protagonists of my thesis: Jeremy 
Waldron, Ronald Dworkin and Jürgen Habermas. Each comes to the question of 
judicial review from a somewhat different angle, and it would be possible to trace the 
differences between them down to more fundamental philosophical disagreements 
about, say, the nature of moral rights, or the foundations of liberal equality, or even 
about the presuppositions that we make when we talk to one another. That is not my 
project. Starting at the political level, each of the three writers can be seen to be 
                                                     
9 See generally John Rawls, Political Liberalism (paperback edn, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996). 
10 See John Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’ (1985) 14 Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 223. 
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wrestling with the problem of political autonomy, seeking to resolve the dialectic 
between respect for the individual and the need for collective action. Note that talk of 
liberalism versus communitarianism here would be crudely reductive. Writers on 
both sides of this supposed divide are met with the same recurring series of tensions 
which they endeavour to reconcile: individual and community, diversity and unity, 
rationality and emotion, norms and facts, universal and particular, Moralität and 
Sittlichkeit. None of the three ‘liberals’ whose work I discuss here ignore the latter part 
of any of these oppositions (which is not to say that there is nothing that they can 
fruitfully learn from those who are seen as sitting on the other side of the fence). The 
challenge of finding a constitutional structure that promotes political autonomy is 
part of this broader problem, which Habermas has called ‘mediation between facts 
and norms’, Dworkin ‘integrating ethics and morality’ and Waldron ‘sparkling back 
and forth’ between the universal and the particular.11 
When looking at these three scholars my main focus is on the way in which they 
address the question of judicial review, and in that regard I find the attempts of each 
to be wanting. My discussion of them is not, however, intended to be purely critical; 
I find in the work of each writer something that contributes to the approach that I 
synthesise in chapter six. This is not, of course, a coincidence. I have chosen my 
interlocutors not simply because they are prominent voices in the judicial review 
debate, but also because I believe that there is much that they get right. Broadly 
speaking, I more or less accept Habermas’ ideal of deliberative democracy. I believe, 
however, that Habermas has a tendency to pay insufficient attention to the non-
rational, affective aspects of democracy, an oversight which might be remedied by 
taking seriously Dworkin’s analogy between citizenship and other associative 
                                                     
11 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and 
democracy (W Rehg tr, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), chap 1; Ronald Dworkin, Justice for 
Hedgehogs (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), chap 11; Jeremy 
Waldron, ‘One Another’s Equals: the basis of human equality’, Gifford Lectures, delivered at 





relationships such as ties of family and friendship. And just as I criticise Waldron’s 
‘core case’ against judicial review for being based on a shallow, ‘static’ methodology, 
so his work on the ‘dignity of legislation’ lays the foundations for a more successful, 
dynamic approach. 
In lieu of a standard, chapter-by-chapter summary, I have prepared an overview of 
four themes that are central to this thesis. This should help guide the reader through 
the chapters that follow, hopefully giving a sense of how the various arguments sit 
together. I will therefore give only the most cursory introduction to the structure of 
the thesis. You are currently reading chapter one. In chapter two I set out my 
methodology, explaining why I think we need to take the symbolic aspects of 
constitutional design much more seriously. Chapters three to five then examine the 
contributions of my three main protagonists, Waldron, Dworkin and Habermas, in 
turn. In chapter six I develop what we in Scotland over the last year or so have learned 
to call the ‘positive case’.12 I give a brief account of the value of political autonomy, 
positioning it in relation to the classic theories of Rousseau, Kant and Rawls, and 
giving an indication as to how the shortcomings of these theories might be overcome. 
I then argue that representative legislatures are particularly well-placed to express 
and honour political autonomy, since they symbolise both the unity of the community 
and respect for citizens’ moral-political judgment. Finally, I argue that, by projecting 
a ‘negative’ image of the constitution as a set of limits to political power, judicial 
review undermines this value. That is why I believe that it is a hindrance to 
democracy. 
                                                     
12 On 18 September 2014 there was a referendum to decide whether Scotland should remain 
part of the UK or become an independent nation. Following criticisms that they were running 
a ‘negative’ campaign, supporters of continued UK membership began to make frequent 
reference to the need for a ‘positive case’ for the Union. To this observer, the distinction 
between the two seems to have been the difference between ‘the economy will be worse under 
independence’ (negative case) and ‘the economy will be better if we remain in the UK’ 
(positive case). Yet despite (or perhaps because of?) its apparent lack of substance, the phrase 
seems to have squarely entered the political lexicon, with a number of organisations pledging 
to make the ‘positive case’ for EU membership ahead of the planned referendum in 2017. 
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1.3 Thematic Overview 
1.3.1 Symbolic Significance of Institutions 
One influential approach to questions of constitutional design divides the issues 
involved into two categories: input legitimacy (whether the system is responsive to the 
preferences and/or beliefs of the citizenry) and output legitimacy (whether the system 
effectively produces solutions to problems so as to work in the interests of the 
citizenry).13 Legislative supremacy is then often seen as supported by the former and 
judicial review by the latter. This thesis wholeheartedly rejects such an analysis. 
Political institutions are not simply machines that process inputs into outputs. Such a 
‘black box’ approach treats such phenomena as political values, beliefs and 
aspirations (on the one hand) and legislation, judicial rulings and administrative 
orders (on the other) as exogenous to the institutions with which they engage. This is 
misleading, since both ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ derive their meaning from the context 
of the practice in which they are embedded, a practice in which institutions play a 
constitutive role. 
Think first of inputs. Citizens develop their political values and beliefs in interaction 
with the practice of politics that is ongoing in society, and such interaction includes, 
of course, their experience of political institutions. A certain institutional structure 
will expose citizens to certain kinds of attitudes, arguments and rhetoric; this will 
have an impact on citizens’ views. More fundamentally, the institutional structure 
will colour a society’s sense of political agency, affecting what citizens take to be the 
boundaries of the political, be they topical boundaries (does politics extend to the 
regulation of commercial arrangements between consenting adults?), territorial 
boundaries (are ‘we’ the people of Scotland, of the UK, of Europe?) or what we might 
call the limits of political possibility (is it feasible to expect politics to effectively 
govern the conduct of multinational corporations?). By altering the boundaries of the 
                                                     
13 See Fritz Wilhelm Scharpf, Governing in Europe: effective and democratic? (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p 6. 
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political, institutions affect not only what political opinions citizens hold, but also 
what questions citizens have political opinions about. 
Now think about outputs. What does it mean to say that parliaments and courts (as 
well as cabinets, presidents, government departments, administrative agencies, 
ombudsmen, and so on) produce political outputs? Of course they produce laws, 
rulings, orders and other decisions which will (usually) be implemented in the world, 
by force if necessary. However, such decisions do not have a meaning that can be 
detached from the institutions that reach them. There is no such thing as a political 
output in the abstract, only a particular kind of decision (statute, judgment, order, 
recommendation) made by a particular decision-making body. A supreme court 
judgment has a different meaning to an act of parliament, and would have even if the 
two carried identical semantic content. The meanings of political decisions depend 
on the institutions that make them, and so they cannot be reduced to brute ‘outputs’ 
separable from the process by which they came into existence. 
Political institutions, then, form part of the context within which political action can 
be seen as meaningful and potentially valuable. In chapter two I develop this idea to 
claim that democratic political institutions are of noninstrumental value. Drawing on 
the work of the ‘new institutionalists’ in political science, I argue that political 
institutions are fora for ‘symbolic rituals’ through which the political community 
affirms its commitment to democratic values. Since these values cannot be dissociated 
from the political practices through which they arise (the value of democracy can only 
conceivably be affirmed through democratic processes), the institutions that 
constitute these practices are themselves of a certain noninstrumental value. One 
cannot, therefore, adequately address institutional design questions without a sense 
of the distinctive political values that democratic institutions serve. 
We should not, however, think of the symbolic significance of political institutions 
solely in terms of the relatively straightforward expression of values. On a more 
fundamental level, institutions also play a role in what Charles Taylor calls the ‘social 
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imaginary’:14 they project a certain way of thinking about our political life, a certain 
shared self-image. They shape the expectations we have of political actors, and of each 
other, and carry a sense of how we fit together as citizens engaged in a common 
practice. They thus allow us to orient ourselves in relation to the political world. Take, 
for instance, the idea of the separation of powers. The familiar tripartite distinction 
between the legislative, the executive and the judicial seems almost natural to us, but 
of course it is not, it is a construction that we have built up over the centuries and 
which is inextricably linked to the particular set of institutions that modern western 
societies have developed. We cannot understand the separation of powers without 
understanding our institutions: one does not, for example, really have a grasp of what 
legislation is unless one knows what a legislature is. Political institutions are thus a 
constitutive element of the concepts that organise our constitutional world, concepts 
which I shall call our ‘constitutional imaginaries’. This idea is central to my defence 
of legislative supremacy in chapter six, where I argue that judicial review 
symbolically projects an image in which politics is constrained within the boundaries 
of law, truncating the field of self-government of the political community. 
1.3.2 Respect for Citizens’ Capacity for Judgment 
The approach that equates questions of constitutional design with issues of input and 
output legitimacy may be supported by the view that the raison d’être of democracy is 
to provide government by consent. This view has its roots in the classic social contract 
tradition of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau; at its heart is the idea that no-one can be 
held to be under any obligation to a political power unless he has consented to its 
authority over him. Although this principle has not always been taken to call for 
democracy (Hobbes is an obvious example), it is not a huge step from demanding 
government by consent to demanding democratic government. Input and output 
legitimacy can be seen as two (potentially competing) ways in which the supposedly 
consensual nature of government can be tested. On the input side, regular 
                                                     




competitive elections and other opportunities for democratic participation provide 
institutional bases for establishing the consent of the people. On the output side, since 
individuals are taken to consent to government for the purpose of protecting their 
interests, we can only impute consent to those whose interests are in fact so served; it 
follows, one might conclude, that a legitimate government must be one that serves 
the interests of all. 
Again, this thesis rejects such an analysis. The equation of democracy with 
government by consent represents what we might call a volitional conception of 
politics, that is, a conception of politics based on will. Inspired by the work of Nadia 
Urbinati,15 I outline a distinction between treating citizens voluntaristically, as bearers 
of wills, and respecting them as agents capable of political judgment. It is, the latter, I 
claim and not the former, that is central to democracy. 
The capacity to make judgments is deeper than the capacity to will. One can grant 
one’s consent to a course of action without any sense that the course of action is worthy 
of one’s consent: one may simply feel like it. Judgments are different. To make a 
judgment in favour of a course of action is to evaluate the action as worth pursuing, 
which necessarily involves invoking criteria other than one’s own desires. To use 
Charles Taylor’s terminology, to consent one need only be a ‘simple weigher’, while 
to make a judgment one must be a ‘strong evaluator’.16 So a conception of democracy 
based on judgment rather than will pays a deeper respect to citizens’ status as moral 
agents. 
In chapter three I argue that focusing on the need for a judgment-based conception of 
democracy highlights a shortcoming in Jeremy Waldron’s ‘core case’ against judicial 
review: it relies on a ‘static’ notion of politics. Waldron makes his argument from the 
perspective of a citizen who disagrees with a particular political decision and who 
asks why the decision was made in the way that it was. The argument is based upon 
                                                     
15 Nadia Urbinati, Representative Democracy: principles and genealogy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2006). 
16 Charles Taylor, ‘What is Human Agency?’, in Human Agency and Language (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p 23. 
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a conception of the ‘circumstances of politics’ which takes political disagreements as 
given and treats political institutions as means for making decisions in the face of 
such disagreements. This is a static view, which looks at the role of political 
institutions through a ‘snapshot’ picture of the citizenry at a particular point in time: 
the point at which the object of disagreement comes to be decided upon. Such a 
conception would be adequate for a politics based on will, since an act of will, such 
as the giving or revoking of consent, is a synchronic act that is separable from the 
reasoning that leads up to it and any further consideration that might follow. 
Judgment, on the other hand, is essentially diachronic: it is continually shaping and 
reshaping in response to ongoing deliberation, so that one cannot identify a specific 
point in time at which judgment ‘occurs’. A judgment-based conception of democracy 
must, then, be based on a dynamic account of politics, and so must view political 
institutions not merely as mechanisms for resolving particular disagreements, but as 
integral components of an ongoing practice. 
More positively, in chapter six I follow Urbinati in arguing that a judgment-based 
conception of democracy will view legislation by representative assembly as a 
distinctively valuable mode of government. The indirectness of representative 
democracy plays a crucial role in forging the discursive character of a politics geared 
around respect for citizens’ judgment. Political representation is ‘a comprehensive 
filtering, refining and mediating process of political will-formation and expression’.17 
We should therefore view the practice of representative legislation as something 
worthy of a special respect, and not, as it is often described, as a mere compromise 
between equality of input and quality of output. 
1.3.3 Political Community 
Democracy provides self-government: rule by the people rather than rule by a 
particular individual or class. This is an inherently collective ideal: ‘the people’ means 
the people as a whole, not each individual taken separately. A citizen who dissents 
                                                     
17 Representative Democracy, p 6. 
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from a political decision can only be expected to accept that he is nevertheless party 
to self-government if he has a sense that he belongs to a political community that 
transcends the particular decision he disagrees with. Without this sense, he will view 
the government as an external imposition by those who happen to hold the levers of 
power. 
Such a sense of democratic self-government can only thrive where citizens adopt a 
particular attitude towards politics. Rather than setting out merely to maximise the 
satisfaction of their individual preferences, citizens must generally be willing to 
engage in discourse aimed at seeking mutual understanding and to attempt to reach 
solutions that are broadly acceptable to all. This means accepting obligations that are 
additional to those which pertain between persons in general, i.e. specifically civic 
obligations that attach to members of a democratic political community. 
In chapter four I argue that Ronald Dworkin has given an attractive account of civic 
obligations, portraying them as associative duties analogous to those that hold 
between family members, friends and colleagues. Dworkin rightly claims that a 
failure to treat individual citizens with equal concern and respect will tend to corrode 
the bonds of citizenship and thus undermine the democratic community, even if such 
unequal treatment is supported by the majority. Dworkin is wrong, however, to 
conclude from this that rights-based judicial review can pose no threat to democracy. 
Although constitutional rights can protect against the kinds of unequal treatment that 
may undermine a democratic community, such protection is not the only goal of a 
constitutional design. Dworkin focuses on a constitution’s concrete ‘outputs’, but 
neglects the role that constitutions play in constructing citizens’ self-understandings, 
i.e. the way they view the practice of democracy, their own role in it, and the nature 
of their relationships with other participants. Once we appreciate the deeper role that 
political institutions play, we cannot satisfy ourselves with examining only whether 
judicial review or legislative supremacy is likely to lead to decisions that better 
respect citizens’ rights. We also need to consider which institutional scheme is likely 
to be more effective at promoting a democratic civic ethos. 
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Habermas’ theory of democracy shows a heightened awareness of the way in which 
the relationship between citizens is shaped over time through the practice of politics. 
In chapter five I give a detailed and largely sympathetic overview of this theory. I 
think that Habermas is right to draw attention to the role that political deliberation 
plays in encouraging citizens to recognise one another as co-participants in the 
collective endeavour of self-government (a feature that is missing in Dworkin’s 
account). However, Habermas goes on to treat the question of judicial review as an 
essentially pragmatic issue. He thus fails to take into account the symbolic effect that 
institutional design can have on a political community. Institutions function as poles 
around which the various factors which link citizens together can crystallise. Their 
significance comes from shared understandings which are deeper than 
straightforward agreements over principles, and which cannot easily be altered. I 
argue that individuals come to view themselves as self-governing citizens partly 
through their relationship to the representative legislature. There is, I believe, a risk 
that judicially interpreted constitutional norms will symbolise a deliberate departure 
from the processes of self-government, in favour of side-constraints imposed by an 
epistemic elite. 
1.3.4 The Positive Conception of Constitution 
The final claim in my thesis is that, given the place that the judiciary hold in the 
popular imagination, placing the responsibility for policing the boundaries of the 
constitution into their hands will tend to have a detrimental knock-on effect on how 
citizens view the constitution: promoting what I call a ‘negative’ rather than a 
‘positive’ conception. The negative conception depicts the constitution as a set of 
limits to political power: a law superior to the machinery of government within which 
political power is to be exercised. The positive conception, on the other hand, presents 
the constitution as literally constitutive of political power. Power, on the positive 
account, is created by action, so that the constitution must encourage political action 
even as it sets out to channel political power. 
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In the sixth chapter of this thesis I argue that the way in which the negative conception 
of constitution depicts political power is, in the final analysis, unintelligible, since the 
very idea of political power entails its channelling through constitutional forms. In 
the absence of constitutional forms, there would be no political power to limit. The 
negative conception of constitution also presents democratic government as standing 
in conflict with constitutionalism, by depicting the constitution as a set of pre-political 
boundaries that constrain the popular will. If, on the other hand, we accept the 
positive view that a constitution is a means of generating political power, then we 
need not view constitutionalism as the imposition of restraints on a sovereign people. 
Properly conceived, constitutionalism does not limit democracy, it enables it. 
The conflict between the negative and the positive conceptions of constitution is 
important to the question of judicial review because there is, I argue, a symbolic link 
between judicial supremacy and the negative conception. Where the judiciary takes 
the primary responsibility for the determination of constitutional issues, the 
constitution will naturally come to be thought of as simply a species of law. Owing to 
the powerful place of law and the judiciary in the popular imagination, judicial 
rulings that action is unconstitutional will tend to be seen as delineating the 
boundaries in which the so-called ‘political branches’ of government must operate. 
So judicial review provides symbolic nourishment for the negative conception of 
constitution, and thus for a vision of constitutionalism that truncates the collective 
agency of the democratic people by placing it within bounds which are not 
themselves presented as products of the practice of democratic politics. Legislative 
supremacy, on the other hand, can allow the law, including the ‘constitutional 
essentials’,18 to be seen as the output of the political power of a self-governing people. 
 
  
                                                     
18 I take this phrase from Rawls, Political Liberalism, Lecture VI, §6. 
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2. Methodology: values, practices and institutions 
This thesis makes an argument against constitutional judicial review of legislation. It 
therefore has as its target a specific (not to say historico-geographically local) feature 
of constitutional design. It proceeds by developing an idealised account of modern 
political democracy; what we might call an ‘ideal theory’. Such an excursus into 
theory will strike some people as unnecessary. They may believe that Brown v Board 
of Education1 (or Lochner v New York2) speaks for itself. Or if they do not quite believe 
that, then they might believe that the answer is to be found by way of a careful 
examination of the empirical impact of judicial review of legislation measured against 
a set of objective indicators roughly agreed upon as indicia of democratic good 
health.3 Approaching the question of judicial review by outlining an idealised account 
of democracy may seem complicated, unnecessary, and unlikely to be particularly 
effective. If our interest is in the question whether, say, the UK should embrace a 
system of strong judicial review, then shouldn’t we look directly at what the likely 
consequences of introducing such a system into the UK would be, rather than aiming 
to tackle the question of whether we would find a place for judicial review in an 
idealised democratic society? 
In this chapter I shall mount a qualified defence of ideal theory against the sceptic’s 
claim that, when addressing questions of institutional design, such theory is surplus 
to requirements.4 The defence is qualified because it based upon of a specific view of 
what political ideals are, a view that sees political values as inhering in political 
practices. The practice account of political value claims that practices carry with them 
                                                     
1 Brown v Board of Education of Topeka (1954) 347 U.S. 483. 
2 Lochner v New York (1905) 198 U.S. 45. 
3 Examples include: The Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Democracy Index’ (www.eiu.com); 
NDI, ‘Democracy Indicators’ (www.ndi.org); University of Zurich, ‘Democracy Barometer’ 
(www.democracybarometer.org); Bertelsmann Stiftung, ‘Transformation Index’ (www.bti-
project.org); Stuart Wilks-Heeg et al, ‘Democracy Audit’ (www.democraticaudit.com); and 
Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World’ (freedomhouse.org). 
4 An archetypal example of this claim is provided by David Wiens, ‘Prescribing Institutions 
without Ideal Theory’ (2012) 20 Journal of Political Philosophy 45. 
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their own standards of appraisal, so that real-world institutions, and the practices 
they embed, are already impliedly committed to realising certain ideals. Rather than 
viewing institutions as means that we can fashion in order to achieve whatever ends 
we deem desirable, the practice conception recognises that institutions do not cause, 
but rather serve to constitute, valuable political practices. As such, they are themselves 
of certain noninstrumental value.  Since empirical studies cannot take account of such 
value, they cannot be complete guides to problems of institutional design. The 
question of judicial review, then, cannot be adequately answered without some 
account of political automony as an ideal. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the first section I set out the practice 
account of political values, developing the claim that practices are constitutive of 
values. The second section proposes that we can identify and elucidate the ideals 
implicit in our political practices by employing Ronald Dworkin’s methodology of 
‘constructive interpretation’. I give an overview of this method, enriching Dworkin’s 
account with insights from Charles Taylor, who has, in a somewhat different register, 
developed a similar approach. In the third section I argue that the relationship 
between practices and institutions is also a constitutive one, so that we cannot 
approach institutional design questions from a purely instrumentalist perspective. In 
section four I introduce the idea of ‘constitutional imaginaries’, which is the term I 
use to describe the shared understandings presupposed by modern political 
institutions. Constitutional imaginaries are necessary in order to make possible the 
practices that define modern democracy, since they shape the expectations that we 
have of political actors and carry a sense of how we fit together as citizens. I conclude 
by defending my ‘idealising’ methodology against various objections that charge 
ideal theory with being unsuited to application in the real world, because it is 
unrealistic, naïve and/or ideological. 
2.1 Political Practices as Constitutive of Political Values 
Implicit within our political practices are certain ideals. Without a grasp of these 
ideals, an observer of the practices would not be able to understand what was going 
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on. To take a straightforward example, take the practice of voting.5 A vote would be 
unintelligible without the understanding that each participant makes an independent 
decision. So for there to be a vote at all, there must be a distinction between an 
autonomous and forced choice. Implicit within the practice of voting, then, is a certain 
ideal of autonomy. 
Because the ideal of autonomy is implicit with the practice of voting, a vote will 
(under suitable conditions) serve the value of autonomy. Of course, I do not mean by 
this that a vote will cause the amount of autonomy in the world to increase. People 
do not become more autonomous the more votes they participate in. But producing a 
value – i.e. increasing the amount of that value that exists in the world – is only one 
way of serving a value. Another is honouring a value, i.e. acting in a way that 
exemplifies respect for it, whether or not this produces more of the value.6 Votes, 
when conducted properly, serve autonomy in this way; by holding a vote we honour 
the value of autonomy by conducting ourselves in a way that shows appropriate 
recognition of its significance. We might describe this as an ‘expressive’ value: voting 
expresses respect for the autonomy of citizens.7 
The expressive value of a practice is distinguishable from the straightforwardly 
instrumental value that may derive from its empirical consequences. For instance, the 
expressive value of voting is clearly distinct from whatever value it might have as a 
tool for reaching substantively good decisions. But one might be tempted, 
nevertheless, to describe the expressive value as instrumental in another sense (I shall 
call this the expressive-instrumental analysis).8 The distinction between producing 
                                                     
5 This example comes from Charles Taylor, ‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man’ (1971) 25 
Review of Metaphysics 3, at 25-6. 
6 On the distinction between producing and honouring values see Philip Pettit, 
‘Consequentialism and Respect for Persons’ (1989) 100 Ethics 116; and Ben Bradley, ‘Two 
Concepts of Intrinsic Value’ (2006) 9 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 111. 
7 This terminology is used, for instance, by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why 
Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p 21-3. 
8 This possibility is explored by Kahane in an interesting blog post which unfortunately 
appears not to have been developed into a full article: Guy Kahane, ‘Extrinsic Final Value or 
Expressive Value?’, Ethics etc, 8 August 2007. 
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and honouring values, one could argue, corresponds to a distinction between two 
types of value, which we might call ‘telic’ and ‘deontic’ values. Just as telic values are 
served by a practice that produces certain consequences, the argument goes, so 
deontic values are served by a practice that expresses the appropriate attitude of 
respect. In each case the value of the practice seems wholly derivative on the more 
fundamental value, be that value telic or deontic. The conclusion we might be 
tempted to draw is that the pertinent distinction between the two cases is the nature 
of the value being served, and not the status of the practice as a means to promoting 
that value. Just as voting instrumentally serves a telic value by producing good 
decisions (assuming that it does), so it instrumentally serves a deontic value by 
expressing respect for autonomy. 
I believe that we should resist this conclusion. Despite the apparent elegance of the 
picture that portrays honouring a deontic value as the mirror-image of producing a 
telic value, I believe that (at least so far as political values are concerned)9 there is a 
closer connection between practice and value than the expressive-instrumental 
analysis allows. The relationship between political practice and political value cannot 
adequately be described as instrumental, because we need political practices not just 
for the flourishing of political values, but for such values even to be intelligible. Just 
as one cannot understand a political practice without grasping the values implicit in 
it, so one cannot understand a political value without having a grasp of the practices 
in which it features. The relationship between political practice and political value is 
therefore mutually constitutive, not merely instrumental. 
This inextricable connection between value and practice derives from the fact that 
political ideals necessarily refer to action. The question whether a society is democratic 
(or just, egalitarian, free, etc.) cannot be answered purely by reference to some state 
of affairs or other set of brute facts. To view an entity as a political society, that is, as 
something to which normative political concepts potentially apply, we need to be able 
                                                     
9 Although I suspect that my arguments here have relevance for other domains of value as 
well, I restrict my discussion to political value. 
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to recognise it as containing agents whose actions are intelligible to us. It is our being 
able to interpret their behaviour as the actions of agents who are doing (or not doing) 
democracy, justice and so on, that explains why we can see that those concepts apply 
to them, and not, say, to a hive of bees who do not elect their queen, or to a weather 
system that distributes snow unequally across the country without the differences 
benefitting the least well off. 
As MacIntyre has shown,10 in order for us to understand an occurrence as an action, 
we need to be able to place it into a context within which we can make sense of it. 
There is no such thing as an action in vacuo. Furthermore, such a context must take 
the form of a historical narrative which stretches across time. There is no such thing 
as an action in scintilla temporis. MacIntyre gives us a couple of pointed examples. 
Imagine a professor in the middle of a lecture on Kant’s ethics suddenly breaking six 
eggs into a bowl, adding flour and milk, and stirring, while all the time continuing to 
explain the categorical imperative.11 His physical acts may be following a sequence 
laid down in a recipe book, but he is not performing an intelligible action. Or imagine 
a man you don’t know approaching you out of the blue and saying ‘The name of the 
common wild duck is Histrionicus histrionicus histrionicus.’12 Although the form of 
words are perfectly intelligible, you can’t understand what he is doing with his speech 
act unless you can place them it a historical context (perhaps he has mistaken you for 
someone who earlier asked him the Latin name of the common wild duck, or perhaps 
he has been told by his psychotherapist to try to initiate conversations with strangers 
by saying the first thing that comes into his head). Intelligible action must form part 
of a meaningful narrative. 
Political practices provide the historical narrative within which political action can be 
seen as meaningful and potentially valuable. Political values therefore cannot 
conceptually be detached from the practices through which they are realised. An 
                                                     
10 Alasdair C MacIntyre, After Virtue: a study in moral theory (3rd edn, London: Duckworth, 
2007), p 239-49. 
11 Ibid., p 242-3. 
12 Ibid., p 243-4. 
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attempt to detach value from practice would be an attempt to detach action from the 
context which gives it meaning, and this we cannot do. The idea of realising political 
autonomy without engaging in the practice of democracy is unintelligible: attempting 
to do so would be like attempting to score a try without playing rugby. 
For this reason, it is inappropriate to talk about political practices as instrumentally 
related to political values, even in the nuanced terms of the expressive-instrumental 
analysis. Political practices are not means to realise political values. Instead, practice 
and value, like rugby and tries, are conceptually indissociable. Political practices are 
constitutive of value. 
To use Korsgaard’s influential terminology, political practices are of final value: they 
are of value for their own sake, and not as means to realise something else.13 This 
should not be confused with the claim that practices are of intrinsic value, i.e. that a 
practice has value ‘in itself’, by virtue of its intrinsic properties. There are two separate 
distinctions in play here. While the opposite of final value is instrumental value, the 
opposite of intrinsic value is extrinsic value, i.e. the value that a thing gets from a 
source outside its own intrinsic properties. Things can be of extrinsic, but nevertheless 
final, value. Kagan gives a couple of straightforward and useful examples. The pen 
that Abraham Lincoln used to sign the Emancipation Proclamation is, as a historical 
artefact, of final (i.e. noninstrumental) value, not by virtue of any of its intrinsic 
properties, but by virtue of its relationship with a momentous historical event.14 A 
rare stamp is of final value by virtue of its rarity, but rarity is not an intrinsic property 
of the stamp.15 Furthermore, the extrinsic properties that give something final value 
may include that thing’s very instrumentality: Korsgaard points out that a cook’s 
                                                     
13 Christine M Korsgaard, ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’ (1983) XCII The Philosophical 
Review 169. 
14 Shelly Kagan, ‘Rethinking Intrinsic Value’ (1998) 2 Journal of Ethics 277, at 285 
15 Shelly Kagan, ‘The Limits of Well-being’, in Ellen Frankel Paul et al (eds), The Good Life and 
the Human Good (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p 184. 
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gorgeously enamelled frying pan may have a noninstrumental value that derives in 
part from the fact that she uses it for cooking.16 
The value of the practice of democracy is final but extrinsic. It is final because the 
value of political autonomy cannot be conceptually detached from the practice of 
democracy and therefore cannot stand as an end to which the practice could serve as 
a means. It is extrinsic because its value does not derive from any intrinsic property 
of the practice, but instead lies in the role that the practice plays in citizens’ lives. 
There is no value in ‘going through the motions’ of democracy: in order to be valuable 
those motions must link up with citizens’ own self-understandings; they must, as 
Williams puts it, ‘make sense’ to the citizens.17 In fact, like Korsgaard’s frying pan, the 
final value of democracy is conditioned on its own instrumentality: if we were not 
able to use democratic processes to make important decisions competently, they 
would not have the same expressive significance.18 But we should not thereby be 
tempted into supposing that we can reduce the value of democratic practices into 
instrumental terms. Political practices constitute political values, they do not cause 
such values to be. Implicit within our practice of democracy lies a certain complex 
ideal that is so indissociably linked with the practice that an understanding of the 
ideal requires no more and no less than an understanding of the practice itself. 
2.2 Working from the Inside: constructive interpretation of political practices 
How, then, do we go about identifying and elucidating the ideals that are implicit in 
political practices? I suggest that we should engage in the process that Dworkin has 
labelled constructive interpretation,19 which requires us to adopt what Dworkin calls 
the ‘interpretive attitude’. This attitude has two components. Firstly, someone who 
holds the interpretive attitude towards a practice believes that the practice does not 
                                                     
16 ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’, p 185. 
17 Bernard Williams, ‘Realism and Moralism in Political Theory’, in In the Beginning was the 
Deed: realism and moralism in political argument (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p 
10. 
18 This point is noted by Gutmann and Thompson, see Why Deliberative Democracy?, p 22. I 
discuss this aspect of democracy’s value further at p 158 below.  
19 See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (London: Fontana, 1986), chap 2. 
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simply exist as a matter of descriptive fact, but that it ‘serves some interest or purpose 
or enforces some principle’, that is to say, it has a certain value.20 Secondly, she will 
view the true requirements of the practice as not purely a matter of convention, but 
rather as sensitive to the practice’s point, so that what the practice truly requires is 
not necessarily what the practice has historically been taken to require. The 
interpretive attitude, I would suggest, is inescapable once we recognise that practice 
and value are conceptually indissociable. As Dworkin puts it: ‘Value and content 
have become entangled.’21 
Dworkin draws an analogy between interpretation of a social practice and 
interpretation of art and literature: in each case interpreters aim to construct an 
account of something that has been created by a person or persons but that exists as 
an independent entity separate from its creator(s). Constructive interpretation, be it 
of a social practice or of a piece of art, involves ‘imposing purpose on an object or 
practice in order to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which 
it is taken to belong’.22 Note that an interpretation does not simply deduce but proposes 
value for a practice. Just as a set of scientific data will always be compatible with more 
than one explanation, so the brute facts about people’s behaviour will be consistent 
with more than one interpretation of the value implicit in a practice. There is no value-
neutral mechanism for determining between competing interpretations: our choice 
must reflect our view of which interpretation proposes the most value for the practice, 
i.e. which portrays the practice in its ‘best light’.23 It follows, of course, that 
interpretation is a controversial activity: different persons’ interpretations will 
conflict, and thus stand in competition with one another. 
Dworkin provides a useful three-stage heuristic for thinking about what 
interpretation of a practice involves.24 In the first, ‘preinterpretive’ stage, we identify 
                                                     
20 Ibid., p 47. 
21 Ibid., p 48 
22 Ibid., p 52. 
23 Ibid., p 47. 
24 Ibid., p 65-6. 
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the rules and standards that we take, provisionally, to provide the content of the 
practice. We then move to the ‘interpretive’ stage, at which we settle on some general 
justification for the main elements of the practice, i.e. an account of what value the 
practice realises and how it does so. Finally comes the ‘postinterpretive’ stage, in 
which we adjust our sense of what the practice ‘really’ requires so as better to serve 
the value that we have identified. Dworkin’s schema is helpful so long as we do not 
mistake it for a concrete procedure that we must always self-consciously follow, or 
(worse) an algorithm for success. The three ‘stages’ of interpretation are not 
analytically discrete. Dworkin makes it clear that even at the preinterpretive stage, a 
degree of interpretation is necessary in order to identify the object of the 
interpretation.25 Furthermore, the progression through the three stages is not linear: 
at any point the interpreter could find, for example, that there is no way of reconciling 
any general justification with the practice he is interpreting, and so be forced to return 
to the preinterpretive stage to see if some different initial selection would be more 
fruitful. The different stages of interpretation do not so much flow in chronological 
progression as sit in a kind of reflective equilibrium. Nevertheless, the three stages – 
identifying and individuating a practice, deriving an account of its value, and making 
proposals for reform – correspond to tasks which a sound interpretation must 
complete. 
How do we decide which interpretation of a practice is the most attractive? What does 
it mean for an interpretation to portray a practice in its ‘best light’? If I am right that 
political values are constituted by political practices, then we cannot hope to stand 
outside of our practices in order to judge putative interpretations from an 
archimedean perspective. Rather, we can only assess interpretations from a viewpoint 
                                                     
25 Hart, in his postscript to The Concept of Law, misunderstood this aspect of Dworkin’s 
methodology. Hart argued that the identification of rules and standards at the preinterpretive 
stage presupposes the existence of a fact-based test for law (HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd 
edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p 266). However, Dworkin does not, as Hart 
describes, take ‘preinterpretive’ law as ‘settled’, and interpret it as if it were somehow 
axiomatic. Constructive interpretation is only complete if the subject-matter chosen in the 
preinterpretive stage turns out, in light of the work at the interpretive and postinterpretive 
stages, to be a set of true paradigm instances of the practice. 
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that is internal to the practices themselves; there is no higher court to appeal to. The 
test of an interpretation is accordingly whether it is able to formulate more explicitly 
what it is that we are already doing, by capturing the significance of those aspects of 
activity and norms of behaviour that are most central to the practice. This is not to say 
that the role of interpretation is simply to tell us what we already know. Indeed, a 
theory may provide a perspicuous account of a practice while challenging the views 
of those engaging in it, perhaps by highlighting an aspect of the world that had 
previously gone unnoticed. Dworkin’s interpretation of law, for example, claims that 
our existing legal practice presupposes the central importance of the value of 
integrity, even though such a value has not been explicitly recognised by legal actors. 
Imputing a concern for integrity to legal actors helps explain their behaviour in an 
attractive way, and thus renders the practice of law more perspicuous.26 
What we are seeking in constructive interpretation is an account of the practice that 
can present people’s behaviour as intelligible by reference to a schema of values that 
we consider broadly attractive. This will to a great extent be a quest for coherence. A 
perspicuous account of a practice will render it coherent with our empirical beliefs 
about cause and effect and about human psychology, with our various considered 
value commitments, and with other practices in which we are also engaged. This is 
not to say that such harmony will always be attainable, but simply that coherence is 
something for which we always have reason to strive. (The importance of coherence 
resonates with our experience of social criticism, so much of which proceeds by 
pointing to supposed contradictions embedded in current practice – the most famous 
example being Marx’s critique of capitalism.27) 
                                                     
26 Dworkin draws an analogy to the discovery of the planet Neptune: ‘Astronomers 
postulated Neptune before they discovered it. They knew that only another planet, whose 
orbit lay beyond those already recognized, could explain the behaviour of the nearer planets. 
Our instincts about internal compromise suggest another political ideal standing behind 
justice and fairness. Integrity is our Neptune.’ (Law’s Empire, p 183). 
27 See Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
1987), p 35-8, for discussion of the employment of internal critique of bourgeois capitalism by 
the Italian Marxists Silone and Gramsci. Walzer emphasises the supposed contradiction 
within the ideology of capitalism, but note that Marx adopted a forceful version of the practice-
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Since an interpretation of a practice will usually recommend changes to the way in 
which the practice is carried out, the process of elucidating a practice is indissociable 
from the process of its appraisal. This connection between the explanatory and the 
normative has been neatly expressed by Taylor: ‘What makes a theory right is that it 
brings practice out in the clear; that its adoption makes possible what is in some sense 
a more effective practice.’28 Like a map, the test of a theory is how well we can use it 
to get around: whether it renders our action less ‘haphazard and contradictory’, and 
more ‘clairvoyant’.29 If a new interpretation gains widespread acceptance, then the 
practice itself is likely to alter, since people will approach the practice somewhat 
differently if they become convinced of the challenging theory. Successful 
interpretation is therefore capable of giving rise to a virtuous circle, in which 
interpretive insight and improvements to the practice feed off one another. As 
Dworkin puts it: ‘Interpretation folds back into the practice, altering its shape, and 
the new shape encourages further reinterpretation, so the practice changes 
dramatically, though each step in the progress is interpretive of what the last 
achieved.’30 
In undertaking constructive interpretation of our political practices, we will likely 
reach the view that, ideally interpreted, the standards that they impose upon 
participants demand significant improvements on the current status quo. There is, for 
instance, no reason why we should expect that modern-day society produces citizens 
who enjoy the kind of autonomy that the practice of voting tacitly endorses. In chapter 
six I set out an account of the virtues of the ideal legislature which requires much 
more than real-world legislatures provide. I am justified in doing so, I believe, 
because the virtues of such a legislature are implicit within our current practice of 
representative democracy. The ideal is a normative one, applicable to representative 
                                                     
based theory which I am advocating here: Marx’s claim was that the contradictions were 
inherent in capitalism itself, and not (just) in bourgeois morality. 
28 Charles Taylor, Social Theory as Practice (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983), p 104. 
29 Ibid., p 111. 
30 Law’s Empire, p 48. 
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democracies in the here-and-now, because it embodies standards which real-world 
legislatures are already impliedly committed to meeting. 
It might be objected that this account of constructive interpretation relies upon an 
unfeasible essentialism about practices, according to which practices have purposes 
of their own, distinct from the purposes of any of the participants in the practices, 
existing in an abstract realm like that of the platonic forms.31 The objection is half-
right: practices do have purposes of their own, distinguishable from the subjective 
purposes of those who participate in them. However, these purposes are not entirely 
detached from the participants, and they certainly do not exist in any strange platonic 
realm. The essentialist objection wrongly assumes that we are faced with a choice 
between viewing the purposes of practices as either entirely detached from the 
participants, or else a purely subjective matter about which there can be no right or 
wrong answer but only different individual opinions. But this is a false dichotomy, 
since practices have an existence which is irreducibly intersubjective. 
I argued above that political practices provide the historical narrative within which 
political action can be seen as meaningful and potentially valuable. Political practices 
form the context that allows political actions to be the kind of actions that they are. 
Practices therefore provide what Taylor has called a ‘background of meaning’, 
without which nothing could count as democratic, just, liberal and so on.32 A 
background of meaning cannot be located in individuals; like language, it can only 
exist by way of continuing interaction between members of a community. Individual 
views about the nature and value of political practices presuppose the existence of a 
shared background against which those views make sense as an interpretation of 
something. Acknowledging the necessity of a background of meaning means accepting 
an intersubjective social ontology which requires neither a reducibility to individual 
preferences or beliefs nor any mysterious collective consciousness or timeless abstract 
                                                     
31 See, for example, George Pavlakos, Our Knowledge of the Law: objectivity and practice in legal 
theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), chap 6. 
32 Charles Taylor, ‘Irreducibly Social Goods’, in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), p 132. 
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form. A practice, like a language, is something that is irreducibly shared. To 
summarise, I cannot do better than to quote Taylor: 
‘The meanings and norms implicit in these practices are not just in the minds 
of the actors but are out there in the practices themselves, practices which 
cannot be conceived as a set of individual actions, but which are essentially 
modes of social relation, of mutual action… Hence they are not subjective 
meanings, the property of one or some individuals, but rather intersubjective 
meanings, which are constitutive of the social matrix in which individuals find 
themselves and act.’33 
Constructive interpretation is a matter of bringing these meanings out into the open, 
so as to enable the values that they embody to be identified and pursued more 
effectively. 
2.3 The Interrelationship of Values, Practices and Institutions  
I have been arguing that there are certain ideals implicit within political practices, 
such that a proper understanding of these practices requires a grasp of such ideals. 
We elucidate these through a process of constructive interpretation that seeks to bring 
a descriptive explanation of political activity and a normative account of political 
value into equilibrium. This thesis is not, however, an attempt at a complete 
interpretation of the practice of modern political democracy. Instead it concerns a 
particular institutional question of perhaps quite localised interest. Thus far I have 
not said anything specifically about political institutions. I need to explain the 
relevance of the practice account of political value for institutional questions such as 
the question of judicial review. 
Political institutions are, of course, of great instrumental significance. Our 
institutional design will help to determine who wields political power, whose 
interests power-wielders take into consideration and whose interests will be 
sidelined. It will have an impact on the quality, quantity and type of information that 
political decision-makers possess and to the resources available to enable them to 
process such information. It will affect the ability of the political system to respond to 
                                                     
33 ‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man’, at 27. 
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social, environmental and technological changes, and to develop strategies to counter 
new internal and external threats. As a result of all of this and more, institutional 
design has a huge impact on the quality of political decisions. I do not intend to 
downplay any of this. However, if political practices are noninstrumentally valuable, 
then we must also view political institutions in a similar light. If political practices 
provide a context that enables us to make sense of the political world, then political 
institutions form an indispensable part of that context. In fact, just as political 
practices are constitutive of political values, so political institutions are constitutive 
of political practices. It follows that democratic political institutions possess a certain 
final, non-instrumental value of their own. So the question of whether judicial review 
is detrimental to democracy cannot be addressed by considering only its empirical 
impact, that is, whether courts or parliaments are most likely to reach decisions that 
we consider desirable. We also need to consider whether, and if so how, systems of 
legislative and judicial supremacy might embody somewhat different practices, and 
thus represent different normative conceptions of democracy. One might express 
more fully a value that the other obscures. 
I said at the outset of this chapter that participation in practices can be a way of 
honouring values, and gave the example of holding a vote as a way of honouring the 
value of autonomy. This example is an incredibly simplified one, since it is deprived 
of context and therefore nuance. Not all votes honour the value of autonomy. A vote 
which a group of prisoners are forced to conduct in order to choose the means of their 
collective execution does not honour the value of autonomy, nor does a vote by five 
white supremacists and a black man as to who has to drop out of the lifeboat. The 
contexts in which these votes take place deprive them of the value internal to voting 
in general (such is the close link between practice and value that we might say that 
they are not really votes at all). So the noninstrumental value of a (particular 
instantiation of) a practice depends upon the context in which it operates. 
In the case of the distinctively political values, institutions form an indispensable part 
of this context. A general election has a specific meaning, as a particular type of vote 
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in a modern political democracy, by virtue of its connection with a representative 
legislature.  It is the symbolic status of an elected legislature, rather than, say, the 
empirical impact of or numbers of participants in the vote, that explains the cardinal 
significance of elections to the practice of democracy. A vote of the executive board 
of a central bank may have greater empirical impact, and more people might 
participate in a vote to decide who wins a television talent contest, but neither of these 
are comparable to a general election in terms of their democratic significance. (The 
latter kind of vote, of course, does not really have anything to do with democracy at 
all, but even this is a matter of interpreting shared understandings, not identifying 
empirical consequences.) Free and fair elections function so as to symbolically affirm 
the ideas of equality, autonomy and respect for citizen capacity because of the 
position that an elected legislature holds in the popular imagination.34 
This symbolic role of political institutions has in recent decades been emphasised by 
political scientists dissatisfied with the behaviouralist paradigm within which the 
discipline operated for much of the twentieth century. Much attention has been paid 
to the way in which political decision-making processes are not merely outcome-
driven procedures but also function as what have been dubbed ‘symbolic rituals’.35 
For example, in a study of the budgeting process in a Norwegian local authority, 
Olsen found the process characterised by a general lack of decision-alternatives, with 
debates in the council chamber very seldom affecting the budget proposal.36 Many 
statements were not directed straight at the choice at hand, but rather gave general 
indications as to longer-term aspirations; and, counter-intuitively, Olsen found that 
there was a negative correlation between the amount of money involved in an issue 
                                                     
34 For a discussion of the symbolic significance of voting in legislative elections see Adam 
Winkler, ‘Expressive Voting’ (1993) 68 New York University Law Review 330, at 363-78. 
35 The classic texts here are Murray J Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (2nd edn, Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1985); and James G March and Johan P Olsen, Rediscovering 
Institutions: the organizational basis of politics (New York: Free Press, 1989). For a more recent 
example see Josef Hrdlička, ‘Symbols of Consent’, in Rudolf Schlögl (ed.), Urban Elections and 
Decision-Making in Early Modern Europe (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2009). 
36 Johan P Olsen, ‘Local Budgeting, Decision-Making or Ritual Act?’ (1970) 5 Scandinavian 
Political Studies 85. 
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and the time devoted to discussing it. Nevertheless, participants and the public alike 
emphasised the importance of the budgeting process, with participants describing 
their own role as that of rational decision-makers. Olsen concluded that the 
significance of the budgeting procedure to the participants and to the onlooking 
public could only be understood by viewing it as a kind of ritual which served to give 
expressive support for the values of democracy, fairness and rationality. This and 
other similar findings37 led March and Olsen to conclude that: ‘Plans, information 
gathering, analysis, consultation, and other observable features of normatively 
approved decision-making are explicable less in terms of their contribution to 
decision outcomes than as symbols and signals of decision-making propriety.’38 We 
can add to this that it is the fact that these decision-making processes take place within 
institutions that enjoy symbolic prestige that allows them to function as such strong 
‘symbols and signals’. Debates outside Olsen’s council chamber may well have had 
much greater impact on the final budget, but what went on inside the chamber had 
much more potent symbolic meaning. And if this is true of local authorities, then it is 
surely true a fortiori of national parliaments and supreme courts. 
The noninstrumental aspect of political institutions is thus similar to the more general 
noninstrumental aspect of political practices that I identified above: institutions form 
part of the context within which political action can be seen as meaningful and 
potentially valuable. Again this relationship is constitutive rather than causal: 
although we might say that a vote is democratic because it appoints a representative 
legislature, the legislature does not cause the vote to be democratic. Rather, we need 
the concept of a representative legislature in order to make sense of the idea of a 
general election at all. Institutions, then, are constitutive building blocks of political 
                                                     
37 For example, Christopher B Keys and Jean M Bartunek, ‘Organization Development in 
Schools: goal agreement, process skills and diffusion of change’ (1979) 15 The Journal of 
Applied Behavioral Science 61; and Leslie L Roos and Roger I Hall, ‘Influence Diagrams and 
Organizational Power’ (1980) 25 Administrative Science Quarterly 57. 
38 March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, p 49. 
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practice. Since political practices are of final value, political institutions thus enjoy a 
certain final, noninstrumental value of their own. 
Our shared understandings about political institutions have profound effects upon 
the behaviour of political actors. Political institutions are not just simply sets of 
procedures and rules, but also carry with them sets of roles (speaker of the House, 
committee chair, loyal civil servant, High Court judge…) based on shared 
assumptions on what is ‘proper’ behaviour for occupants of those roles. Participants 
internalise these assumptions and thus come to act according to what March and 
Olsen have called a ‘logic of appropriateness’.39 Rather than treating difficult 
decisions as rational choice problems (the behaviouralist paradigm that March and 
Olsen label the ‘logic of consequentiality’), political officials typically try to clarify the 
rules that apply to them in order to find an interpretation of their role that ‘fits’ their 
predicament.40 Rather than asking themselves ‘how do I best achieve my goals’, the 
question posed is often ‘what is the proper behaviour for a civil servant/committee 
member/judge/etc. in these circumstances?’. The logic of appropriateness has a 
widespread impact, since a politically knowledgeable citizen comes to be seen as one 
who is familiar with the various roles of appropriate behaviour and the moral and 
intellectual virtues attached to them, and who can justify the division of roles by 
reference to the requirements of the political order as a whole (think of the law 
student who can give a neat normative account of the separation of powers). Society 
is thus permeated with a sense of what it means to be an MP, a minister, a judge, and 
so on, which, as well as reinforcing participants’ own internalisation of those roles, 
has a huge impact on the way in which the public reacts to their behaviour (think of 
MPs’ expenses). To put it crudely, people have a generally shared sense of what 
                                                     
39 James G March and Johan P Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: the organizational basis of politics 
(New York: Free Press, 1989), chap 9; Democratic Governance (New York: Free Press, 1995), chap 
2. 
40 Rediscovering Institutions, p 161. 
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Parliament, the courts and so on are for, and this sense affects both how political 
officials behave and what the public expects from them.41 
Our institutions, our practices and our values therefore stand in a relationship of 
interdependence. A change in one may unintentionally have a profound effect on the 
others. Institutional design is accordingly characterised by what Dryzek has called an 
‘informal logic’, with ‘no simple and unidirectional causality’.42 When a common-
sense view is upset by a newly-accepted ideal, this will frequently mean that the way 
an institution works itself alters: people will treat the institution very differently if 
they become convinced of the challenging theory. And vice versa: interventions in 
institutional systems may affect practices so as to alter the way people perceive the 
values that the systems set out to pursue. For example, Polanyi has claimed that the 
profit motive did not play an important part in human economy prior to the creation 
of capitalist institutions in the early modern period.43  Polanyi argues that the growth 
of the institutions of a market economy transformed the way in which people 
perceived the motive of profit-maximisation, turning the sin of avarice into the virtue 
of prudence. Regardless of the merits of Polanyi’s particular account of economic 
history, it is not implausible that evolution of market institutions was not entirely 
driven by the needs of practice, but had at least an effect in shaping the practice itself. 
To take a more topical example, the introduction of student tuition fees has perhaps 
caused a change in the way students perceive the value of education, with an 
                                                     
41 Here ‘expect’ carries a normative, not merely descriptive sense. It might be common, for 
example, for members of the public to say that they do not expect MPs to behave honestly. 
Here ‘expect’ is used descriptively. The fact that this is taken as such a biting criticism of 
politicians shows that members of the public do normatively expect honesty from their MPs. 
42 John S Dryzek, ‘The Informal Logic of Institutional Design’, in Robert E Goodin (ed.), The 
Theory of Institutional Design (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p 104. Dryzek is 
particularly concerned with the relationship between institutions and ‘discourses’, where a 
‘discourse’ is defined as ‘a framework for apprehending the world embedded in language’ 
(ibid., p 103). While a discourse is not the same as a practice, practices rely on discourses, and 
the interrelationship between institution and discourse can thus be seen as an aspect of the 
interrelationship between institution and practice. 
43 Karl Polanyi, Origins of Our Time: the great transformation (UK edn, London: Victor Gollancz, 
1945), particularly chaps IV-V. As he pithily puts it, economists have a tendency to look ‘at the 
last ten thousand years… as a mere prelude to the true history of our civilization which started 
approximately with the publication of The Wealth of Nations in 1776’ (ibid., p 45). 
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increasing emphasis on economic benefits and a corresponding diminution of ideas 
of intellectual self-improvement.44 
Those concerned with proposals for institutional reform cannot, then, view political 
institutions simply as means that we can fashion so as to target whatever ends we 
deem desirable. They need also to be awake to the symbolic significance of 
institutions: the role that they play in the popular imagination. Institutional logics of 
appropriateness will constrain the extent to which institutions may be radically 
transformed, since role-identities are likely to be resilient to change, at least in the 
short term. And if we accept the practice conception of political value, then we will 
not measure the success or failure of institutional design purely in terms of empirical 
outcomes, but will play close attention to the expressive function of institutional 
‘ritual’ and to the identities and relationships that institutions help construct. We 
should look to craft our institutions so as to reinforce what we take to be the values 
inherent in our practices, so as to render our practice more clairvoyant and our values 
more coherent and complete. Ideal theory therefore has a crucial, direct role in the 
theory of institutional design. 
2.4 Constitutional Imaginaries 
The symbolic aspects of political institutions, then, are critical to any attempt to 
understand democracy. Our institutions are constitutive of a political ‘lifeworld’ 
based on shared values and expectations, what we might call a certain shared self-
image. In this respect, our political institutions are tied to a kind of ‘myth’,45 or, as I 
have put it so far, to ‘shared understandings’ that lie in the ‘popular imagination’. 
As part of an extensive research project into the nature of modernity, Taylor has 
identified what he calls ‘the social imaginary’, which he defines thusly: 
                                                     
44 See, for example, H Rolphe, ‘The Effect of Tuition Fees on Student Demands and 
Expectations’, National Institute of Economic and Social Research Discussion Paper Number 
190 <http://niesr.ac.uk/publications/effect-tuition-fees-students%C3%B5-demands-and-
expectations-evidence-case-studies-four>. 
45 See, for example, Martin Loughlin, Sword and Scales: an examination of the relationship 
between law and politics (Oxford: Hart, 2000), chap 2. 
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‘By social imaginary, I mean something much broader and deeper than the 
intellectual schemes people may entertain when they think about social reality 
in a disengaged mode. I am thinking, rather, of the ways people imagine their 
social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between 
them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper 
normative notions and images that underlie these expectations.’46 
The ‘myths’ on which political institutions are based, their place in the ‘popular 
imagination’, might be thought of as part of the modern social imaginary. In order to 
acknowledge this link, I shall describe the general, value-laden ideas that political 
institutions embody as ‘constitutional imaginaries’. 
Constitutional imaginaries should be distinguished from constitutional theories; they 
are broader, more inchoate and more implicit. They are not readily susceptible to 
analytical definition, rather, in Taylor’s words, they are ‘carried in images, stories, 
and legends’.47 While theories might be the possession of a small intellectual elite, 
constitutional imaginaries are widely shared across society as a whole. And while 
theories look to explain and/or to justify, constitutional imaginaries have a more 
primitive role: they are necessary in order to make possible the practices that define 
modern politics. They shape the expectations that we have of political actors, and of 
each other, and carry a sense of how we all fit together as citizens engaged in a 
common practice. They thus allow us to orient ourselves, both factually and 
normatively, in relation to the political world.48 They also pick out certain aspects of 
our practices as being of particular significance, that is, of carrying a certain symbolic 
import. 
Some constitutional imaginaries are particularly fundamental, central to our whole 
way of thinking about politics, and thus particularly difficult to consider dispensing. 
An example, for modern democracies, is the idea of citizenship: a relationship of 
                                                     
46 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), p 23. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Taylor describes the relationship of imaginary to theory as analogous to the relationship 
between a sense of orientation in a familiar environment and a map of the same area. The 
map provides an explicit overview and a particular structured way of viewing the area 
which it covers, but one can find one’s way around, in a much more implicit and intuitive 
way, without ever having looked at it. (Ibid., p 26.) 
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equality (in a particular sense) pertaining between members of a political community. 
Another is the idea of what might be called the public/private divide: the sense that 
there exists a protected area of life (albeit with contestable boundaries) that ought to 
be free from political interference. A third is representation: the idea that the acts of 
certain officials or bodies can stand as the acts of the political community as a whole, 
without the citizens being thereby straightforwardly dominated by those officials or 
bodies. 
Other imaginaries are less fundamental to our thought about politics in general, but 
instead are more closely tied to particular institutional designs, so that we can without 
too much difficulty think about what politics might look like without them. Here an 
example is the separation of powers into the legislative, the executive and the judicial. 
It is not too difficult for us to consider what politics might be like without such a 
divide. It is not just that we can find examples of such politics without travelling too 
far, either across the globe or backwards in time. It is that, when we find such 
examples, we find them aberrant but not unintelligible; we do not have the same 
puzzlement when faced with them as we do when we are told, say, that the ancient 
Athenians lacked a distinction between one’s public and one’s private affairs.49 
Nevertheless, it is important not to underplay the significance of the separation of 
powers as a constitutional imaginary. For although we might not struggle to imagine 
the separation being ignored, it is much more difficult for us to conceive how powers 
could be delineated other than into our three familiar categories. To put it another 
way, we can imagine the functions of the legislature, executive and judiciary being 
agglomerated, with all-powerful institution carrying out all three. But we would want 
to say, of such a constitutional system, that the powers of law-making, law-
application and adjudication had been conflated. We understand the deficiencies of 
such a system by employing the concepts with which we are familiar, even if they are 
                                                     
49 I put this crudely, of course. The Athenians did possess a concept of the household (oikos) 
as a locus of privacy. But they lacked the concept of ‘civil society’, i.e. of a private life outside 
the household. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (2nd edn, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999), chap 2. 
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denied by the system itself. We would struggle, on the other hand, to imagine a 
system in which the tripartite distinction was rendered otiose, not merely as a result 
of the different powers being confounded, but as the result of a system separating 
functions according to a different conceptual scheme. This highlights the status of the 
separation of powers as a constitutional imaginary. It would require exceptional 
powers of creative thought to dream up a constitutional scheme in which the 
legislative, the executive and the judicial powers ceased to be useful categories. In this 
respect the tripartite distinction seems almost natural to us. But of course it is not 
natural, it is a construction which we have built up over the centuries, and one which 
we have no reason to suppose that a complex society must inevitably build. 
The idea of the separation of powers provides the clearest example of a constitutional 
imaginary being linked to a particular set of institutions. The imaginary and the 
institutions are completely interdependent: we cannot understand what a legislature 
is unless we know what legislation is; but then our understanding of what legislation 
is comes from our experiences of legislatures. And mutatis mutandis for executives and 
courts. 
Central to the tripartite division is, of course, the concept of law: legislation is the 
creation of law, administration is the application of law, adjudication is the determination 
of the law. In this respect, our concept of law can be said to be institutional;50 the way 
we think about law is inherently bound up with the legal institutions with which we 
are familiar. And similarly with the concept of politics. Politics is that activity which 
goes on, and which ought to go on, in political institutions.51 And we do not 
understand political institutions unless we have a grasp of what it means for them to 
be political. This is not a vicious circle; it merely points to the fact that we already 
share, at the level of constitutional imaginary, an idea of what politics is, and that this 
idea cannot be detached from the particular institutions that embody it. 
                                                     
50 In apparent contrast to the ancient conception of law; see Sword and Scales, chap 5. 
51 Which is not to say that politics only goes on in political institutions. 
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Democratic institutions, then, are valuable as much for what they symbolise as for 
what they empirically achieve. Note, finally, talk of symbolism should not be 
mistaken for reference to a mere appearance of value. Respect for the status of citizens 
as equal moral agents is conveyed through structures and acts which can only carry 
the significance that they do because they are widely recognised as doing so. For 
example, one-person-one-vote is a procedure which conveys a deep respect for 
citizens’ equality only because of the symbolic significance of equal voting rights in 
our society. The value’s dependence on symbolic factors in no way diminishes its 
fecundity. 
2.5 Some Real-World Worries 
Governments in contemporary liberal democratic societies face competing demands 
on their resources, time and epistemic capacities. Even the most affluent countries 
face difficulties in alleviating poverty, eradicating illiteracy, reducing unemployment, 
preventing crime, providing medical and old-age care and ensuring security against 
external threats. We cannot expect that all of the legitimate concerns raised by citizens 
be completely resolved in the short-term, or even at all. What use, then, is a 
methodology that seeks an idealised account of our political practices? Shouldn’t we 
focus our attention on the pressing problems in the real world? 
One concern about idealisations is that they necessarily invoke a number of 
deliberately unrealistic assumptions in order to simplify the problems under 
consideration so that they might be dealt with by a relatively straightforward set of 
principles.52 These principles might be philosophically neat but, one might argue, 
they do not apply to the real world, in which the problems we face are far from simple. 
Since our diverse problems are interrelated, we cannot safely bracket away social 
complexity. 
                                                     
52 See, for example, C Farrelly, ‘Civic Liberalism and the “Dialogical Model” of Judicial 
Review’ (2006) 25 Law and Philosophy 489. 
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The first thing to say in response to this objection is to concede that ideal theory 
cannot solve all our problems on its own. But why should we expect it to? Certainly, 
when faced with a practical problem, it is rare that we are able to resolve it simply by 
invoking some ideal principle or value. All principles require judgment in their 
application, as even such an idealist as Kant acknowledged.53 But as Erman and 
Möller have pointed out, the difficulty here is not simply caused by the ‘idealness’ of 
the principle, but rather concerns the very nature of principles: all principles, even 
principles crafted to deal specifically with non-ideal scenarios, require judgment in their 
application.54 And the same can be said about virtue-based theory: to say that an agent 
should display the virtue of justice, or civility, or even pragmatism, is to announce 
the starting-point, not the end-point, of practical deliberation. There is a limit to the 
amount of ‘action-guidingness’ we can demand from a theory, since ultimately we 
need to recognise that political theory and practical political decision-making are two 
distinct enterprises. 
Nevertheless, there is a legitimate concern that the particular kinds of principles 
yielded by ideal theory are problematic by virtue of their disconnect from real 
political contexts. There comes a point of abstraction at which even a faultlessly 
correct principle ceases to be of any practical assistance whatsoever (‘always do the 
right thing’ would be an extreme example). Yet the approach to political philosophy 
that I have outlined in this chapter should put pay to fears that I am advocating such 
a hollow formalism. I have argued that the aim of a political theory is to bring the 
presuppositions of our practices out into the open, to formulate more perspicuously 
what it is we are already doing. As we do this, I have claimed, we will unearth certain 
ideals which may make demands far beyond what our current society is able to 
                                                     
53 ‘To be sure, these laws require, furthermore, a power of judgment sharpened by experience, 
partly in order to distinguish in what cases they are applicable, and partly to gain for them 
access to the human will as well as influence for putting them into practice.’ (Immanuel Kant, 
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (JW Ellington tr, 3rd edn, Indianapolis: Hackett, 2010), 
Preface). 
54 Eva Erman and Niklas Möller, ‘Three Failed Charges Against Ideal Theory’ (2013) 39 Social 
Theory and Practice 19, at 28. 
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provide, perhaps even beyond that which might feasibly be achieved in the future. 
But since the purpose of our activity is to render our present practice more 
clairvoyant, it would be too easy a victory to come out with generic, contentless 
platitudes. The goal should be to find ideals which, when confronted with them, 
participants in practices might say: ‘I hadn’t thought of it quite like that, but yes, that 
does explain what I have been doing’. They therefore need to find real traction in our 
form of life; we need to be able to recognise them as ideals for us. 
We should remember, as well, that if we hypothesise an idealised society we do not 
do so because we believe that such a society could somehow be realised, or because 
we naïvely intend to enjoin agents to act as if we inhabited such a state. The purpose 
of idealisation is to clarify our values, to test them for coherence (both internally and 
against one another) and for fit with our intuitive sense of what is desirable. This is 
not to deny the crucial role of learning from particular, concrete and complex 
experiences. But sometimes a certain degree of simplification is beneficial just because 
of the limits of our mental capacity for processing voluminous data. A different kind 
of being might be able to consider proposals for dealing with all our political and 
social problems simultaneously. But human beings lack that capacity. Ideals function 
as organising concepts that help us to deal with what would otherwise be 
overwhelming complexity. They allow us to clarify the core principles we are 
committed to without having to deal with impossible detail. Thus clarified, ideals 
then give us something that we can hold steady while dealing with the multitudinous 
moving parts of a real-world problem.55 
A related concern pertains more specifically to democracy; in particular, it questions 
whether we should consider democracy to be a value at all. Zolo, for example, has 
argued staunchly that realising a value-laden notion of democracy is a forlorn hope 
                                                     
55 This role of simplifying assumptions is neatly summed up by Rawls: ‘Taken all together the 
parties hope that [the assumptions in the original position] will simplify political and social 
questions so that the resulting balance of justice… outweighs what may have been lost by 
ignoring certain potentially relevant aspects of moral situations.’ (John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), p 454). 
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in complex modern societies.56 He claims that the realities of modern life mean that 
‘political decision-making is typified by an ineradicable lack of impartiality and 
universality’, rendering political organisation ‘essentially incompatible with the 
criteria of a system of public ethics’.57 He argues that increasing social complexity 
leads to greater uncertainty and therefore fear among the public, which can only be 
palliated by a more concentrated governmental power. At the same time, however, 
an increasingly intrusive government threatens the autonomy of civil society and the 
civil liberties of citizens. Furthermore, given the complexity of contemporary 
societies, ordinary citizens are bound to operate with levels of information that are 
‘dangerously low’, rendering popular participation in government at best ineffective 
and quite possibly positively harmful.58 Zolo claims that efforts to remedy these 
problems are predestined to fail. The attempt to counteract the inability of the public 
to process complex political reality by way of representative democracy simply leads 
to a ‘self-referential’ system in which political parties promote their own autonomous 
interests.59 And the attempt to restrain overweening governmental power through 
systems of checks and balances leads to ‘power inflation’, which inhibits the 
constructive use of political power, and furthermore hands sovereignty to the non-
elected bureaucrats through whom legislative norms are filtered.60 In light of these 
difficulties, Zolo argues, the best that we can hope for from the political system is 
‘pure decision’: political commands justified by contingent requirements of stability.61 
He therefore argues that we should reject the notion that democracy is a value, and 
instead embrace Schumpeter’s view of democracy as a ‘procedural strategem’.62 
One need not be an opponent of the current system in order to be drawn to this line 
of criticism of democratic idealism. At the opposite end of the political spectrum, 
                                                     
56 Danilo Zolo, Democracy and Complexity: a realist approach (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992) 
57 Ibid., p 38. 
58 Ibid., p 71. 
59 Ibid., p 115-23. 
60 Ibid., p 128-9. 
61 Ibid., p 71. 
62 Ibid., p 82. 
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Posner makes a similar argument, although he is far more sanguine about where it 
leads. Like Zolo, Posner believes that the complexity of the issues involved in the 
governance of modern societies, together with the lack of any realistic prospect of 
agreement on political-moral fundamentals, make ideal theories of democracy 
hopelessly naïve. Posner claims that few people have the time or the intellectual 
capacity required to participate in public affairs intelligently and in an open-minded 
fashion, a point which he claims is evidenced in the low levels of interest in politics, 
and the poor quality of political debate, seen in the contemporary US. However, he 
does not view widespread political disengagement as problem, taking it rather as an 
indicium of a contented electorate. Elitist democracy, he says, promotes the general 
welfare by allowing ordinary people to be free to spend their time on commercial 
activities and private leisure pastimes, which are ‘not only more productive of wealth 
and happiness than the political life, [but] also more peaceable’.63 Likewise, Posner 
praises the tendency of elitist democracies towards inertia and conservatism.64 The 
shift of political power from ordinary citizens and elected officials to interest groups 
and career civil servants brings with it, he says, an increasing amount of expertise, 
while the focus on the median voter operates as a valuable bulwark against 
extremism. So Posner believes that democracy brings genuine gains, but that it does 
so only instrumentally. Despite their radically different appraisals of the present 
situation, Posner and Zolo agree – for remarkably similar reasons – that democracy is 
not of any noninstrumental worth. 
Zolo and Posner are, however, both guilty of neglecting the significance of our 
constitutional imaginaries. For example, Zolo’s argument that liberal democracy 
inevitably leads to ‘power inflation’ overlooks the place that the symbolic aspect of 
democracy has in the generation of political power. Here Arendt’s analysis of power 
                                                     
63 Richard A Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2003), p 173. 
64 Ibid., p 192. 
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is instructive.65 Political power is not the property of an individual: it cannot simply 
be ‘possessed like strength or applied like force’.66 It is dependent upon a plurality of 
actors joining together to achieve some common purpose, and its existence through 
time can only be maintained where actors give assurances that they are committed to 
the joint project. As Arendt puts it, ‘binding and promising, combining and 
covenanting are the means by which power is kept in existence’.67 These assurances, 
whether express or implied, obtain their purchase from the shared understandings of 
the practice in which they are embedded. It is because democratic citizens view 
themselves (at least sometimes, in some respects) as co-participants in a joint venture 
that they feel able to rely upon one another’s ‘promises and covenants’ so as to make 
political action possible.68 Indeed, a disenchanted, Schumpeterian democracy, lacking 
the notions of joint venture and common good, would seem more likely to result in 
decisional paralysis, since political actors would find less reason to seek workable 
compromise arrangements and more reason to push for the greatest possible 
satisfaction of their own interests without regard to the potential broader costs to 
society. 
We might say something similar about Posner’s faith in a ‘pragmatic’, instrumentalist 
democracy. Posner recognises that some normative requirements must be met by a 
putative democracy in order for it to do the stabilising work he hopes of it. The 
‘essence’ of his conception of democracy is, he says, ‘that the interests… of the 
population… be represented in government’.69 He gives two reasons for this. Firstly, 
when government is not broadly representative, the unrepresented may become 
disruptive, endangering political stability. Secondly, although the people as a whole 
                                                     
65 See Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970); On 
Revolution (London: Faber and Faber, 1963), chap 4; and The Human Condition (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999), chap V. 
66 The Human Condition, p 200. 
67 On Revolution, p 175. 
68 Taylor gives the example of the winning of the allegiance of the working class to the new 
industrial regimes in the nineteenth century, which relied upon their acceptance of the vision 
of society as a large-scale enterprise of production for the common good: see ‘Interpretation 
and the Sciences of Man’, p 38-9. 
69 Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, p 165. 
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are taken not to be knowledgeable about specific policy issues, they are capable of 
functioning as a ‘repository of common sense’, and so act as ‘a barrier to the mad 
schemes… hatched by specialists and intellectuals’.70 Yet both of these functions rely 
on shared understandings which Posner’s methodology cannot account for. In the 
first case we may ask why representation should make a difference to the allegiance of 
political minorities. What should the potential rebel care that she has a senator or 
congressman that shares her interests if he is consistently outvoted? The answer 
cannot simply be that representation serves political stability; that begs the very 
question in issue. The only answer that might win the allegiance of the potential rebel 
would be that representation symbolises her inclusion in a political community that 
seeks the good of all. If she views such talk as implausibly idealistic, then Posner’s 
goal of stability is thwarted. In the second case we can ask how ‘the people’ are to 
make even the rudimentary distinction between the trustworthy and the ‘mad’ if 
political campaigning is purely ‘manipulative and largely content-free’.71 In order for 
citizen-consumers to choose what technocrat-brand they prefer, they must have some 
basis on which they are rationally able to place trust in experts. But if democracy is 
merely a method for stabilising self-interested forces, it is difficult to see how voters 
could rationally trust any politician. Posner says that ‘often, in political as in economic 
markets, not much turns on which brand one buys’.72 But if this is true of the economic 
market it is only because there are mechanisms in place to guarantee against fraud, 
which allow consumers to trust economic actors whom are taken to be acting purely 
self-interestedly. Trust in politicians – those who operate the very mechanisms that 
(are supposed to) protect the integrity of the market – cannot be guaranteed in this 
way. Without the idea that politicians are at least supposed to be public-spirited, there 
would be no reason to trust any politician at all. So, again, without an ideal of 
orientation to the public good being implicit within the practice of democracy, 
Posner’s stated goal of stability would not be realised. 
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Zolo and Posner both make the error of supposing ideal theory to be disconnected 
from the real world, which is why they believe themselves justified, as a matter of 
methodology, to disregard political ideals when they examine the democratic 
process. But this deprives them of a key sociological datum: the systems they describe 
are held together in part by actors’ shared understandings, and these understandings 
ascribe a certain noninstrumental value to the practice of democracy. There is nothing 
‘realistic’ or ‘pragmatic’ about ignoring that fact.  
Finally, there is a third worry about ideal theorising, and one which may well have 
been exacerbated by my response to Zolo and Posner. It is one thing to say that shared 
understandings about certain kinds of value help to stabilise our political system. It 
is quite another to say that these shared understandings are warranted or desirable. 
The worry here is that a theory that constructs ideals based on an interpretation of 
current practices can serve only to reconcile people to their existing social order, thus 
muting radical social criticism. If this is the case, then constructive interpretation is 
ideological in the pejorative sense of serving (intentionally or no) to distort people’s 
beliefs so as to perpetuate the advantage that a certain group or groups hold over 
others.73 By focusing on identifying the shared understandings that may justify our 
current practices, the objection goes, ideal theory draws attention away from the 
manner in which the current balance of power influences the way we see the world. 
I cannot straightforwardly refute this objection. I cannot deny a priori that an idealised 
account of democracy might have this ideological effect. Yet I do not accept that this 
possibility is in itself a criticism of idealisation. It is not a presupposition of the 
methodology of constructive interpretation that the interpreter will find anything of 
value in the social practice that he is interpreting. The question of whether progress 
would be better secured by rejecting the putative value and abandoning its associated 
practice is always an open one. If democracy is a façade that serves only to mask the 
                                                     
73 See Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2008), Part II; and Charles W Mills, ‘“Ideal Theory” as Ideology’ (2005) 20 Hypathia 165. 
47 
 
domination of the ruling classes, then the substantive arguments used to support it 
must be flawed, and can be criticised accordingly. 
Furthermore, my defence of constructive interpretation does not deny that we may 
also benefit from other methodologies. It would be useful, I think, to combine ideal 
theory with a sociology of belief that might uncover that the roots of our shared 
understandings lie in a structure that privileges the interests of some advantaged 
minority. Such a discovery would clearly give us reason to revisit our convictions to 
examine whether they are supportable. But in doing so we could only test them 
against our existing background of meanings, that is, by testing our ideals against one 
another. There is no external standpoint, neither moral nor sociological, for us to have 
recourse to. 
Those who are sceptical about the utility of ideal theory might accuse me of simply 
‘assuming’ that democracy is valuable. The accusation is true in a benign sense. I have 
chosen to examine the question of whether judicial review is democratic precisely 
because I think democracy is of non-instrumental value; if I didn’t believe that I 
would have no interest in the question. My conviction in the value of democracy 
therefore precedes my investigation into the matter, and could thus be labelled an 
‘assumption’. But there is another sense in which I have not ‘assumed’ democracy’s 
value. I do not take the noninstrumental value of democracy as an axiom in my 
research. I am not asking the reader merely to concede arguendo that democracy is 
valuable. Rather I look to develop, as I go along, an account of democracy that 
supports that contention. Whether my arguments are sound is, of course, for the 
reader to judge. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have sought to defend my theoretical approach to the question of 
judicial review against the charge that institutional questions should be resolved 
without recourse to ideal theorising. The charge gains much of its plausibility, I 
believe, from a popular misconception about the nature of political values, which 
views them as entirely detached from the real world. Instead, I have argued, we 
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should recognise that political values are inherent in existing practices. On the 
practice account, we cannot conceptually detach a value from the process of realising 
that value. This account affords noninstrumental value to political institutions, by 
virtue of the role that they play in expressing the values, identities and relationships 
that constitute our political practices. The question of judicial review cannot be 
adequately addressed without an understanding of this role. 
This chapter provides something of a methodological introduction to the more 
substantive arguments that are to follow. But it would be a mistake to suppose that it 
is therefore of minor importance to my thesis. The central claim of this thesis is that 
legislation by representative assembly is distinctively valuable, and that its value may 
be inhibited (I do not say destroyed) by a system of strong judicial review. To 
understand this claim, one needs to appreciate that a representative assembly is not 
simply a means to achieve democracy, but is a constitutive component of it. One 
needs to understand that political values inhere in practices, that constitutional 
imaginaries play a fundamental role in ordering our normative political world, and 
that political institutions bear a symbolic significance that surpasses their empirical 




3. Waldron: static or dynamic? 
Jeremy Waldron has mounted a well-known attack on judicial review. Waldron 
presents democracy as a ‘second-order’ issue that arises because we disagree about 
‘first-order’ issues such as justice and rights, and argues that political equality is best 
served by giving each citizen an equal say over how the political community should 
address such issues. He claims that leaving these disagreements to be determined by 
supposedly expert elites – which is essentially what judicial review does – is insulting 
to the moral-political capacities of ordinary citizens. 
In this chapter I claim that Waldron is wrong to reduce the question of judicial review 
to a question of what mechanism we ought to employ to resolve our various political 
disagreements. Waldron is wrong, I believe, to presuppose the existence of political 
disagreement as one of the ‘circumstances of politics’, since it is only through politics 
that we are able to arrive at that position of disagreement. Waldron’s ‘core case’ 
against judicial review, I shall argue, overlooks the dynamism of politics, that is, the 
fact that politics is an ongoing practice of definition and redefinition of the political 
community. As a result – and despite express intentions to the contrary – the logic of 
Waldron’s core case points us towards a shallow, statistical version of democracy. 
I start by outlining Waldron’s account of the ‘right to participation’ and his ‘core case’ 
against judicial review. I then make the observation that, if we proceed in abstraction 
from the shared understandings that underlie our political institutions, the ‘right to 
participation’ can be no more than a placeholder devoid of specific content. Following 
that I turn more directly to criticise Waldron’s core case, arguing that disagreement 
should not be presupposed as part of the circumstances of politics, as political 
disagreements can only arise within the context of an ongoing practice of politics.. 
This error, I argue, leads the core case to have a static quality, giving it an affinity to 
an argument in favour of direct democracy that Waldron expressly disclaims. Finally, 
I suggest that, in order to remedy the shortcomings of Waldron’s core case, and to 
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properly benefit from his own insights about the ‘dignity’ of legislation, one needs a 
dynamic account of democratic politics as a practice. 
3.1 The ‘Core Case’ against Judicial Review 
Waldron presents his argument against judicial review as being ‘rights-based’; based, 
that is, on a right to participation, which he (following the Georgian-era radical William 
Cobbett) describes as ‘the right of rights’.1 Waldron traces the idea of moral rights 
back to the Enlightenment conviction that, just as man can grasp the workings of the 
natural world, so he can understand the principles according to which society ought 
to be organised.2 Moral rights, he argues, recognise each individual’s capacity for 
moral thinking: 
‘… the idea of rights is based on a view of the human individual as essentially 
a thinking agent, endowed with an ability to deliberate morally, to see things 
from others’ points of view, and to transcend a preoccupation with his own 
particular or sectional interests.’3 
As such, we cannot properly display respect for someone’s rights without being 
prepared to respectfully consider anything he has to say about the matter. If we are 
committed to the idea of rights, we ought to respect the judgments of rights-holders 
on the nature and scope of those rights. And, therefore, when we are determining 
what rights are to be collectively recognised and enforced – that is, when we are doing 
politics – we should recognise that each individual has a right to a say. This, Waldron 
claims, establishes a right to participation. 
Waldron applies the right to participation to what he calls the ‘circumstances of 
politics’, which he defines as the felt need for a common course of action in the face 
of disagreement about what that action should be.4 Thus politics, for Waldron, seeks 
to answer the question ‘what ought we to do, given our disagreement?’. 
                                                     
1 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), p 232. 
2 See Jeremy Waldron, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism’ (1987) 37 Philosophical 
Quarterly 127, p 134-5. 
3 Law and Disagreement, p 250. 
4 Ibid., p 102. 
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Waldron claims that, if we take the circumstances of politics seriously, then it is not 
quite right to say that there can be a ‘conflict’ between democracy and justice. 
Waldron here refers to Wollheim’s so-called ‘paradox in the theory of democracy’.5 
This stems from the fact that a citizen, faced with a choice between policies A and B, 
might find that he believes that A is recommended by justice, but that B has been 
selected by a process of which he approves. This paradox does not involve a 
contradiction, Waldron argues, because the values of justice and democracy operate 
on different levels. One’s view of democracy arises as a second-order response to the 
lack of first-order agreement about what justice requires.6 
Having set out the distinction between a first-order theory of justice and a second-
order theory of authority, Waldron then argues that the different theories must be in 
a certain sense independent from one another. That is to say, the theory of authority 
must identify some view as the one to prevail on criteria other than those which were 
the source of the original disagreement. Our response to disagreement cannot be ‘let 
the truth about justice prevail’, since that is precisely what we disagree about.7 
The question thus set, Waldron proceeds to argue that it is rational and fair in the 
circumstances of politics to make decisions by majority vote, or, as he calls it, 
‘majority-decision’. He argues that majority-decision respects individuals in two 
ways.8 Firstly, it respects differences of opinion, as it does not require any individual’s 
opinion to be suppressed. The very idea of taking a vote portrays disagreement as 
reasonable; it is not necessary to invoke bad faith, ignorance, or latent self-interest to 
explain dissent. Secondly, it counts each individual equally, by treating each person’s 
opinion as a reason for deciding in the way that the individual prefers. As Waldron 
                                                     
5 Richard Wollheim, ‘A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy’, in Peter Laslett and WG 
Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics and Society, second series (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969). 
As Waldron rightly argues, there is nothing distinctively democratic about this ‘paradox’; it 
will arise in any theory which makes a distinction between justice and political legitimacy. 
6 Law and Disagreement, p 105-6, 195-8, 246-8. 
7 Ibid., p 245. 
8 Ibid., p 109. 
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puts it, ‘it attempts to give each individual’s view the greatest weight possible in this 
process compatible with an equal weight for the views of each of the others’.9 
Waldron contrasts majority-decision with the approach he labels ‘rights-
instrumentalism’, i.e. choosing whatever decision-procedure is most likely to yield 
the right answer about what rights we have or ought to have morally. Rights-
instrumentalism, he claims, is incoherent: it presupposes possession of the truth 
about what rights we have, whereas this is precisely what we disagree about. 
Furthermore, we cannot retreat to any uncontroversial moral epistemology that 
indicates the best procedure for identifying truth about rights; just as people disagree 
over what rights we have, so they disagree about the best way to reason about rights. 
So, argues Waldron, we are left with majority-decision as a rational and fair way of 
resolving our dispute. ‘It is a mechanical procedure’, he says, ‘precisely because 
recourse to a substantive procedure would reproduce not resolve the decision-
problem in front of us.’10 
Waldron invokes his argument for the rationality of majority-decision as a ‘process-
related’ reason for preferring legislative enactments over judicial determination of 
fundamental rights. Waldron’s ‘core case’ against judicial review is premised on four 
assumptions, such that ‘if any of the conditions fail, the argument may not hold’.11 
These assumptions are: 
(1) democratic institutions in reasonably good working order; 
(2) judicial institutions in reasonably good working order; 
(3) a commitment on the part of most members of society to the idea of individual 
and minority rights; and 
(4) persisting, substantial and good faith disagreement about rights. 
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Waldron makes his argument by considering the position of a citizen who disagrees 
with a political decision that has been made by those who wield power.12 She asks 
two questions: 
1. Why did they decide? Why not leave the decision to me? 
2. Why wasn’t greater weight given to the views of those with whom I agree? 
Legislatures answer both questions by reference to majority-decision; it is first used 
to elect representatives and then used among representatives when passing laws. 
This, Waldron claims, provides ‘a reasonable approximation of the use of [majority-
decision] as a decision-making procedure among the citizenry as a whole’.13 On the 
other hand, Waldron argues, courts cannot provide satisfactory answers to these two 
questions, which leaves judicial review with a significant legitimacy deficit. 
3.2 The Right to Participation: a placeholder in need of content 
Most supporters of liberal democracy would probably agree that citizens have a 
moral right to participation which flows from their capacity for moral judgment, 
along something like the lines that Waldron sets out. At this level of abstraction, 
however, the right to participation has no specific content. What has been justified is 
the outline of a right; what Habermas would call an ‘unsaturated placeholder’.14 And 
most liberals would probably disagree about the content (and/or the weight) of the 
right. 
Perhaps surprisingly, Waldron does not go into detail about what content he takes 
the right to participation to have. In places he suggests that it entails that each citizen 
have a right to equal impact on political decisions.15 But this cannot be what he means. 
Waldron does not favour government by plebiscite: he supports legislation by a 
representative assembly, which of course permits a huge inequality of impact 
between legislators and ordinary citizens. So we cannot take Waldron’s right to 
                                                     
12 Ibid., at 1386-95 
13 Ibid., at 1388. 
14 See Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p 160. 
15 For example: ‘each individual claims the right to play his part, along with the equal part played 
by all other individuals, in the government of the society’ (Law and Disagreement, p 236). 
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participation to demand equality of impact. There is, however, little other indication 
of precisely what Waldron takes the right to entail, save that he clearly believes that 
it permits government by representative assembly, and forbids, or militates against, 
judicial review (in ‘core’ cases at least). The thrust of Waldron’s argument seems to 
be that the right to participation establishes a prima facie case for using majority-
decision to resolve political disagreements, that this does not translate into an 
absolute right to equality of impact, but nevertheless supports more broadly 
majoritarian procedures such as legislation by assembly over less majoritarian 
procedures such as judicial review. 
We need to be on guard, however, that we are not induced to make an illegitimate 
slip from an equal right to participation to what we might call a ‘right to equal 
participation’. Waldron argues, relatively uncontroversially, that it is inherent in the 
idea of rights that they are enjoyed by citizens equally. But it does not follow from 
this formal equality that there be a requirement that rights have some content which 
is distributed equally between all rights-holders. Suppose, for the sake of argument, 
that citizens have an equal moral right to healthcare. It does not follow that citizens 
have a moral right to an equal amount of healthcare. If two citizens have the same 
disease, treatable by a drug that is in short supply, but one of them is dying while the 
other is merely being made uncomfortable, they do not have the right to an equal 
dosage of the drug. It is no offence to an equal right to healthcare to differentiate 
between individuals on the basis of relevant criteria, such as the degree of their need.16 
So in order to substantiate a rights-based argument for majoritarianism, Waldron 
needs to show that respect for each individual’s capacity for moral thinking gives rise 
to a prima facie requirement that equal weight be given to each individual’s view. Yet 
it is far from clear that this is the case. We can imagine a supporter of judicial review 
arguing that the right to participation entails a right to present one’s case to some 
                                                     
16 This example is an amended version of an argument made by Ronald Dworkin in Taking 
Rights Seriously (2nd edn, London: Duckworth, 1978), p 227. (Dworkin uses the example to 
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body that will determine the issue by virtue of the strength of argument alone. This, 
they might claim, provides the deepest form of respect for the moral judgment of each 
citizen. On this argument there is not even a prima facie case for equality of impact, 
but the right is nevertheless an equal right. Now I am not endorsing this defence of 
judicial review. But it goes to show that something extra is required; something more 
than a relatively uncontroversial outline of an equal right to participation. 
A related problem is that Waldron’s discussion of an equal right to participation does 
not address the crucial issue of who ought to be the rights-holders. Most people do 
not believe that anyone capable of making a judgment about a political decision that 
affects her thereby has a right to participate in the decision. It was not a violation of 
democracy that Saddam Hussain did not have a vote in the 2000 US presidential 
election,17 even though he was more personally affected by its outcome than was the 
average citizen of Minnesota. This cannot be explained solely by reference to the 
capacity of persons as moral reasoners. Again, further argument is required. 
This ‘something extra’, I would like to suggest, must tie in with the fact that the right 
to participation ‘has less to do with a certain minimum prospect of decisive impact 
and more to do with avoiding the insult, dishonour, or denigration that is involved’.18 
Unlike, say, physical injury, insult is not a simple consequence of a perpetrator’s acts. 
Rather, it can only be inflicted where there exists a shared background understanding 
that certain actions bear a certain significance. Simplistically put, in order to insult 
someone you must do something that is generally recognised as the kind of thing that 
is insulting. This is not to say that insult is a purely subjective matter: one can 
mistakenly perceive insult, or fail to see insult where it is present. Indeed, to properly 
grasp the concept of insult one must be aware that it is the kind of thing that one can 
be wrong about; that is, one must differentiate it from a purely subjective sensation 
such as pain or displeasure. An insult bears a significance that can be detached from 
                                                     
17 Of course, this election was a travesty from a democratic perspective, for reasons which have 
nothing to do with the exclusion of the province of Baghdad from the US Electoral College. 
18 Law and Disagreement, p 238. 
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any individual’s subjective perception of it. But the significance that it bears cannot 
be detached from the background of shared understandings: the significance of an 
insult arises out of these understandings. 
If this is the case, then the demands of the right to participation must themselves be 
linked to the shared understandings which afford significance to political 
participation so that excluding someone therefrom causes insult to him: what ‘counts’ 
as political participation in the relevant sense is determined by these understandings. 
Furthermore, our understanding of what political participation is is closely entwined 
with the political institutions that we have (so that it is quite natural, for example, to 
point to the agora as showing that the Athenians had an understanding of the nature 
of political participation that was quite different to our own). It would be wrong, 
therefore, to think that one could derive the content of the right to participation in 
abstraction from any particular constitutional form. What counts as significant and 
insignificant participation, of insulting and of non-insulting exclusion, is so 
intertwined with the way we understand our political institutions that a right to 
participation in abstracto can be no more than a hollow shell. 
3.3 Rejecting Waldron’s Circumstances: disagreement as downstream of politics 
Waldron’s argument from the ‘circumstances of politics’ suffers, I believe, from a 
fundamental shortcoming: it attempts to reduce a normative theory of democratic 
institutions to a defence of a particular decision-making procedure. This shortcoming 
infects his ‘core case’ against judicial review, which portrays the issue at stake as how 
to make a decision on particular questions that are posited as being already extant in 
some already-constituted political society. But, as I argued in the previous chapter, a 
system of political institutions is far more than a decision-mechanism. Disagreements 
do not present themselves ready-made for resolution by whatever institutional 
structure we happen to employ. Rather, the institutional structure provides a point of 
reference around which disagreements are forged. Our constitutional system 
determines which disagreements are decided upon and which are ignored, it 
determines the terms in which disagreements are articulated, it determines the 
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professional ethos of decision-makers and it determines the relationships that exist 
between decision-makers and ordinary citizens. (Or, at least, it partially determines 
these matters; they are determined by our practice of politics, of which the 
institutional structure is a constitutive part.) So to view the issue of institutional 
design as a choice of decision-making procedure – to view it from the perspective of 
a citizen who is unhappy with a particular political decision – is to ignore a host of 
crucial features of constitutional systems which are conceptually prior to the 
resolution of any particular controversy. 
Politics, as an idea, provides a distinctive way of understanding one’s place in the 
world, one’s relationships with others, and the significance of particular kinds of 
activity, particular beliefs and particular events. While Waldron is right to say that it 
presupposes a certain conflict or disagreement, the idea of politics does not simply 
make reference to the fact of disagreement; instead it provides a category that enables 
us to understand a particular kind of disagreement as political disagreement. We can 
say, with Schmitt, that the political ‘does not reside in the battle itself… but in the 
mode of behaviour which is determined by this possibility’.19 While a complete 
analysis of politics as an organising idea would be beyond the scope of this thesis,20 
certain key points are relevant here. For a start, political disagreements are 
distinctively public.21 By this I mean not merely that they take place ‘out in the open’ 
– i.e. that they are not hidden or secret – but that they are understood as concerning 
the ‘public interest’, as opposed to the ‘private’ interests of individuals and sectoral 
groups. (Indeed, publicness in the former sense is not even a prerequisite for 
publicness in the latter sense: think of voting.) Such an understanding must be 
reflected in a vocabulary of politics, i.e. a way of articulating disagreements that 
                                                     
19 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (G Schwab tr, New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1976), p38. 
20 For an overview, see Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), p 32-42. 
21 For a fascinating discussion of this notion of publicity in the context of the ancient Greek 
city-state, see Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (2nd edn, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999), § 5. 
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presents them as public in the relevant sense. Such a vocabulary can, in turn, only 
bear meaning in the context of an ongoing practice of political discourse. So the 
practice of politics lies ‘upstream’ of any specific political disagreement about what 
we ought to do in a given situation: without it, we wouldn’t be able to understand 
our disagreements as political. Of course, there is a certain circularity here, since I am 
effectively saying that in order to disagree politically we need an existing practice of 
political discourse, but then what could such discourse consist of other than political 
disagreements? However, rather than think of this as a problematic chicken-and-egg 
paradox, we should instead view it as an instance of the general difficulty of 
explaining how linguistic animals come to possess and disagree about concepts: there 
must be some sort of iteration between employing a concept and coming to possess 
it, with each accruing gradually through a process which builds up in stages.22 
Secondly, politics presupposes a sense of solidarity that connects the individual 
citizen to a broad political community. More specifically, it is a pre-requisite for 
disagreements over the question ‘what ought we to do?’ that there is the sense in 
which there exist a we that is capable of doing anything at all, what we might call a 
collective subject. Of course, people can co-ordinate their actions without conceiving 
of themselves as a collective subject. Drivers, for example, might develop a 
convention of giving way to vehicles approaching from the right without there being 
any sense of their engaging in a collective endeavour. Such a convention could arise, 
and thrive, purely as a result of the discrete actions of individuals. However, this set 
of drivers would not be capable of having the kind of disagreement that characterises 
political communities. An individual driver might wish that the convention were 
different, but he would not be able to say, properly speaking, that we ought to have 
decided differently, for there was no collective decision. Politics is characterised by 
decisions that are irreducibly collective, in that they cannot be reduced to some 
                                                     
22 See, for instance, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (E Anscombe tr, 3rd edn, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994), § 7. 
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function of the decisions made by citizens individually. For us to disagree politically 
over the question ‘what ought we to do?’, we must take the ‘we’ literally. 
As Walker has pointed out, disagreements as to the appropriate scope and 
constituency of collective decision are of a ‘higher order’ to the more specific 
disagreements that Waldron sees as characterising the circumstances of politics.23 
These higher order disagreements cannot be directly resolved by political institutions 
as decision-making mechanisms, since the very legitimacy of those mechanisms is 
part of the question in issue. It does not follow, however, that political institutions are 
irrelevant to the attempt to address these issue, since, quite apart from the content of 
the decisions that they make, institutions also play a symbolic role, by providing ‘a 
modality of thought, affect, and discourse enabling individuals and groups within a 
political community to make sense of and to articulate a notion of their common past, 
to form and pronounce judgments about their common present, and to plan and 
project various imagined common futures’.24 In addition to functioning as decision-
making mechanisms, political institutions play a higher order role as poles around 
which social identities are constructed.25 
Our concept of politics, then, with its associated ideas of publicness and collective 
subjectivity, is constructed dynamically, through an ongoing practice that is partially 
constituted by the political institutions within which it takes place. Part of what 
enables us to recognise certain disagreements as political is the fact that they are the 
                                                     
23 Neil Walker, ‘Europe’s Constitutional Momentum and the Search for Polity Legitimacy’ 
(2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 211, at 215-9. 
24 Ibid, at 223. Walker is writing in the context of the attempt in 2004 to implement the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, which at the time was in front of the member states for 
ratification (which was, of course, never forthcoming), and so his argument is specifically 
about written constitutions. However, there is nothing to suggest that he would deny that 
concrete decision-making institutions (i.e. parliaments, courts and the like) cannot play a 
similar symbolic role. 
25 For obvious reasons, this issue has been of particular interest to EU scholars. In addition to 
Walker, ibid., see Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione, ‘Normative Theory and the EU’, in 
Lars Trägårdh (ed.), After National Democracy: rights, law and power in America and the new 
Europe (Oxford: Hart, 2004); and Hans Lindahl, ‘Sovereignty and Representation in the 
European Union’, in Neil Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart, 2003). 
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type of disagreements that are resolved by institutions that we recognise as political. 
And political practices provide a framework within which a sense of collective 
solidarity can be sustained, so that democratic processes and collective identities feed 
off one another. The practice of politics is thus a reflexive process of continual 
definition and redefinition of the political community, and political institutions have 
a key role to play as focal points for the kind of discourse that can sustain collective 
political identities.26  
It is, therefore, an inadequate portrayal of ‘politics’ to depict it as a response to 
disagreement over particular questions of justice. The role of politics is not only to 
resolve disagreements but also to frame them, to tease them out, to finesse them, to 
enable us to understand what is at stake in them, to constitute a community capable 
of having them, and so on. Waldron’s argument from the ‘circumstances of politics’ 
overlooks the dynamism of politics in this regard. Disagreements over particular issues 
arise in the context of an ongoing practice without which political disagreement 
would be impossible. Disagreement, then, lies downstream of politics. Waldron’s 
‘circumstances of politics’ present us with a static view of politics as a mechanism for 
resolving this or that disagreement, when what we need is a dynamic view which sees 
each disagreement as part of an ongoing practice. 
3.4 Why not Plebiscite? ‘Static’ Will versus ‘Dynamic’ Judgment 
To say, as Waldron does, that the electoral and legislative processes provide a 
‘reasonable approximation’ of the use of majority-decision among the citizenry as a 
                                                     
26 The idea that political discourse can play an important role in forging a cohesive collective 
identity has been a key element of theories of deliberative democracy: see, for example, John 
Rawls, Political Liberalism (paperback edn, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 
Lecture VII, § 5; Jürgen Habermas, ‘Citizenship and National Identity’, in Between Facts and 
Norms (Rehg tr, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); and Joshua Cohen, ‘Deliberation and 
Democratic Legitimacy’, in James Bohman and William Rehg (eds.), Deliberative Democracy: 
essays on reason and politics (Cambridge: MIT, 1997). However (as I shall argue in chapter five 
with particular reference to Habermas), deliberative democrats have not always paid 
adequate attention to the symbolic role that political institutions play in this process. On the 
latter, see James G March and Johan P Olsen, Democratic Governance (New York: Free Press, 
1995), chap 3. 
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whole is to beg a rather obvious question: why should we be satisfied with an 
approximation? Why don’t we just hold a plebiscite? On Waldron’s own argument it 
seems that this would have been more respectful to our disgruntled citizen, who may 
quite reasonably ask why her participation in the decision-making process should be 
so indirect and her opinion given so little effective weight in comparison to the 
opinions of the legislators. Curiously, perhaps, Waldron’s ‘core case’ article does not 
address this question. In some of his other writings, however, Waldron does mount 
arguments supporting legislation by a representative assembly over plebiscitary 
democracy.27  
Waldron presents one argument in favour of representative assemblies by drawing 
an analogy between the passing of legislation and the generation of customary law. 
In both cases law is not generated by the act of some sovereign will, but by a pooling 
of experience and judgment. Legislation and custom are thus based on an ‘ascending’ 
rather than a ‘descending’ theory of authority.28 Now majority-decision certainly 
features in this account – it is the mechanism by which a legislative proposal is finally 
approved – but the analogy between legislation and custom requires more than 
majority approval of the final outcome. As Waldron puts it: ‘In the case of both statute 
and custom, the basis of legal authority has to do with a process (formal or informal) 
that brings together the plural and disparate experiences and opinions of those who 
are going to have to live with the norm in question.’29 This process enables individuals 
to identify with statutes as ‘their laws and the basis of the law’s legitimacy [as] their 
understanding and their acceptance of the place the laws… occupy in their way of 
life’.30 Now Waldron presents this analogy to show a way in which legislation might 
be a superior form of lawmaking to executive order, but it is not too much of a stretch 
to see that a similar argument could be made against direct democracy. Direct 
democracy, one could argue, is antithetical to the kind of pooling of experience and 
                                                     
27 The most explicit statement to this effect is Jeremy Waldron, ‘Representative Lawmaking’ 
(2009) 89 Boston University Law Review 335. 
28 Law and Disagreement, p 55-6 
29 Ibid., p 66. 
30 Ibid., p 66-7 (emphasis in original). 
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judgment that is characteristic of a well-functioning representative legislature. 
Indeed, it is not at all fanciful to suggest that referendums are a way of closing a 
debate; invoking the authority of ‘the people’ in order to secure for the majority what 
it wishes.31 
A second benefit of legislatures is presented in The Dignity of Legislation, where 
Waldron discusses, with apparent endorsement, Aristotle’s theory of the ‘wisdom of 
the multitude’:32 
‘[Aristotle’s] view is that deliberation among the many is a way of bringing 
each citizen’s ethical views and insights… to bear on the views and insights 
of each of the others, so that they cast light on each other, providing a basis 
for reciprocal questioning and criticism and enabling a view to emerge which 
is better than any of the inputs and much more than a mere aggregation or 
function of those inputs.’33 
Again, this benefit is lacking in a plebiscitary democracy – or at least in a plebiscitary 
democracy the size of a modern state – as the wisdom of which the multitude is 
capable emerges only ‘when they meet together’.34 The epistemic benefit that Aristotle 
claims for the multitude is not a simply a consequence of superior numbers (as it is in 
Condorcet’s jury theorem), but rather arises because in a deliberative process that 
involves a large number of speakers, each contributes something distinctive to the 
conversation. Legislative procedures make explicit and deliberate provision for 
minority views to be aired and considered, and, although a minority will not be able 
to defeat a proposal by force of numbers, minority representatives may be able to 
                                                     
31 It is worth bearing in mind that the doyen of direct democrats, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
believed that unanimity or near unanimity was a sign that a decision embodied the general 
will, while widespread disagreement suggested ‘the ascendancy of particular interests’ (Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book IV, chap ii). I think that it is accurate to say that 
Rousseau would have wholeheartedly accepted the analogy between legislation and custom, 
and that, indeed, his argument for plebiscite depends upon it. In a heterogeneous society the 
analogy between plebiscitary legislation and custom fails. 
32 Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
chap 5. See also ‘Representative Lawmaking’, at 343. 
33 Ibid., p 106. 




procure improvements to the bill originally proposed. In contrast, a minority 
viewpoint in a plebiscite has no influence: it is simply defeated. 
Thirdly, Waldron points to the fact that legislatures provide a political system with 
an institution that is publicly dedicated to lawmaking: they exist, and are known to 
exist, explicitly for that purpose. ‘If we know this is where laws are made, then this 
will be the place on which to focus our attention so far as democratic principles are 
concerned.’35 
Finally, Waldron argues that representation provides a certain abstraction that is 
particularly appropriate for lawmaking, where what we are striving to produce are 
abstract norms rather than directives focused on one particular person or situation. 
Just as our laws should be universisable, so ‘our representatives should present 
people’s interests, concerns and ideals, universalizably’.36 In this regard a large 
representative assembly is superior to both non-representative institutions and 
lawmaking processes which rely on the personal presence of citizens. 
These arguments contain important insights, some of which I shall develop further in 
chapter six. For now it is important to note that Waldron’s arguments in favour of 
representative democracy draw their strength from an implicit recognition of 
something that has been made explicit by Urbinati: representative democracy pays 
respect to citizens’ judgments, rather than merely their wills.37 This distinction is 
important, since a seemingly compelling case for direct democracy can be constructed 
if we focus on the latter. 
Acts of will, unlike judgment, possess a certain bruteness, by which I mean a couple 
of things. Firstly, acts of will do not permit of qualitative variation. While a judgment 
may be certain or uncertain, tentative or settled, partial or comprehensive, a will, as 
it were, just is. One either decides to  or does not decide to ; one either consents to 
                                                     
35 ‘Representative Lawmaking’, p 339. 
36 Ibid., p 349. 
37 See Nadia Urbanati, Representative Democracy: principles and genealogy (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2006). 
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X or does not consent to X. One cannot strongly decide or slightly consent. Because 
the will does not permit of qualitative variation, instances of consent must be 
qualitatively equal. This leaves quantitative assessment – i.e. taking a headcount – as 
the only mechanism of combining individuals’ wills to form a collective will. If we 
are faced with disagreement amongst citizens, with some consenting to proposed 
legislation and others rejecting it, then if consent is what we are really interested in 
we can only fall back on strength of numbers.38 
Secondly, acts of will are synchronic. An act of will, such as the giving or withholding 
of consent, occurs in a specific moment in time, a scintilla temporis. It is separable from 
the reasoning that leads up to it and any further consideration that might follow. 
Contrast this with judgment, which is diachronic. Judgment flows dynamically, 
shaping and reshaping in response to information received and ongoing deliberation. 
One cannot identify a point in time at which judgment ‘occurs’. To illustrate this 
distinction, consider a citizen in a direct democracy consenting to a specific piece of 
legislation, by voting in its favour. At the time of the vote he both judges that the 
                                                     
38 Rousseau understood this well. While he clearly favoured widespread agreement between 
citizens (Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book IV, chap i), he saw a majority-vote as sufficient to 
create binding law, even to the extent that ‘[a] difference of one breaks a tie’ (ibid., Book IV, 
chap ii). This is not because the outcome of a majority-vote has some inherent quality, indeed 
Rousseau ‘presupposes that all the characteristics of the general will are present also in 
majority decisions; when they cease to be, whatever view may be adopted, liberty exists no longer’ 
(ibid. (emphasis added)). The italicised words are important here. Where the general will is no 
longer present in the majority view, liberty cannot be preserved by following the minority. In 
other words, both alignment to the general will and majority support are necessary in order 
for citizens to ‘obey [themselves] alone, and remain as free as before’ (ibid., Book I, chap vi). 
Yet a majority of only one ‘breaks a tie’ and is sufficient, when in alignment with the general 
will, to preserve the liberty even of those citizens who voted with the minority (ibid., Book IV, 
chap ii). This is because the decision to follow the will expressed by the majority can be 
reached by regarding only the individual (qualitatively equal) wills. Such a decision ensures 
that the law ‘both come from all and apply to all’ (ibid., Book II, chap iv). Contrariwise, a 
decision to follow the will expressed by a minority can only be reached by someone looking 
beyond the individual wills to the reasoning that underlies them. Supposing that, in this case, 
the ‘characteristics of the general will’ are in fact present in the minority. This will not rescue 
the citizenry from dependence on the will of another, since whoever makes the assessment 
that the minority view ought to be followed replaces the citizens’ will with his own. 
Rousseau’s unyielding requirement for majority (but, in strict terms, no more than majority) 




legislation is desirable and gives his consent to it by act of will. Some time after the 
vote he may cease to judge that the legislation is desirable. He might change his mind 
and reach the opinion that it is undesirable, or the passage of time might simply lead 
him to cease to have any interest in the issue, losing his favourable judgment without 
replacing it with a disfavourable one. In neither case has he withdrawn his consent. 
Nor would it be quite accurate to say that he continually consents to the law 
notwithstanding the change in his judgment. The withdrawal or continued granting 
of consent can only be effected by a further, discrete, act of will.39 
Waldron is right not to base the right to participation on the capacity to give or 
withhold consent. Portraying human persons merely as consenting beings does not 
recognise the depth of their status as moral agents. One can grant one’s consent to a 
course of action without any sense that that course of action is worthy of one’s consent. 
One may simply feel like consenting, preferring consenting over non-consenting in 
the same way in which one might prefer a glass of beer over a glass of whisky. One 
need not evaluate the course of action against anything other than one’s pre-existing 
or anticipated inclinations. Judgments, on the other hand, are different. To make a 
judgment in favour of a course of action is to evaluate that action as worth pursuing, 
which necessarily involves invoking criteria other than one’s own desires. To use 
Charles Taylor’s terminology, to consent one need only be a ‘simple weigher’, while 
to make a judgment one must be a ‘strong evaluator’.40 To base the right to 
participation on the capacity to give or withhold consent – i.e. on the status of persons 
as simple weighers – would be to rob the concept of self-government of much of its 
deep significance. Indeed, in overlooking the distinction between the capacity to 
                                                     
39 Thus the past perfect (‘he has consented…’) may be used appropriately (say to justify some 
action) in circumstances where the simple present (‘he consents…’) is unrealistic. The simple 
past (‘he consented’) would generally be used in circumstances in which the issue of consent 
was no longer germane (compare ‘he has consented, and so I will operate on him’ with ‘he 
consented, and so I operated on him’). With the verb ‘to judge’, on the other hand, usage of 
the past perfect is rare, and generally restricted to situations in which we are using ‘to judge’ 
to signify ‘to make a decision’, i.e. an act of will (e.g. ‘I have judged you guilty, and you must 
abide by my decision’). 
40 Charles Taylor, ‘What is Human Agency?’, in Human Agency and Language (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p23. 
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choose and the capacity to evaluate, it would fail to respect the latter. It is insulting to 
treat a strong evaluator as a simple weigher. 
So the conception of democracy that portrays it as respecting the capacity of citizens 
to will is an inadequate one; instead democracy should be seen as respecting citizens’ 
capacity for judgment. When this distinction is made clear, arguments in favour of 
representative as opposed to direct democracy – such as Waldron’s arguments that I 
mentioned at the start of this section – begin to look persuasive. However, the move 
from respecting will to respecting judgment causes further problems for Waldron’s 
‘core case’ against judicial review. A will-based conception of democracy supports 
the static view, exemplified by Waldron’s circumstance of politics, that views 
democracy as a mechanism for resolving particular disagreements. When we move 
to a judgment-based conception, however, the static view starts to look inadequate, 
and the need for a dynamic, practice-based account of democracy becomes apparent. 
By adhering to the static view in his ‘core case’, Waldron fails to make a complete 
break from the will-based conception of democracy. 
Owing to the synchronicity of the will, voluntaristic conceptions of democracy are 
forced to take a ‘snapshot’ view of the citizenry at a particular point in time.41  But this 
provides an impoverished picture of a political community, one which separates each 
individual decision from past and future chains of opinions. As Urbinati has put it: 
‘Ideas and opinions are not like dispersed atoms or accidental entities that magically 
appear in the mind of the voters’.42 A picture which includes the reasoning and 
arguments of citizens provides a richer view of the way in which judgments are 
formed and developed by people acting together. A judgment-based conception of 
democracy is, therefore, necessarily a dynamic conception. 
                                                     
41 Though it will not literally be a single point in time if not all votes are cast at once, in 
which case it would perhaps be more accurate to talk of a collage made up of individual 
snapshots. 




Although Waldron believes that representative government is a more complete 
expression of the democratic ideal than is direct democracy, the logic of his core case 
against judicial review tends to point us in the direction of plebiscitarianism. This, I 
have argued, is a consequence of the way he puts the question; i.e. by examining it 
from the point of view of a citizen who is unhappy with a particular decision, he 
excludes from consideration the dynamic processes which frame individual 
disagreements, giving them a context without which they would be unintelligible. 
The move from a static to a dynamic conception of democracy is necessary to 
complete the move from a will-based to a judgment-based account, and it is upon the 
latter that the argument for representative over direct democracy relies. 
It would be an exaggeration to say that Waldron wholeheartedly adopts a static 
conception of democracy. For example, we have hints at a dynamic view in Waldron’s 
working assumption that he is talking about a society with ‘democratic institutions 
in reasonably good working order’, in which members of the legislature ‘think of 
themselves as representatives’.43 However, the ‘core case’ argument does not have the 
resources to determine in what way these requirements should be met; i.e. what it 
means for democratic institutions to be in reasonably good order, or precisely what 
self-conception is appropriate for a representative legislator. The assumptions on 
which Waldron premises his core case are left hanging without support. 
I have suggested that Waldron’s core case argument lacks an adequate account of 
democracy as a practice. Such an account would have to go well beyond the issue of 
the fairness or rationality of a particular decision-making mechanism, to look at how 
different institutional structures shape our politics as a whole. It would have to 
examine the self-understandings inherent in various constitutional forms, since these 
can neither be thought of as merely instrumental devices intended to achieve some 
externally defined end, nor reduced to competing decision-making mechanisms. 
                                                     
43 ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’, at 1361-2. 
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Courts, legislatures and other political institutions are constituted not only by the 
procedures for decision-making, deliberation and for the selection of members, but 
also by the self-understandings of those members and by the place that such 
institutions hold in the popular imagination. The case against judicial review (or for 
it, for that matter) will need to give an account of the differences between courts and 
legislatures in these respects. By reducing the issue to a question of how to resolve 
this or that disagreement in a fair and rational manner, Waldron’s core case bypasses 
these crucial issues. 
A dynamic account of the practice of democracy would be able to give content to the 
right to participation, by pointing to the aspects of the practice that play an important 
role in recognising the capacity of citizens for moral judgment. It would, I venture to 
suggest, highlight the partly-functional, partly-symbolic role of the legislature as a 
representative body; a role that cannot be adequately derived from abstract or a priori 
reasoning detached from our constitutional imaginaries. Furthermore, the practice-
based account helps us to make sense of the fact that not everyone capable of making 
a moral judgment about a political decision that affects her thereby has a right to 
participate in the decision. For a practice implies the existence of a community of 
practice, which is not to be identified with all those who may be affected by the 
practice’s operation. Saddam Hussain was profoundly affected by the practice of US 
politics, but he was not a member of the relevant community of practice, nor did he 
have grounds on which he ought to have been accepted as such. Denying him the 
vote was therefore not undemocratic. 
I have argued that Waldron’s case against judicial review is inadequate, as it focuses 
on the resolution of individual political disagreements abstracted from our ongoing 
practice of democratic politics. Instead, I suggest that we shall make better progress 
if we take for our starting-point the arguments – including some persuasive 
arguments given by Waldron himself – in favour of the representative legislature as 
a distinctive constitutional arrangement. These arguments are based on the idea that 
representative democracy pays respect to citizens’ judgments rather than merely their 
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wills, and as such rely on a dynamic conception of democracy. On the dynamic view, 
we cannot consider political institutions to be merely devices for resolving 
disagreement. Out institutions constitute the political world within which our 








4. Dworkin: an incomplete interpretation 
In this chapter I look at the work of perhaps the most well-known theorist of judicial 
review in recent years, Ronald Dworkin. Though he is best known for his work on 
the US Constitution, Dworkin has mounted a general defence of judicial review, 
presented as part of an ideal theory of democracy, which in turn forms a part of a 
broader political theory. 
The first part of this chapter looks at the idea, introduced in the previous chapter, that 
a political community constitutes a collective subject. I argue that we cannot plausibly 
view a political community as a voluntary or consensual relationship, but must 
instead follow Dworkin’s lead in viewing citizenship as an associative relationship, 
like family or friendship, which imposes genuine obligations, by virtue of its ethical 
significance. In the second part I examine Dworkin’s conception of democracy. 
Dworkin sees democracy as promoting three values, which he calls the ‘symbolic’, 
the ‘agency’ and the ‘communal’. I argue that each of these values identifies an 
important aspect of democracy that cannot be reduced to the language of political 
‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’. In the third part I examine Dworkin’s institutionalisation of 
democracy, including his defence of judicial review. Dworkin argues in relatively 
straightforward terms that judicial review does not hinder, and may well promote, 
democracy’s symbolic value. He takes judicial review to serve as a kind of democratic 
prophylactic: without insulting the status of citizens as equals, it protects the 
community against legislative decisions that would tend to eat away at the egalitarian 
basis on which it is founded. 
In the final two sections I argue that Dworkin does not take his own interpretive 
methodology far enough. The symbolic significance of courts and legislatures is 
‘thicker’ than Dworkin recognises, and thus his defence of judicial review is 
altogether too quick. In section four I argue that the very virtue that seems to 
recommend courts as arbiters of disputes over the extent of fundamental rights – their 
impartiality – is linked with a way of thinking about constitutional politics that is 
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problematic for democracy. Judicial decision-making is premised on the idea that it 
is in some respect a ‘nonpolitical’ process, so that, by sending questions about 
fundamental rights to the courts for determination, judicial review presents such 
issues as qualitatively differentiated from matters of ‘ordinary politics’. This casts 
doubt on Dworkin’s claim that judicial review provides an arena of contestation that 
is ‘directly connected to [citizens’] moral lives’,1 and threatens the ability of citizens 
to view themselves as a self-governing political community. In the final section I 
argue that Dworkin fails to complete his interpretation of democracy, since he 
neglects to consider whether legislation by representative assembly has any 
distinctive democratic merit in and of itself. I argue that our practice of democracy 
affords the representative legislature an indispensable role as the focal point of 
political debate. Although legislatures do not, of course, always live up to the ideal, 
if we overlook, in theory, the part that legislatures play in the popular imagination, 
we risk losing grasp of an important aspect of what is valuable about democracy. 
4.1 Political Community as Associative Relationship 
In the last chapter I argued that Waldron’s characterisation of the ‘circumstances of 
politics’ is inadequate because it does not recognise the reflexive role that politics 
plays in constituting the political community. That there exist a ‘political community’ 
at all is presupposed by the concept of politics. A claim of political authority is a claim 
over, and, in a certain sense, in the name of, a particular community: this is what 
allows us to distinguish it from, say, a claim of proprietary or contractual right, or an 
act of brute domination. Democracy offers the promise of congruence between the 
addressor of such claims and their addressee, that is to say it promises self-government: 
government of the political community over itself. So, for democracy to be more than 
a mirage, the political community must become a collective subject, capable of action 
of its own account. 
                                                     
1 Ronald Dworkin, ‘What is Equality? Part 4: Political Equality’ (1987) 22 University of San 
Francisco Law Review 1, at 29. 
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Political communities are themselves constituted by ongoing political practices. They 
do not exist as metaphysical entities, waiting for us to find them and then 
institutionalise them with a government and laws. They are, in Anderson’s influential 
terminology, ‘imagined communities’.2 That does not mean that they are purely 
subjective matters: a political community is not just what you or I or anyone else 
happens to think that it is. Nor are their existence and scope fixed purely as matters 
of convention. It is possible for two people, each with the same knowledge of the 
empirical facts in a particular society, to disagree over whether that society amounts 
to a political community or over exactly who is to be included as a member. In order 
to determine the existence and nature of political communities, we must engage in 
constructive interpretation.3 We form our opinions on such questions by reference to 
our views on the underlying point of our political practices. 
It should be clear that we cannot view political communities as voluntary 
arrangements: people are born into political communities, and the decision not to 
emigrate can scarcely be said, in all but perhaps a tiny handful of cases, to be a 
genuine free choice. Nor can political communities be defined along the lines of those 
whose lives are affected by a particular set of political decisions, since political 
communities make decisions all the time that have profound effects upon outsiders 
(most obviously, but not exclusively, in foreign policy). We need an account of 
political communities which portrays citizens as bound together in a special kind of 
way, not merely as passive recipients of various benefits and burdens.4 
                                                     
2 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism 
(revised edn, London: Verso, 2006). Of course, Anderson’s book is about nations, rather than 
political communities per se, but the term ‘imagined community’ can be usefully applied more 
broadly. 
3 See the discussion at §2.2, above. 
4 Cf Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), p 93-5, in which Nozick 
argues against the idea of non-consensual political obligation by analogy to a situation in 
which a philosopher broadcasts lectures from a sound truck. Nozick is, of course, right to say 
that the recipients of such lectures are not morally obliged to pay for the privilege. The 
argument fails because the analogy does not hold: the relationship between citizens and state 
is not merely one of recipient and (unsolicited) provider of services. 
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Dworkin provides what is to me a persuasive account. He describes political 
communities as ‘associative’ groupings, analogous to families and groups of friends, 
neighbours and colleagues.5 These groups are defined by social practice, not choice 
or consent, yet they are characterised by special relationships that are capable of 
creating genuine obligations between members. The non-voluntary nature of these 
groups is clearest in the case of family, but is also true of the others. I can become 
someone’s friend without really intending to; indeed, it might not dawn on me that I 
have become his friend until I realise that I owe him obligations that I would rather 
not fulfil. I might choose my place of work, but I do not choose my colleagues. The 
normative force of these relationships stems not from the method by which they are 
entered into, but from their ethical value.6 
The fact that such non-consensual groups can give rise to genuine obligations shows 
that a popular argument for the will-based conception of democracy is mistaken.7 
This argument can be clearly seen in a passage from Locke: 
‘that which acts any Community, being only the consent of the individuals of 
it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is 
necessary the Body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, 
which is the consent of the majority; or else it is impossible that it should act 
or continue one Body, one Community, which the consent of every individual 
that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that 
consent to be concluded by the majority’8  
So long as we suppose that ‘any Community’ can only be constituted by ‘the consent 
of the individuals of it’, then such an argument seems persuasive. But the examples 
of family, friendship and so on show that this is not the case, and so Locke’s logic 
does not run. There is no necessary connection between the acts of a political 
community and ‘the consent of the majority’. We identify the acts of the community 
in the same way we identify the community itself: through a process of constructive 
                                                     
5 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (London: Fontana, 1986), p 195-202. 
6 In addition to Dworkin, ibid., see Andrew Mason, ‘Special Obligations to Compatriots’ 
(1997) 107 Ethics 427. 
7 See my discussion of the distinction between will-based and judgment-based conceptions of 
democracy at §3.4, above. 
8 John Locke, Two Treatises on Civil Government (London: G. Routledge, 1884), chap VIII, §96. 
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interpretation that is sensitive to the purpose, point or value that the particular 
community serves, embodies or honours. 
4.2 The ‘Participatory Values’ of Democracy 
Dworkin, then, provides a persuasive account of the structure of a political 
community, one which presents the very idea as inherently value-laden. This 
structure does not, of course, tell us what it is about political communities that are 
valuable: for that we need to go further than pointing at the methodology of 
interpretation and begin to engage in interpretation ourselves. Just because we accept 
Dworkin’s methodology, it does not follow that we will agree with him on the 
substantive issue. Questions of political value tend to be controversial, and we can 
expect that different people will arrive at competing interpretations. Nevertheless, 
there is, I believe, much in the substance of Dworkin’s conception of democracy from 
which we can profitably learn.  
Note that I have moved from talking about the value of political communities to 
talking about the value of democracy. The question of this thesis is whether judicial 
review is a hindrance to democracy, not whether it is a hindrance to political 
community per se. I take the former to be a special case of the latter; democracy, as I 
have said, is the system of government in which the political community governs 
itself. I do not doubt that there is value in the notion of political community per se; i.e. 
that there is a distinctive good that distinguishes being a member of a non-democratic 
political community from being subject to non-political power.9 Our concern is not 
primarily with that good, rather it is with the distinctive good that arises when the 
political community is democratic. We should remember, though, that democracy 
presupposes a political community, so that any account of democracy must have an 
account of political community nested within it. It was a failing of Waldron’s ‘core 
                                                     
9 At least where the political community is legitimate. I have in mind something like the 
conception of legitimacy given by Bernard Williams in ‘Realism and Moralism in Political 
Theory’, chap 1 in In the Beginning was the Deed: realism and moralism in political argument 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
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case’ that it did not leave space for an attractive account of political community;10 it is 
a strength of Dworkin’s conception of democracy that it includes such an account. 
In chapter one I mentioned – and rejected – a popular way of thinking about 
democracy that divides the issues at stake into questions of ‘input legitimacy’ and 
‘output legitimacy’.11 This schema, I argued, is misleading, because it overlooks the 
fact that so-called ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ derive their meaning from the practice of 
democracy itself, and so cannot be treated as distinct from such practice. 
Unfortunately, Dworkin’s account of democracy proceeds in the language of ‘inputs’ 
and ‘outputs’. As I hope to demonstrate, however, Dworkin in fact rejects the 
substance of the dichotomy. 
In the fourth of his ‘What is Equality?’ papers, Dworkin draws a distinction between 
what he calls ‘detached’ and ‘dependent’ conceptions of democracy.12 He describes 
detached conceptions as based on input, i.e. they judge the democratic character of a 
political system by looking solely at its procedural aspects, asking whether it 
distributes political power equally amongst citizens. Dependent conceptions, on the 
other hand, are described as outcome-based, such that they recommend as democratic 
whatever political system is most likely to lead to the best substantive consequences. 
Now it might seem that the distinction between detached and dependent conceptions 
corresponds to the distinction between noninstrumental and instrumental views of 
democracy respectively. However, that is not the case, since Dworkin includes as 
‘consequences’ of a political system those values which are constituted by the way in 
which they find their expression in political practices.13 These values Dworkin calls 
the ‘participatory consequences’ of a political process: ‘the consequences that flow 
from the character and distribution of political activity itself’.14 Dworkin identifies 
three types of participatory consequence: the ‘symbolic value’ of the confirmation of 
                                                     
10 See §3.3, above. 
11 See p 9, above. 
12 ‘What is Equality?’, at 3-8. 
13 See my discussion of the distinction between instrumental and expressive values at p 19-20, 
above. 
14 ‘What is Equality?’, at 4. 
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the status of citizens as free and equal; the ‘agency value’ which accrues when politics 
is connected to each individual’s moral experience; and the ‘communal value’ of a 
cohesive and fraternal political community.15 
By including ‘participatory consequences’ as part of his ‘dependent’ conception of 
democracy, Dworkin recognises the noninstrumental, constitutive role of political 
practice. Dworkin’s symbolic, agency and communal values are not ‘consequences’ 
in the instrumental, empirical sense. Unlike the ‘distributive’ consequences of a 
political process (such as the rates of taxation and public spending, the substance of 
the rules of property, contract and tort, and so on), the ideas of political equality, 
agency and community are only intelligible within the background context that 
political practices provide. We can note here that Dworkin’s ‘symbolic’ value is 
misleadingly named. All of the participatory consequences rely on the symbolic status 
of democratic practices and institutions in order to bear the significance that they do 
in our society. 
The value that Dworkin calls the ‘symbolic’ value would perhaps be better referred 
to as ‘political equality’; Dworkin also describes it as ‘a declaration of equal standing 
for all’.16 Dworkin associates this value with voting rights, such that one-person-one-
vote signifies a commitment to the equal status of all citizens. But, as Dworkin rightly 
acknowledges, the shape that voting rights must take in order to successfully 
symbolise equality depends upon contingent historical factors: 
‘Our own history is such that no deviation from equal impact within a district 
– no deviation, that is, from equal vote – is tolerable for us. That strict 
requirement would not necessarily hold in a community whose history 
showed that unequal voting did not itself display contempt or disregard. We 
can imagine, for example, a society in which people gain votes as they grow 
older, or in which people acquire more votes by pursuing a course of study 
genuinely open to everyone, or something of that sort. But in a society like our 
own, in which the vote has traditionally been an emblem of responsibility, 
                                                     
15 Ibid., at 4. 
16 Ibid., at 19. 
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weight, and stake, any violation of equal vote would reflect a denial of the 
symbolic attachment equal vote confirms.’17 
Because of the nature of the symbolic status of voting rights, one-person-one-vote is 
an essential requirement of democracy as we know it. But the symbolic expression of 
equality does not require that each citizen has equal impact on political ‘outputs’. 
Such a requirement would rule out representative government altogether, since a 
representative structure is necessarily one that gives greater impact to legislators over 
ordinary citizens.18 Furthermore, our history does not afford a strong symbolic role to 
equality in the way in which the community is divided into electoral districts: for 
instance it does not convey disrespect for the people of California that they have far 
less impact on the constituency of the US Senate than do the citizens of Wyoming.19 
Here Dworkin recognises something that I mentioned in my discussion of Waldron’s 
‘right to participation’, what amounts to an insult to citizens’ political equality 
depends upon shared understandings which afford significance to particular features 
of our practice.20 
If the nature of the ‘symbolic’ value of political equality is straightforward enough, 
Dworkin’s discussion of the ‘agency’ value is a little more cryptic. The agency value 
accrues, he says, when politics connects ‘each individual, to his or her own moral 
experience’21, so that ‘our political life [is] a satisfactory extension of our moral life’.22 
While it is not made completely explicit, Dworkin’s discussion of the agency value 
recognises, I think, two important characteristics of democracy: democracy is both 
practical and social. Democracy is essentially practical in the sense that, as I put it in 
chapter two, its noninstrumental value is conditioned on its instrumental value: if we 
were not able to use democratic processes to make important decisions competently, 
they would not have the same expressive significance.23 It is crucial that those aspects 
                                                     
17 Ibid., at 19-20. 
18 Ibid., at 10-11. 
19 Ibid., at 20. 
20 See §3.2, above. 
21 Ibid., at 5. 
22 Ibid., at 21. 
23 See p 23, above. 
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of democracy that have socially recognised symbolic significance are also of practical 
import. It is only because voting is a practical act of moral agency that the right to 
vote can serve as a symbol of respect: a merely symbolic election would fail in this 
regard. And it is also crucial that democratic politics is a social pursuit. It is not 
adequate, for democratic citizenship, to allow each person freely to contemplate 
political issues in private. It is central to one’s status as a citizen that one is able to 
engage in discourse with others and try to persuade them to accept one’s own point 
of view. 
Dworkin’s ‘communal’ value of democracy is that which I referred to earlier as the 
promise of self-government: in a genuine democracy, the laws are created by the 
collective agency of the people. This requires that we take ‘the people’ to be a distinct 
entity, capable of acting in a way that is irreducible to any statistical function of the 
actions of individual citizens.24 Dworkin calls this view the ‘partnership conception 
of democracy’, since ‘it holds that self-government means government not by the 
majority of people exercising authority over everyone but by the people as a whole 
acting as partners’.25  As Dworkin makes clear, this is not such a mysterious 
                                                     
24 Bratman has proffered a ‘reductive’ account of collective agency which is expressed purely 
‘in terms of the attitudes and actions of the individuals involved’ (Michael Bratman, Faces of 
Intention: selected essays on intention and agency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
p 108; see generally chaps 5-8). On Bratman’s account, a group engages in what he calls ‘shared 
cooperative activity’ when each of its members: (i) intend that the group carry out some joint 
activity; (ii) are mutually responsive to one another’s intentions and actions; (iii) are 
committed to the success of the activity; (iv) are committed to supporting one another in the 
pursuance of the activity; and (v) are led to carry out the joint activity by virtue of their 
attitudes (i) – (iv). Bratman’s aims are explicitly functionalist: ‘What we want to show is that 
intentions of individuals with these special contents should lead to planning, bargaining and 
action of those individuals which, taken together, constitute appropriately coordinated 
planning and unified shared activity.’ (Ibid., p 123.) He takes the fact that the complex of 
interlocking intentions (i) – (iv) is likely to lead consistently mutually-supportive action as 
evidence that it adequately explains the phenomenon of joint action. However, (i) seems 
tacitly to assume what Bratman is at odds to deny: the existence of an ontologically irreducible 
collective agent. More generally, Bratman’s functionalist approach is incapable of capturing 
what we might call the ethical significance of joint action: i.e. the fact that joint action is 
qualitatively, and not just functionally, different from a set of mutually responsive individual 
actions.  
25 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2011), p 384. 
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phenomenon as it might at first glance appear. He borrows from Rawls the example 
of an orchestra: it is essential to an orchestral performance not just that a specified 
function of musicians each plays some appropriate score, but that the musicians play 
as an orchestra, each intending to make a contribution to the performance of the 
group, rather than isolated individual recitations.26 This does not depend on any 
ontological priority of community over individual, but simply on a certain kind of 
shared attitude among individuals. Democracy enables citizens taking part in 
political action to view themselves (authentically)27 as engaged in a joint venture, such 
that – like musicians in an orchestra – they can each share in the credit due for the 
achievements of the community as a whole. 
Since participants in a joint venture share in the credit of the venture’s achievements, 
self-governing citizens cannot view the success or failure of their political community 
as entirely detached from their personal failure or success as individuals. The 
achievements of the community are their achievements, and so form part of the 
goodness of their own lives. The well-being of individual citizens and that of their 
community thus become fused or, as Dworkin puts it, ‘integrated’.28 The communal 
value of democracy is therefore what Taylor calls an immediate common good: ‘a sense 
of shared fate, where the sharing itself is of value’.29 While convergent goods (such as 
security and a clean environment) are ‘for me and for you’, democracy is ‘for us’.30 This 
perfects the analogy with friendship through which Dworkin’s conception of 
                                                     
26 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Equality, Democracy and Constitution’ (1990) XXVIII Alberta Law 
Review 324, at 329. 
27 I add this parenthesis to underline the fact that collective agency here is not merely a 
subjective matter: it depends on, but cannot be reduced to, individual opinions about the 
nature of the action. It is crucial for democracy that citizens are not brainwashed or misled 
into thinking that they are engaged in a joint venture: the sense of joint venture must be 
authentic. 
28 See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: the theory and practice of equality (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), p 222-3. 
29 Charles Taylor, ‘Cross-Purposes’, in Philosophical Arguments, p 192. 
30 ‘Irreducibly Social Goods’, p 139 (emphasis added). 
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democracy was introduced. Like friends (but unlike, say, shareholders in a joint stock 
company), citizens share a good which cannot be reduced to mutual benefit.31 
4.3 Dworkin’s Attempt at Institutionalising Democracy 
Dworkin claims that the participatory values recommend a basic outline of a 
democratic structure, leaving open a number of specifics to be crafted so as to deal 
with localised requirements. The ‘symbolic’ value, as we have seen, requires equality 
of vote within electoral districts. The ‘agency’ value requires that citizens are 
guaranteed the freedom to express their opinions, and that they have ‘enough access 
to influential media… to give each person a fair chance to influence others if he or she 
can’.32 And the ‘communal’ value demands that ‘collective decisions must reflect 
equal concern for the interests of all members’.33 As Dworkin sees it, the symbolic 
value of equal voting rights sets a default of equality of impact between citizens, from 
which we should not depart unless two conditions are met: firstly, the different 
procedure must not outrage any of the participatory values; and secondly, we must 
have some positive reason to think that a different procedure would considerably 
improve the quality of political decisions. 
The first condition rules out formal electoral discriminations, such as restriction of the 
franchise to men, whites, property-holders and so on, or any proposal that would 
give weightier votes to classes of persons thought more likely to make good decisions 
on political issues.34 It does not, however, rule out representative government, since 
this lowers the political impact of all citizens, and thus ‘disenfranchises all unelected 
                                                     
31 Dworkin is here in essential agreement with Aristotle: see John M Cooper, ‘Political Animals 
and Civic Friendship’, in Neera Kapur Badhwar (ed.), Friendship: a philosophical reader (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1993). 
32 ‘What is Equality?’, at 22. 
33 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Equality, Democracy and Constitution’ (1990) XXVIII Alberta Law 
Review 324, at 339. 
34 With what I think is a pinch of self-deprecating humour, Dworkin gives the example of a 
proposal ‘that only lawyers and moral philosophers should be allowed to vote on choice-
insensitive matters’ (‘What is Equality?, at 27). Dworkin does not specify whether he is using 
‘and’ in the conjunctive or the disjunctive. 
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groups and persons equally’.35 Furthermore, Dworkin says, we have a positive reason 
to think that representation improves the quality of political decisions, since ‘elected 
officials, rather than popular assemblies, are better able to protect individual rights 
from dangerous swings in public opinion’.36 He accordingly concludes that both 
conditions for departure from equality of impact are met in the case of representative 
government, so that there can be no general democratic requirement that laws, even 
on issues of fundamental importance, be put to referendums. Issues of detail, such as 
the lengths of parliamentary terms, the system of election and the make-up of 
electoral districts, must be looked at in the context of the particular community for 
which they are being considered. 
He addresses the question of judicial review in similar manner. Judicial review clearly 
creates a vast disparity of political impact: it gives a handful of judges the power to 
overrule policies that are supported by the overwhelming majority of the populace. 
But, Dworkin argues, the first condition for departure from equal impact is 
nevertheless met. Firstly, he claims, judicial review does not impair the symbolic 
value of equal voting rights, since it does not reflect any contempt for or disregard of 
any group within the community.37 Secondly, judicial review supports the ‘agency 
value’, by providing ‘a forum of politics in which citizens may participate, 
argumentatively, if they wish, and therefore in a manner more directly connected to 
their moral lives than voting almost ever is’.38 Finally, judicial review promotes the 
communal value of democracy, since in upholding individual rights against 
violations by government, it preserves the political community as an inclusive 
democratic community.39 He accordingly gives us an account of judicial review as a 
kind of democratic prophylactic: without insulting the status of citizens as equals, it 
                                                     
35 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p 393. 
36 Ibid., p 394. 
37 ‘What is Equality?’, at 29; ‘Equality, Democracy and Constitution’, at 337-9; Justice for 
Hedgehogs, p 396. 
38 ‘What is Equality?’, at 29. See also ‘Equality, Democracy and Constitution’, at 340-2; and 
Justice for Hedgehogs, p 396-8. 
39 ‘Equality, Democracy and Constitution’, at 342-6; Justice for Hedgehogs, p 398. 
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protects the community against legislative decisions that would tend to eat away at 
the egalitarian basis on which it is founded. This still leaves open the second 
condition, whether judicial review in fact improves the substantive quality of political 
decisions. Like the issues surrounding the detail of the electoral system, an answer to 
this question will depend upon a host of factors that vary from place to place. Nothing 
guarantees in advance that judicial review will make a community more democratic, 
and Dworkin floats the possibility that other strategies for protecting individual 
rights against majority domination might prove superior.40 Nevertheless, Dworkin is 
confident that in most, if not all actually existing cases, judicial review has had a 
positive effect. He accordingly concludes that judicial review is generally a benefit to 
democracy. 
4.4 Court as Symbol: the myth of legality and the negative conception of 
citizenship 
We can see Waldron’s criticism of Dworkin as focusing mainly on the first value, the 
‘symbolic value’ of political equality. Waldron essentially premises his attack on 
judicial review on the inequality of impact inherent in such a system. However, as I 
argued in the previous chapter, a judgment-based conception of democracy does not 
require equality of impact. In the following section I suggest that Dworkin is, 
surprisingly perhaps, susceptible to a similar line of criticism, since he also gives an 
unjustified priority to majoritarianism. In this section I want to say something about 
the relationship between judicial review and Dworkin’s other two values. In short, I 
think that the symbolic significance of courts is ‘thicker’ than Dworkin recognises, 
such that his argument that judicial review does not impede the agency and 
communal values is altogether too quick. 
Judicial review does not place decisions about fundamental rights into the hands of 
just any set of experts: it places them specifically into the hands of a court. And courts, 
of course, occupy a particular status in the popular imagination. As I put it in chapter 
                                                     
40 Justice for Hedgehogs, p 398-9. Dworkin gives the example of an elected upper chamber, 
though it is not clear why he believes the upper chamber need be elected. 
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two, people have a generally shared sense of what courts are for, and this sense affects 
both how judges, lawyers and parties to court cases behave and how the public at 
large responds to their behaviour. In fact, Dworkin relies on the status of courts in the 
popular imagination in his defence of judicial review. He needs to be able to answer 
the question of why judicial review should signify a concern for equality rather than 
a desire to place government in the hands of an elite: why is it democratic and not 
aristocratic? He can answer this question because our constitutional imaginary 
distinguishes courts from aristocratic bodies. Judges are associated with a particular 
set of virtues – virtues of impartiality, rationality and fairness – and not with 
superiority or excellence simpliciter. The narrative that justifies their authority speaks 
of professional learning and institutional independence, not of their possessing gold 
in their soul.41 This narrative allows Dworkin to differentiate judicial review from 
aristocracy, and thus conclude that judicial review does not symbolise a lack of 
respect for any section of the community. 
However, as scholars of cultural symbolism have pointed out, symbols often 
‘condense many references, uniting them in a single cognitive and affective field’.42 
Those seeking to defend a political institution must take its significance in its entirety; 
one cannot pick-and-choose those aspects of symbolic significance that are desirable 
and hope to discard the others. In the case of courts, the very virtue that seems to 
recommend them as arbiters of disputes over the extent of fundamental rights – their 
impartiality – is linked with a way of thinking about constitutional politics that is 
problematic for political autonomy. 
For a number of decades now political scientists have puzzled over what they have 
come to call the ‘myth of legality’: the notion that judicial decision-making is 
somehow a ‘nonpolitical’ process.43 Empirical investigations have found such a view 
                                                     
41 Cf Plato, The Republic (HDP Lee tr, 2nd edn (revised), London: Penguin, 2007), Book III, 415a. 
42 Victor W Turner, Dramas, Fields and Metaphors: symbolic action in human society (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1974), p 55; see also his The Forest of Symbols: aspects of Ndembu ritual 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), p 27-30. 
43 See Gregory Casey, ‘The Supreme Court and Myth: an empirical investigation’ (1974) 8 Law 
and Society Review 385; Austin Sarat, ‘Studying American Legal Culture: an assessment of 
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to be widely held (at least in the US),44 although it is not entirely clear what is meant 
by ‘nonpolitical’ in this context, and a number of studies show citizens holding 
apparently contradictory views.45 The tenor of much of the political science literature 
tends to suggest that the myth of legality is, in the words of Caldeira, ‘silly formalism’, 
that ‘no one who has taken Introduction to American Government… is going to 
ascribe to’.46 But, as Caldeira goes on to point out, this attitude simplistically equates 
the myth of legality with acceptance of what Pound derided long ago as ‘mechanical 
jurisprudence’.47 The myth, however, should not be seen as acceptance of any 
particular jurisprudential theory, nor, indeed, as the acceptance of any particular 
theory at all. In fact, we need some sort of myth of legality in order to accept the very 
idea of law. To be clear, I do not mean by myth ‘a widely held misconception’, but 
rather ‘a symbolic narrative’.48 Myths are the stories that we tell ourselves in order for 
us to bring order to a complex and potentially chaotic world.49  ‘Law’ is not a natural 
kind, an a priori concept or the product of pure rational thought; it is a frame through 
                                                     
survey evidence’ (1977) 11 Law and Society Review 427; Dean Jaros and Robert Roper, ‘The 
Supreme Court, Myth, Diffuse Support, Specific Support, and Legitimacy’ (1980) 8 American 
Politics Quarterly 557; John M Scheb II and William Lyons, ‘The Myth of Legality and Public 
Evaluation of the Supreme Court’ (2000) 81 Social Science Quarterly 928; Sara C Benesh, 
‘Understanding Public Confidence in American Courts’ (2006) 68 Journal of Politics 697; James 
L Gibson and Gregory A Caldeira, Citizens, Courts and Confirmations: positivity theory and the 
judgments of the American people (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
44 A certain caution about drawing generalised conclusions from this empirical data is due 
owing to the fact that almost all studies have been conducted in the US. However, James L 
Gibson et al have found evidence of similar attitudes in a number of EU countries: see their 
‘On the Legitimacy of National High Courts’ (1998) 92 American Political Science Review 343. 
45 For an overview, see James L Gibson and Michael J Nelson, ‘The Legitimacy of the US 
Supreme Court: conventional wisdoms and recent challenges thereto’ (2014) 10 Annual 
Review of Law and Social Science 201, at 209-12. 
46 Gregory A Caldeira, (1994) 88 American Political Science Review 485, at 485, reviewing Segal 
and Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model. 
47 Roscoe Pound, ‘Mechanical Jurisprudence’ (1908) 8 Columbia Law Review 605. 
48 The former definition is from the Oxford English Dictionary (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), the latter from the Encyclopaedia Britannica (15th edn, Chicago: 
Britannica, 1994). 
49 See Martin Loughlin, Sword and Scales: an examination of the relationship between law and politics 
(Oxford: Hart, 2000), p 22-6. 
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which we organise aspects of our social and political lives. It exists on the level of 
constitutional imaginary. 
I therefore do not think that we should be surprised by the fact that the ‘myth of 
legality’ appears to be widespread, or by the fact that its content lacks clarity. What 
the empirical studies show, I believe, is citizens struggling to articulate verbally 
certain inchoate understandings that are usually expressed symbolically. The way in 
which the courts are ‘different’ from ‘political’ actors does not permit straightforward 
definition, but it is nevertheless deeply ingrained into our structures of thought and 
behaviour.50 It is this understanding that enables us to see courts as ‘impartial’ 
arbiters. They are certainly not impartial in the sense of not being affected by the 
outcome of decisions: judges, like the rest of us, have to obey the law. Nor are they 
impartial in the sense that they may reach decisions by recourse to some algorithm 
that spares them the need to make normative judgments: this kind of ‘formalism’ is 
indeed ‘silly’. Their impartiality comes from the fact that they are bound to ‘legal’ as 
opposed to ‘political’ considerations. And while there are countless competing 
theories about precisely what this entails for judicial decision-making, these theories 
only make sense on the understanding that courts are different from the ‘political’ 
branches of government, i.e. that the distinction between law and politics has at least 
some substance. It is this constitutional imaginary that allows us to see judicial review 
as premised on a liberal ideal of impartiality rather than on an aristocratic supposition 
of judicial superiority. 
                                                     
50 My claim here is supported by the finding, in a number of empirical studies, that there is a 
positive correlation between strength of adherence to the ‘myth of legality’ and familiarity 
with/knowledge of the law and courts (Casey, ‘The Supreme Court and Myth’; Gibson et al, 
‘On the Legitimacy of National High Courts’; Benesh, ‘Understanding Public Confidence in 
American Courts’). This correlation is difficult to explain on assumption that the myth is 
simply a falsehood, since in that case we would expect experience of the courts to disabuse 
rather than bolster it. Gibson and Caldeira conclude, sensibly, I think, that exposure to 
legitimising judicial symbols reinforces the process of distinguishing courts from other 
political institutions, so that those who are experienced with courts tend to perceive and 
evaluate their decisions through the frame of law (Citizens, Courts and Confirmations, p 7-14). 
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The difficulty with this, however, is that our constitutional imaginary frames not only 
the decision-process (nemo judex in causa sua, audi alteram partem, etc.), but also the 
subject-matter of the decision itself. By sending questions about fundamental rights 
to the courts for determination, judicial review presents such issues as qualitatively 
differentiated from matters of ‘ordinary politics’. Furthermore, the supremacy of the 
courts over parliament promotes the idea of the supremacy of law over politics; i.e. 
an understanding of politics as being limited within the bounds set by law. This 
causes problems for both the ‘agency’ and ‘communal’ values of democracy. 
The distinction between the ‘political’ and the ‘legal’ casts doubt on Dworkin’s claim 
that judicial review provides an arena of contestation that is ‘directly connected to 
[citizens’] moral lives’.51 Sending an issue to be determined by the court elevates it to 
the level of constitutional law, and thereby marks its difference from everyday moral 
issues. A constitutional ruling presents itself not merely as one side in a moral-
political quarrel, but as an authoritative statement of the permissible framework 
within which such quarrels are to be conducted. Such statements are buttressed by 
powerful symbolism. This is most obviously manifested in quasi-religious courtroom 
design and dress and the elaborate use of supplicant honorifics,52 but perhaps even 
more important is the symbolic force of the ‘sacred text’ of The Constitution.53 This is 
not to say that judges are presented as infallible, or that constitutional decisions are 
placed beyond dispute. The point is that constitutional decisions may only be 
disputed in a certain register: not the register of everyday morality, or of political 
action, but the learned, mystifying register of constitutional law. Citizens may indeed 
‘participate, argumentatively, if they wish’54 in judicial review, but they can only do 
                                                     
51 ‘What is Equality?’, at 29. 
52 Note the US Supreme Court’s description of itself on its own website: ‘The Supreme Court 
Building: America’s Temple of Justice’ 
<http://www.supremecourt.gov/visiting/TempleOfJustice.aspx>. See also Murray J Edelman, 
From Art to Politics: how artistic creations shape political conceptions (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1995), chap 5; and Jerome Frank, ‘The Cult of the Robe’, in Courts on Trial: 
myth and reality in American justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950). 
53 See, for example, Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1988). 
54 ‘What is Equality?’, at 29. 
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so in the sacred language of law. (Furthermore, if they expect results they are best 
advised to hire an acolyte to speak for them.) The link between the outcome and the 
citizens’ sense of moral agency is, I submit, accordingly diluted. 
The image of politics bounded by law also threatens to weaken the ‘communal value’, 
i.e. the ability for citizens to see themselves as engaged in a joint project of self-
government. When the most basic questions about the principles upon which the 
political community is built are presented as questions of law, then we should not be 
surprised if, as de Tocqueville put it, ‘the spirit of the lawyer… infiltrates all society’.55 
Judicial review places courts at the pinnacle of our institutional hierarchy, and thus 
presents legal action as the most fundamental way in which citizens may interact with 
the political community. This, I suggest, will project a ‘negative’ conception of 
citizenship, according to which the characteristic capacity of the citizen is the ability 
to secure one’s rights as against the state.56  However, (and without wanting to 
downplay the importance of government in accordance with the law), ‘rights-
retrieval’ is not the essence of democratic self-government.57 If citizens are to view 
themselves as engaged in a joint project of self-government, they will need a ‘positive’ 
conception of citizenship, where the defining characteristic of a citizen is a voice in 
deciding the laws by which the community defines itself. My concern here is not just 
the instrumental one that a society of individualistic rights-claimers will be unstable 
without widespread civic virtue.58 It is a deeper claim: if people’s relationship with 
the state is defined in terms of a list of rights, the full value of self-government is not 
                                                     
55 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (HC Mansfield and D Winthrop ed and tr, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), Volume I, part 2, chap viii. 
56 The classical exposition of this conception of citizenship is TH Marshall, ‘Citizenship and 
Social Class’, in Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1950). Marshall’s idea that it is through enjoyment of an array liberal-
democratic rights that individuals come to see themselves as full members of society bears 
more than a passing resemblance to Dworkin’s account of the ‘communal value’. 
57 See Taylor, ‘Cross-Purposes’, p 200-2. 
58 For arguments along these lines see Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: citizenship, virtue and 
community in liberal constitutionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); William A Galston, 
Liberal Purposes: goods, virtues and diversity in the liberal state (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991); and Richard Dagger, Civic Virtues: rights, citizenship and republican liberalism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
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available to them. A claim of right is an action taken against the community; people 
can only be self-governing insofar as they conceive of themselves as acting through 
the community.59 By elevating legal action to the highest form of citizen-participation, 
judicial review celebrates individual rights-retrieval at the expense of more 
collaborative forms of political engagement. It therefore threatens the ability of 
citizens to view themselves as a self-governing political community. 
4.5 Legislature as Symbol: the focal point of the practice of democracy 
I argued in the previous chapter that a plebiscitary democracy cannot do justice to the 
complex, dynamic and collective nature of judgment-formation, and that it is 
therefore only capable of respecting citizens as ‘simple weighers’ and not as ‘strong 
evaluators’. To really respect individuals as moral agents, the connection between 
individual agency and the community’s political decisions cannot merely be an 
aggregative one. Instead the process must involve some deliberative engagement, as 
this is the only way to acknowledge respectfully the various judgments of citizens who 
hold differing opinions. This is fundamentally different from – indeed, it is 
inconsistent with – the idea that any particular individual should have any particular 
degree of causal impact on the final decision reached. 
Dworkin is, of course, critical of aggregative conceptions of democracy. Of his own 
conception, he says this: 
‘It denies that it is a defining goal of democracy that collective decisions 
always or normally be those that a majority or plurality of citizens would 
favour if fully informed and rational. It takes the defining aim of democracy 
to be a different one: that collective decisions be made by political institutions 
                                                     
59 I do not, however, go so far as to say that ‘the life of the active citizen is the highest life 
available to us’ (Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: an introduction (2nd edn, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), p 294). Kymlicka wins a pyrrhic victory over ‘civic 
republicanism’ by presenting it as relying either on an instrumental conception of citizenship 
(and thus collapsing into ‘liberalism’) or a comprehensive conception of the good life (and 
thus placing an implausible intrinsic value on political participation) (ibid., p 294-9). My claim 
is not about what makes an individual human life go well, all things considered, it is about 
the kind of relationship that must pertain between citizens in order to make available a 
particular kind of value that they enjoy by virtue of membership in a democratic community. 
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whose structure, composition, and practices treat all members of the 
community, as individuals, with equal concern and respect.’60 
I agree: democracy is not identified by an ‘input-based’ test of statistical equality of 
impact, nor an ‘output-based’ test of majority support for laws. The question is 
whether (or, more accurately, to what extent) citizens govern themselves collectively 
through a process that respects each of them as free and equal moral agents. This is 
not a question that can be answered by statistical data: it is an interpretive question, 
one which can only be answered by venturing an opinion as to the symbolic meaning 
and value of political processes. 
Given Dworkin’s apparently unequivocal rejection of majoritarianism, however, we 
may well ask why, when appraising institutions, he takes as his default starting 
position statistical equality of impact. He is happy, of course, to depart from equality 
of impact so long as such a departure does not signify contempt for or disregard of 
any group within the community. But if democracy does not demand 
majoritarianism, even as a theoretical ideal, then why should statistical equality 
feature even as a starting-point? It is as if, after expressly rejecting the majoritarian 
conception of democracy, Dworkin is unable completely to escape its grasp.61 
I find this feature of Dworkin’s theory curious. The reason for it, I think, is that 
Dworkin does not follow through with his own interpretive methodology. After 
appreciating that a normative study of democracy must take the form of an 
interpretation of a practice, he takes an incredibly narrow view of what that practice 
consists of. In his discussion of the ‘symbolic’ value of democracy, Dworkin focuses 
his attention on elections; indeed, he goes as far as to equate the symbolic value with 
the assertion of equality inherent in a one-person-one-vote electoral system. After 
                                                     
60 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: the moral reading of the American constitution (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1996), p 17. 
61 There seems to be a parallel here with Dworkin’s early treatment of utilitarianism in ‘Why 
Bakke has no Case’, New York Review of Books, 11 October 1977, p11: despite criticising 
utilitarianism for ignoring individual rights, Dworkin seemed to rely on a background 
utilitarian conception of the common good. For criticism, see Michael J Sandel, Liberalism and 
the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p 135-47. 
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identifying this positive symbolic value of elections, Dworkin then treats the symbolic 
significance of all departures from majoritarianism in purely negative terms, asking 
only whether they detract from the equality that equal voting rights establish. By 
focusing so squarely on the symbolic value of elections, Dworkin fails to consider 
whether other parts of the democratic process have a positive symbolic significance.62 
The benefits secured by departures from plebiscitarianism – representative 
government, judicial review, and so on – are treated as merely instrumental. He fails 
to entertain the possibility that non-plebiscitary forms of government might 
noninstrumentally express respect for citizens’ moral agency. Dworkin’s attempt at a 
constructive interpretation of democracy in fact only constructively interprets the 
practice of voting. 
The narrow scope of Dworkin’s interpretation leads him to adopt a ‘vote-centric’63 
view of democratic politics which seems better suited to aggregative theories of 
democracy than to his own ‘partnership conception’. Dworkin presents legislatures 
as ‘the battleground of power politics’,64 with the primary function of aggregating 
private interests so that decisions on ‘choice-sensitive’ issues are made in a manner 
roughly corresponding to the preferences of the majority65 and a secondary, negative 
                                                     
62 In places Dworkin has suggested a positive noninstrumental expressive value for judicial 
review. For example: 
 
‘[Judicial review] calls some issues from the battleground of power politics to the 
forum of principle. It holds out the promise that the deepest, most fundamental 
conflicts between individual and society will once, someplace, finally, become 
questions of justice. I do not call that religion or prophesy. I call it law.’ (Ronald 
Dworkin, ‘The Forum of Principle’ (1981) 56 New York University Law Review 469, 
at 518 (footnotes omitted)) 
 
Claims like this, however, dropped out of his later work, perhaps following accusations that 
he was presenting a ‘rosy’ picture of courts not matched by his ‘cynical’ picture of legislatures 
(see, for example, Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), p 
31-2). In any event, Dworkin fails to consider whether representative government may have 
any positive noninstrumental significance. 
63 Here I use the terminology of Kymlicka, who contrasts ‘vote-centric’ theories of democracy 
with ‘talk-centric’ theories (Contemporary Political Philosophy, p 290-1). 
64 ‘The Forum of Principle’, at 518. 
65 ‘What is Equality?’, at 23-8. 
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function of guarding against ‘dangerous swings in public opinion’.66 This model of 
the legislature is familiar from those ‘interest group’ theorists (mostly based in the 
US) who have viewed democratic politics as consisting mainly of a clash between 
competing self-interested groups.67 But the model fails on both interpretative 
dimensions: as an account of modern democracy it is neither descriptively realistic 
nor normatively desirable. 
Descriptively speaking, as Waldron has pointed out, the supposed inability of elected 
representatives to engage responsibly with matters of principle has been exaggerated. 
Waldron gives the example of the UK Parliament in the 1960s debating controversial 
moral issues such as abortion, homosexuality, capital punishment, obscenity and 
prostitution.68 The Parliament passed a raft of liberalising legislation, often against 
the wishes of the majority of the public, following reasoned (and reasonable) debates 
on the matters of moral and political principle involved (without, Waldron adds, the 
distraction of ‘issues about interpretive technique, or issues about precedent or 
jurisdiction or other legalisms’69). Although legislatures clearly do not always act in 
such a responsible way, such examples show that they are capable of acting as fora of 
principle, at least some of the time. 
Waldron’s anecdotal observations gain support from the findings of more systematic 
studies showing that ‘interest group theory’ has under-appreciated the level of 
interaction between legislative debate and individual political beliefs: far from merely 
giving expression to pre-existing public views, the reasons given by legislators in 
support of (or against) government policy help shape the political principles that are 
held by ordinary voters.70 Here legislatures are aided by their distinctive institutional 
                                                     
66 Justice for Hedgehogs, p 394. 
67 For an overview, see Andrew McFarland, ‘Interest Group Theory’, in Louis Sandy Maisel at 
al (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
68 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Legislating with Integrity’ (2003) 72 Fordham Law Review 373, at 388-94. 
69 Ibid., at 393. 
70 See, for example, Arthur Maas, Congress and the Common Good (New York: Basic Books, 1983) 
(in the US); and Philip Norton, Parliament in British Politics (2nd edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013) (in the UK). 
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features: their large numbers of members and non-specialised function allow them to 
provide a forum for nonexpert deliberation involving inputs from a wide variety of 
perspectives. Legislative debates are not (like court proceedings) detached from pre-
existing public opinion, but nor do they merely reflect it mimetically. Legislative 
debate provides an opportunity for public opinion to be refined, to be given more 
specific content and to be brought to bear on detailed issues which require more time 
and attention than ordinary citizens are able to give. 
In order to understand the normative shortcomings of interest group theory, it is 
important to note a distinction between merely widespread or general opinion, on 
one hand, and a truly public opinion, on the other.71 While general opinion may be 
simply inherited from preceding generations, or passively absorbed by the recipients 
of propaganda, public opinion is the product of active reflection and discussion. 
Public opinion can only arise where there exists a common space of discussion that 
allows people to share thoughts, beliefs and arguments without ever meeting in 
person, or even communicating with one another directly. This requires citizens to 
have a certain self-conception: they must understand themselves as taking part in a 
discursive process that is oriented towards a common resolution. This is qualitatively 
different to a group of people who just happen to be talking and forming opinions 
about the same thing. Public opinion is irreducibly shared, rather than merely 
convergent, opinion. 
The ‘communal value’ of democracy – the idea that the laws are created by the 
collective agency of the people – relies entirely on the existence of a public opinion as 
opposed to merely general opinions. We can only view ourselves as a self-governing 
community if we see political power as answerable not simply to widely-held 
opinions about the general welfare but to a public opinion which is the common 
property of us all. The notion that our disagreements over particular issues take place 
                                                     
71 Here I follow Taylor, ‘Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere’, in Philosophical Arguments, p 
260-5. See also Habermas, ‘Popular Sovereignty as Procedure’, in Between Facts and Norms, 
which I discuss at §5.1.3, below. 
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within the context of a broader shared fabric prevents them from threatening our 
sense of common enterprise. As Warner has put it: ‘It silently transforms the ideal of 
a social order free from conflictual debate into an ideal of debate free of social 
conflict.’72 
What I want to suggest, then, is that had Dworkin taken seriously the task of 
constructively interpreting the practice of representative government, he would not 
have seen the value of the legislative assembly (negatively) as an instrumentally 
valuable reflection of/brake on majority opinion, but rather (positively) as reflecting a 
commitment to the idea that government ought to be steered by public opinion. Public 
opinion cannot be equated with the opinions that happen to be held by the majority 
of citizens and its content cannot be ascertained by empirical inquiry, opinion polls, 
or referendums. It is the opinion that arises when people, understanding themselves 
as a community that shares some common purposes, engage in a reflective and critical 
debate. For public opinion to be democratic, every group and class of citizen must be 
given a genuine hearing so as to be able to have a real impact on the debate (we can 
contrast the eighteenth century ‘republic of letters’). Such a debate is the ideal towards 
which legislative debates aspire, and is implicit both in the procedures for the 
composition and conduct of legislatures and in the role that legislatures play in the 
popular imagination. 
By reaching decisions through a process of public debate, legislative assemblies 
respect citizens’ moral/political agency in such a way as to recognise that the relevant 
faculty is not the will but the capacity for judgment. A voluntaristic conception of 
democracy will be concerned with respecting majority opinion since, as I argued in 
chapter three, wills are qualitatively equal.73 But a conception of democracy based on 
respect for judgment, recognising the latter’s essentially collective and diachronic 
nature, will ground itself in a concern for public opinion. The practice of legislation by 
                                                     
72 Michael Warner, The Letters of the Republic: publication and the public sphere in eighteenth century 
America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p 46. 
73 See p 63-4, above. 
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assembly represents a commitment to the kind of public, reasoned debate that is the 
lifeblood of political judgment. It therefore has a certain distinctive, noninstrumental 
value. 
By representing inclusive and reasoned elaboration of a public opinion that is 
oriented towards a common good, legislatures can promote the communal value of 
democracy, i.e. the idea that the political community is collectively self-governing. 
Legislatures can also promote the agency value, by serving as the target of 
participation that connects the politically active citizen with the procedure by which 
significant political decisions are made. Taken individually, each citizen has a 
representative (or group of representatives) to whom she may make political 
arguments and expect a considered response.74 In its individualised nature, this mode 
of participation has something in common with participation as a ‘citizen-claimant’ 
in a judicial review action, though it does not require the petitioner to speak the 
language of law, or to assert an individual right. However, the legislature is also the 
focal point of political action of an irreducibly collective kind, namely demonstrations 
and protests. As Norton points out, the continued relevance of Parliament in UK 
politics is shown by the fact that demonstrations against particular measures are held, 
not outside a particular ministry, but outside Parliament.75 This behaviour cannot be 
explained in straightforwardly instrumental terms as trying to influence those who 
hold the levers of power, since, although Parliament of course has the power to make 
significant changes to government legislation, in practice it is extremely rare that it 
does so. The phenomena of protests outside Parliament only make sense when we 
take a broader perspective. Parliament is understood to be the focus for political 
activity and thus the proper place for attempts to garner public attention to a political 
cause. The aim is not simply to get MPs to act in the way that the demonstrators want, 
but to ‘send a message’ both to government and to the wider public. Parliament thus 
                                                     
74 Again, I am using ‘expect’ in a normative, not a descriptive sense, see p 34, n 41, above. 
75 Norton, Parliament in British Politics, p 261. See also Rob Boggatt, Pressure Groups Today 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), chap 7. 
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provides a ‘dignified site’ for interaction between citizens and the state.76 Even when 
it is perceived to be unjust, unrepresentative, even cynically self-serving, and even 
when its members are considered merely puppets of political parties and commercial 
interests, Parliament is seen as the proper venue for (attempts at) popular 
sovereignty. Its symbolic status at the heart of democracy runs deep. If we view it 
merely as an instrumental guardian against ‘dangerous swings in public opinion’, we 
miss its true significance. 
4.6 Why Idealise Legislatures? 
I am not so naïve as to suppose that the above describes how real-life legislatures 
always operate. Legislators do not tend to come from all sections of society, they are 
predominantly white,77 male78 and upper-middle class.79 They do not generally spend 
                                                     
76 See John Parkinson, Democracy and Public Space: the physical sites of democratic performance 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p 94. 
77 The underrepresentation of ethnic minorities is a recurring trend in economically developed 
countries. Examples include Canada (19.1% of the population as a whole is non-white, 9.4% 
of legislators are non-white); France (12.6%, 1.56%); the Netherlands (11.1%, 5.3%); New 
Zealand (33.4%, 22.8%); Sweden (13.3%, 10.9%); the UK (12.9%, 4.2%); and the US (36.3%, 
22.8%). (See Didier Ruedin, ‘Ethnic Groups in National Legislatures’ (2012) Harvard 
Dataverse <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/17476>.) 
78 Data collected by the Inter-Parliamentary Union shows that only 22.2% of parliamentarians 
worldwide are women (Inter-Parliamentary Union, ‘Women in National Parliaments’ (2015) 
<http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm>). 
79 In the UK, over a third of MPs have attended fee-paying schools, compared with 9% of the 
population as a whole; 27% of MPs have an Oxbridge background, compared with 0.8% of the 
population as a whole (House of Commons Library, ‘Social Background of MPs’, Briefing 
Paper SN1528 (2010); Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission, Elitist Britain? (2014)). 
In the US, the median net worth of members of Congress is $1.5 million, roughly nineteen 
times the median net worth of Americans in general; the alumni of 13 prestigious universities 
constitute about 15% of the House of Representatives, but less than 1% of the population as a 
whole; and only 20% of legislators grew up in working-class homes, compared with 65% of 
the population as a whole (Nicholas Carnes, ‘Does the Numerical Underrepresentation of the 
Working Class in Congress Matter?’ (2012) XXXVII Legislative Studies Quarterly 5; and White 
Collar Government: the hidden role of class in economic policy making (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2013), p 4-8). Across the EU fewer than 4% of legislators are drawn from the 
ranks of blue collar workers, a figure which has been in steady decline since the 1950s 
(Heinrich Best, ‘New Challenges, New Elites? Changes in the recruitment and career patterns 





their time debating a representative selection of viewpoints on their merits, and all 
too often devote their time debating only two positions – ‘government policy good’ 
versus ‘government policy bad – picking sides solely according to what party they 
belong to. The demands of the common good are often out-trumped by the interests 
of a few swing voters in marginal constituencies. A convenient scapegoat can be 
worth a thousand convincing arguments. It can, I admit, be difficult at times to see 
how any of this respects citizens as intelligent moral agents. Furthermore, the 
formation of public opinion is not an egalitarian, inclusive, deliberative process; it is 
distorted, right at its centre, by powerful media interests who often quite deliberately 
oversimplify, trivialise and mislead with the aim not so much to persuade the public 
to agree with them as to dissuade them from thinking at all. In light of all of this, is 
there any point in constructing an idealised account of legislatures? 
With respect to a given legislature it may well be the case that, if its shortcomings are 
sufficiently acute, it will utterly fail to provide any noninstrumental good. The best 
we could say about it then would be that it provides a compromise between the 
symbolic value of equal vote and the practical need for quality of outcome (assuming 
it achieved even that). We would then have little reason to suppose that its decisions 
necessarily had any greater democratic quality than the decisions of a constitutional 
court; they might even have less. 
It is not my aim here to assess the operation of existing legislatures; any such 
assessment would need to be highly context-sensitive and involve a degree of 
empirical analysis beyond the scope of this thesis. I would like to suggest, however, 
that, despite some rather acute flaws, the way in which legislative assemblies operate 
in modern western democracies is premised upon the idea that, according to our 
dominant constitutional imaginary they are at least supposed to be arenas for reasoned 
deliberation, representative of society as a whole and firmly grounded in a reflective 
and critical public opinion. We overlook a vital aspect of our practice – our 
interpretation of our political institutions is wanting – if we do not recognise these 
internal virtues of legislatures. 
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So I do not deny that a version of Dworkin’s argument might succeed as a piece of 
nonideal theory, intended for particular contingent circumstances. Dworkin, 
however, does not develop his argument in these terms. His defence of judicial review 
is presented as an ideal constitutional theory, an interpretation that portrays the 
practice of democracy in its best light. As such, it fails, since it overlooks much of the 
significance of the central institution in modern democracy, the representative 
legislature. In a sense, Dworkin is guilty of not taking his own methodology far 
enough: he does not portray legislatures in their best light, and thus misses the 
distinctive role that they play in the democratic ideal. This failing has potentially more 
than merely theoretical consequences. As Dworkin himself says: ‘Interpretation folds 
back into the practice, altering its shape, and the new shape encourages further 
interpretation, so the practice changes dramatically; though each step is interpretive 
of what the last achieved.’80 If so, then interpretations of democracy that, consciously 
or otherwise, do not require the legislature to function as a deliberative and 
representative assembly run the risk of becoming self-fulfilling prophesies. 
4.6 Conclusion 
It is a great virtue of Dworkin’s theory of democracy that it is premised on an account 
of political community that does not portray citizens either (implausibly) as having 
consented to political authority or as mere passive beneficiaries (or victims) of state 
action. We determine the nature and constituency of a political community not by 
examining who can be said to have tacitly consented or who has been empirically 
affected by political decisions, but through a process of constructive interpretation 
that is sensitive to the point or value that we take political communities to serve. We 
should remember that special relationships – like family, friendship and citizenship 
– do not exist as brute facts: they can only be understood when we have a grasp of 
their significance to the lives of those who are party to them. Political communities 
                                                     
80 Law’s Empire, p 48. 
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must therefore be interpreted ‘from the inside’, i.e. from the point of view of someone 
who shares in the background understandings that lend them meaning. 
Although Dworkin talks of the ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ of a democratic system, he 
should not be taken to endorse the ‘black box’ view that takes political values as 
exogenous to the institutions with which they engage. By including ‘participatory 
consequences’ as part of his ‘dependent’ conception of democracy, Dworkin 
recognises the noninstrumental role that political practice plays in constituting 
political value: what amounts to ‘insult’ or ‘respect’ depends upon shared 
understandings which afford significance to particular features of our practice. And 
with his ‘symbolic’, ‘agency’ and ‘communal’ values, Dworkin identifies important 
normative characteristics of democracy: it recognises citizens as equals; it is 
inherently practical and social; and it enables members of the political community to 
view themselves as collectively self-governing. Democratic citizens thus share an 
irreducibly social good which cannot be reduced to mutual benefit. 
When it comes to institutionalising his theory, however, Dworkin adopts a curious 
starting-point: arithmetical equality of impact between voters. While this may be a 
reasonable starting-point for a theory of elections, it provides an overly ‘vote-centric’ 
perspective from which to examine democracy as a whole, better suited to 
aggregative theories of democracy than to his own ‘partnership conception’. It is as 
if, after expressly rejecting the majoritarian conception of democracy, Dworkin is 
unable completely to escape its grasp. The effect of this is that Dworkin ends up 
viewing any departures from plebiscitarianism as bearing instrumental value only. 
Yet representative assemblies, constitutional courts and so on are not merely practical 
expedients to improve the quality of our political decisions, they are institutions that 
occupy particular places in our constitutional imaginaries. As well as being decision-
making mechanisms, they are cultural symbols that condense many references into a 
single affective field, with courts representing the panoply of meanings associated 
with ‘law’ and legislatures roughly representing ‘politics’. Our constitutional 
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imaginaries frame not only the decision-processes, but also the very subject-matter 
and meaning of the decisions that fall to be made. 
I have argued that the distinction between the ‘political’ and the ‘legal’ casts doubt on 
Dworkin’s claim that judicial review provides an arena of contestation that is ‘directly 
connected to [citizens’] moral lives’.81 Judicial review may dilute the link between 
decision and citizens’ sense of moral agency, and threaten the ability of citizens to 
view themselves as a self-governing political community. Legislatures, on the other 
hand, are not merely majoritarian institutions, but provide a forum for nonexpert 
deliberation involving inputs from a wide variety of perspectives. When they 
function well, they symbolise a commitment to government in accordance with a 
critically-reflective public opinion. 
I develop these claims further in chapter six. First, however, reflection upon 
Dworkin’s failure to recognise the centrality of the legislature in the democratic 
process should lead us to consider the deliberative democratic theory of Jürgen 
Habermas. Habermas expressly recognises that the heart of democracy lies ‘in the 
interplay between, on one hand, the parliamentary will-formation institutionalised in 
legal procedures and programmed to reach decisions, and, on the other hand, 
political opinion-building in informal circles of political communication’.82 Yet 
judicial review still forms part of his theory. How does he reconcile the democratic 
centrality of the legislature with an institution that seems to grant superiority to the 
judiciary? And is his reasoning persuasive? These questions are the subject of the next 
chapter. 
                                                     
81 ‘What is Equality?’, at 29. 
82 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p 275. 
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5. Habermas: reason, relationships and representation 
In chapters three and four I have argued for two claims about the nature of 
democracy. Firstly, democracy presupposes a collective subject, that is to say, a ‘we’ 
capable of acting jointly, without which the idea of self-government is incoherent. 
Secondly, democracy must respect the capacity of citizens to render normative 
political judgments, rather than merely their capacities to will.  
If these claims are true, then a theory of democracy will need to account for the 
following. Firstly, how do democratic citizens come to view themselves as a collective 
subject? Clearly the means by which this occurs must be compatible with democratic 
values: an unreflectively traditional society, or a herd of brainwashed drones, may 
engage in collective action, but these are not democratic communities. Secondly, how 
can the judgments of citizens on moral and other normative political matters make its 
way into the content of the law? If there is no link between the content of the law and 
citizens’ judgments, then surely democracy fails to respect the latter. 
Habermas has put forward a complex theory of democracy according to which the 
answer to both of these questions is ‘through the communicative use of reason’. 
Through practical deliberation with one another in the public sphere, citizens (1) 
come to recognise one another as equal members of a self-governing political 
community, and (2) form a ‘communicative power’ that binds the administrative 
power of the state apparatus to their collectively produced will. Habermas’ approach 
to both questions shows an awareness of the dynamic nature of democracy that is not 
always present in Waldron’s and Dworkin’s work. When he comes to apply his 
theory to the question of judicial review, however, he fails to pay adequate attention 
to the symbolic dimension of constitutional design. 
In the first section of this chapter I conduct my own reconstruction of Habermas’ 
position. I then argue, in section two, that Habermas shows a lack of concern for the 
ethical significance of political relationships. Such relationships cannot be explained 
purely in terms of the communicative use of reason, since they depend upon largely 
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unarticulated, shared background assumptions. Habermas’ focus on rational 
processes of communicative action therefore appears excessively narrow. A 
constitutional design is not merely a mechanism for translating the communicative 
power of citizens into the administrative power of government: it also tells us 
something about the kind of association that a political community is. When it comes 
to questions of institutional design, our constitutional imaginaries must play an 
important role. 
In the third section I reflect on the fact that there will always be an irreducible gap 
between ideal consensus following uninhibited communicative action and any actual 
decision reached in imperfect real world procedures. A ‘cut’ must be made in the 
process of deliberation, and the timing of and place in which this cut is made will be 
decided by a particular individual or body who thereby enjoys a certain freedom from 
the communicative process. The idea of representation, I suggest, is necessary to 
maintain the link between communicatively-acting citizens and particular political 
decisions. The ‘cut’ is not arbitrary insofar as it is made by a person or institution that 
speaks for the self-governing political community as a whole. This need for decision-
makers to represent the people gives rise to a particular concern about judicial review, 
since in the modern popular imagination it is the legislature, and not the courts, that 
is seen as the institution that represents the self-governing people. There is therefore 
a risk that judicially-enforced constitutional norms will be seen as detached from the 
process of ordinary political deliberation, and thus appear as a set of side-constraints 
imposed by an epistemic elite. 
5.1 Habermas’ Rational Reconstruction of Democracy 
5.1.1 The Jurisgenerative Potential of Communicative Power 
The starting-point of Habermas’ theory of democracy is an essentially Kantian 
account of the legal form as presupposing equal rights that abstract from citizens’ 
capacity for moral autonomy and from their individual needs and wishes.1 However, 
                                                     
1 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p 111-2. 
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Habermas criticises Kant for subordinating the notion of collective self-determination 
to the universal principle of moral right, or, in Habermas’ terms, for prioritising 
private autonomy over public autonomy.2 Habermas claims that we must instead 
appreciate that these two principles are in fact mutually dependent upon one 
another.3 The basic thought here is that both forms of autonomy should be 
understood as an expression of the modern conception of a person as a free and equal 
moral citizen. This status entails both an entitlement to rights to individual freedom 
and rights to participate in the process of political will-formation; neither can take 
priority. As Habermas puts it: ‘the scope of citizens’ public autonomy is not restricted 
by natural or moral rights just waiting to be put into effect, nor is the individual’s 
private autonomy merely instrumentalized for the purpose of popular sovereignty’.4 
Habermas postulates a system of rights intended to secure for each person individual 
freedom and equal participation in the legislative process.5 These rights are divided 
into five categories. The first three represent the private autonomy that Habermas 
infers from the form of law itself. These are:  
1. Rights to the greatest possible measure of equal individual liberties. 
2. Rights associated with the status of membership in a political community. 
3. Rights to legal protection. 
A fourth category of rights is necessary to allow legal subjects to view themselves as 
authors of the legal order: 
4. Rights to equal opportunities to participate in processes of opinion- and will-
formation in which citizens exercise their political autonomy and through 
which they generate legitimate law. 
Finally, a fifth category of rights is necessary for the effective enjoyment of the other 
rights: 
5. Rights to the provision of basic living conditions. 
                                                     
2 Ibid., p 120-1. 
3 Ibid., p 121-2. 
4 Ibid., p 128. 
5 Ibid., p 122-3. 
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The key thing to note about Habermas’ conception of the basic rights is that they 
function only as ‘unsaturated placeholders’, lacking in specific content.6 It is only 
through citizens’ exercise of their political autonomy (i.e. rights in category 4) that 
these abstract rights can be interpreted and their meaning developed. Were it 
otherwise, citizens would not be able to view themselves as authors of the law to 
which they are subject. In Habermas’ theory, rights without democratic political 
participation would have no shape, while democratic political participation without 
a system of rights would be a subject without an object. We can see then, that 
Habermas has a dynamic conception of democracy. As he puts it: ‘every constitution 
is a living project that can endure only as an ongoing interpretation continually carried 
forward at all levels of the production of law’.7 
Of course, the idea that basic rights function as unsaturated placeholders to be filled 
by citizens’ exercise of political autonomy does not in itself answer the question of 
how citizens’ judgment can work its way into the content of the law. His answer to 
this further question involves conceptualising democratic politics as a form of 
communicative action: the free and open exchange of reasons between citizens who are 
committed to reaching an agreement that is acceptable to all.8 Taking inspiration from 
Arendt’s distinction between ‘power’ and ‘violence’,9 Habermas calls the 
motivational force of this communicative action communicative power: ‘the potential of 
a common will formed in noncoercive communication’.10 Through democratic social 
and political processes, communicative power is converted into the ‘administrative’ 
power that is implemented by government.11 
Habermas sets out a ‘two track’ account of democratic processes, according to which 
informal communication in the public sphere (‘weak publics’) provides a close-to-the-
ground and unregulated arena for detecting new problems, while formal political 
                                                     
6 Ibid., p 126. 
7 Ibid., p 129 (emphasis in original). 
8 Ibid., p 144-54. 
9 See, in particular, Arendt, On Violence. 
10 Between Facts and Norms, p 147 (emphasis in original). 
11 Ibid., p 150. 
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processes (‘strong publics’) provide institutionally regulated ways to assess the 
acceptability and viability of various ideas and, of course, to make binding 
decisions.12 Habermas describes the interaction between formal decision-making 
bodies and informal civil society as a ‘sluice’ through which communicative power 
flows from the ‘periphery’ of the democratic political process to its ‘center’.13 The 
legislature must ‘remain anchored in the informal streams of communication 
emerging from public spheres that are open to political parties, associations and 
citizens’.14 To this end, legislatures should provide the broadest possible spectrum of 
perspectives, be informed by active political debates in society, and be designed so 
that the better arguments are more likely to be those that prevail. Parliamentarians 
should view themselves as the ‘organized midpoint or focus of the society-wide 
circulation of informal communication’.15 
Of course, real-world processes of discourse can only approximate the ideal of 
consensus following uninhibited communicative action between free and equal 
citizens. We cannot expect universal agreement in real-world discourse, where we 
need unambiguous and binding decisions to be made in a timely manner. Habermas 
accordingly recognises that we will need to resort to majority-vote, as ‘a caesura in an 
ongoing discussion’.16 We should therefore always consider the outcome of any actual 
decision-making process to be only provisionally justified, liable to be revised as a 
result of future argument or new information. 
                                                     
12 Ibid., p 304-8. 
13 Ibid., p 356. 
14 Ibid., p 171. 
15 Ibid., p 182. 
16 Ibid., p 179. Note that Habermas’ conception of deliberative democracy cannot be adequately 
characterised in Rawls’ terminology as either ‘imperfectly procedural’ or ‘purely procedural’ 
(Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p 74-5), since although the decisive criterion for the validity of a 
legal norm is the procedure through which it was enacted, a valid norm is not thereby 
insulated from critique, and the question of what constitutes the best practicable 
approximation of ideal speech conditions is itself always potentially up for debate (see, for 
example, William Rehg and James Bohman, ‘Discourse and Democracy: the formal and 
informal bases of legitimacy in Habermas’ Factizität und Geldung’ (1996) 4 Journal of Political 
Philosophy 79 and Stefan Rummens, ‘Democratic Deliberation as the Open-Ended 
Construction of Justice’ (2007) 20 Ratio Juris 335). 
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We can view Habermas’ theory of democracy as based on the idea of the flow of 
reasons: reasons flow from the communicative action of citizens engaging in political 
deliberation in the public sphere, through legislative processes in representative 
assemblies, and into the content of the law itself. Clearly, this process is not supposed 
to be rational in a noumenal sense: Habermas does not claim that the rationality of 
discourse eliminates the contingency of the context of the particular interests and 
values of the particular people concerned. Indeed, as Rummens points out, it is the 
contingency of such particularity that makes deliberation necessary; if people did not 
have a variety of interests and value-orientations, a ‘monological’ approach to reason 
would suffice.17 The contingency that makes deliberation necessary also renders the 
outcomes of deliberation fallible and temporary, so that there is an irreducible gap 
between any actual decision and the regulative idea of an ideal consensus. From this 
perspective, any decision, not just a majority one, is ‘a caesura in an ongoing 
deliberation’. 
5.1.2 Constitutional Patriotism 
The question of how democratic citizens are to come to identify themselves as a 
collective subject highlights an internal tension in the concept of democracy. On one 
hand, in opposing the distinction between rulers and ruled, democracy is clearly 
premised upon a sense of equality. This seems to call for inclusivity, perhaps even 
cosmopolitanism. On the other hand, democracy is supposed to provide self-
government, not of each individual taken separately, but of the whole of the citizenry 
in common. Citizens who dissent from this or that political decision can only be 
expected to accept that they are nevertheless part of a larger self-governing 
community if they have a sense that they belong to the community. And this seems to 
call for a particularistic identity, such that might threaten to generate exclusion of 
those who do not conform to a certain national self-image. This tension gives rise to 
                                                     
17 Stefan Rummens, ‘Democratic Deliberation as the Open-Ended Construction of Justice’ 
(2007) 20 Ratio Juris 335, at 345-6; ‘Deliberation Interrupted: confronting Jürgen Habermas 
with Claude Lefort’ (2008) 34 Philosophy and Social Criticism 383, at 402. 
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the potential for what Taylor has called ‘democratic exclusion’.18 Democratic 
exclusion can take the form of the straightforward denial of citizenship and/or 
political rights to certain classes of people, but it might also take place through more 
subtle, less overt means. People who are granted formal rights might yet still not quite 
find themselves to be insiders in the practice of democracy. The common identity 
might not quite be capable of encompassing all of those who have legal rights to 
participate, perhaps because its boundaries are drawn along ethnic, cultural or 
linguistic lines, or perhaps because it stipulates a certain way of life which certain 
members of society are simply unable to accept.  
Habermas argues that the threat of democratic exclusion can be avoided without 
losing the sense of collective identity by the development of ‘an abstract patriotism 
that no longer refer[s] to a concrete whole of a nation but to abstract procedures and 
principles’.19 Historically, nationalism and democracy have common origins, which 
Habermas traces back to the French Revolution.20 Whereas in ancient and medieval 
thought, the natio was seen as a prepolitical entity, in early modernity the nation 
became a constitutive feature of the political identity of the citizens of a democratic 
polity. When it did so, it made possible a new mode of legitimation based on a new, 
more abstract form of social integration. Democratic participation generated a new 
level of legally mediated solidarity via the status of citizenship. This led to a ‘double 
coding’ of citizenship, with the result that the legal status defined in terms of equal 
rights also implied membership in a culturally-defined community.21 However, 
Habermas argues, the fact there is a social-psychological connection between 
citizenship and national identity does not mean that the two are linked at the 
                                                     
18 Charles Taylor, ‘Democratic Exclusion’, in Alan Cairns et al (eds.), Citizenship, Diversity and 
Pluralism: Canadian and comparative perspectives (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 
1999). 
19 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity’, in The New 
Conservatism: cultural criticism and the historians’ debate (SW Nicholsen ed and tr, Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1994), p 258. 
20 See Jürgen Habermas, ‘Citizenship and National Identity’, p 490-515, at 491-500; and ‘The 
European Nation-State’, in The Inclusion of the Other: studies in political theory (C Cronin and P 
De Geiff ed and tr, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998). 
21 ‘The European Nation-State’, p 113. 
108 
 
conceptual level. Given the dangerous potential, and troubled history, of the idea of 
an ‘organic’ ethnocultural nation, Habermas concludes: ‘The lesson to be learned 
from this history is obvious. The nation-state must renounce the ambivalent potential 
that once propelled it.’22 
Despite his opposition to nationalism, however, Habermas recognises the necessity 
that democratic citizens be able to view themselves as acting in concert, or as he puts 
it, that the political community be ‘settled in the “we” perspective of active self-
determination’.23 But he denies that this needs to be rooted in a shared national 
identity. Instead, he argues, the democratic process can itself serve as a guarantor for 
the social integration of an increasingly diverse society, with a commitment to the 
common good maintained by a shared liberal political culture. As each national 
culture develops a distinctive interpretation of constitutional principles in light of its 
own national history, he says, citizens can come to be bound together by a 
‘constitutional patriotism’, through which universalistic principles are situated ‘in the 
horizon of the history of a nation’.24 
It is important to bear in mind the link between Habermas’ conception of 
constitutional patriotism and his more general theory that democracy should be 
understood as a form of communicative action. As Markell has noted, Habermas is 
sometimes interpreted as if he is pursuing what Markell calls the ‘strategy of 
redirection’, according to which liberal constitutional principles become the object of 
affective attachment, as a replacement for a concrete ethnonational community.25 
However, this interpretation overlooks Habermas’ dynamic conception of the system 
of basic rights as ‘a living project that can endure only as an ongoing interpretation 
continually carried forward at all levels of the production of law’.26 Constitutional 
rights can therefore not be thought of as a concrete object that can serve as the basis 
                                                     
22 Ibid., p 117 
23 ‘Citizenship and National Identity’, p 499. 
24 Ibid., p 496. 
25 Patchen Markell, ‘Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On “Constitutional Patriotism”’ 
(2000) 28 Political Theory 38, at 39. 
26 See p 104, n 7, above. 
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of a ‘civic national’ identification. Rather, we should interpret Habermas as seeing 
constitutional patriotism as flowing from the integrative force of communicative 
power. 
Habermas is perhaps partly to blame for the misinterpretation that Markell identifies, 
since in his writings on constitutional patriotism he is not explicit about the link with 
communicative power. He has, however, affirmed Günther’s useful elaboration of 
this connection.27 Günther describes communicative power as the motivational force 
which flows from the ‘reflexive identification and confirmation of those who have 
factually accepted a validity claim’.28 According to Günther, where participants in 
discourse each accept a validity claim for shared reasons, each will become aware that 
the other expects them to be motivated to act accordingly. This gives rise to what 
Günther calls a ‘singular action community’, constituted by the illocutionary force of 
shared reasons.29 When each member of such a community recognises the community 
as such and positively identifies with it, Günther argues, the illocutionary community 
is transformed into a social community of persons of who view themselves as acting 
together. We can thus see that, with the idea of communicative power, Habermas and 
Günther attempt to link citizens’ communicative use of reason both to the content of 
the law and to the dynamic definition of the political community as a collective 
subject. 
Habermas thus goes some way to remedying a defect of Dworkin’s account of 
democracy that I highlighted in the previous chapter. I criticised Dworkin for 
underestimating the effect that political institutions have on the way in which citizens 
view the practice of democracy, their own role in it, and the nature of their 
relationships with other participants. Habermas, on the other hand, is acutely aware 
                                                     
27 Klaus Günther, ‘Communicative Freedom, Communicative Power, and Jurisgenesis’, in 
Michel Rosenfeld and Andrew Arato (eds.), Habermas on Law and Democracy: critical exchanges 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). In his ‘Reply to Symposium Participants’, 
Habermas says: ‘There is nothing I can add to Klaus Günther’s exemplary analysis…’ (ibid., p 
381) 
28 Ibid., p 247. 
29 Ibid., p 243. 
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of the impact that democratic processes can have on individuals’ understandings of 
themselves as citizens. He recognises that the practice of democracy itself plays a key 
role in orienting citizens toward one another as co-participants in the collective 
endeavour of self-government. While Dworkin paid scant attention to the source of 
citizens’ democratic motivation, Habermas views such motivation as dynamically 
produced by the ongoing practice of democracy. It is through communicative 
engagement with one another in the public sphere, that is to say, through political 
debate and action, that individuals come to recognise one another as free and equal 
citizens. 
5.1.3 Popular Sovereignty as Procedure 
This dual role of the communicative use of reason as both binding the administrative 
power of the state to the collective will of the ‘people’ and binding citizens together 
as equal members of a political community provides what Habermas calls a 
‘procedural’ conception of popular sovereignty, which he presents as an alternative 
to what he sees as the prevailing ‘liberal’ and ‘republican’ models.30 
The liberal model presents the democratic process as a succession of compromises 
between individuals and groups acting in the pursuit of their own interests.31 On this 
view, citizens are seen primarily as the bearers of negative rights (and particularly 
property rights), with the state as guardian of an essentially pre-political market 
society. Within this framework, citizens compete for control of governmental power, 
with the political authority of the sovereign people being exercised only through 
means of elections which determine which officials will wield political power. (This 
model essentially corresponds with the ‘interest group’ theories that I briefly 
criticised in chapter four.)32 
                                                     
30 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Three Normative Models of Democracy’ (1994) 1 Constellations 1. 
31 Ibid., at 1-2. 
32 See p 92-3, above. 
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The republican model, on the other hand, equates democratic will-formation with the 
expression of an authentic ethicopolitical self-understanding.33 Citizens are seen as 
co-authors of a collective form of life which finds its very embodiment in the state. 
The state is therefore presented as the institutionalisation of an ethical community, 
such that ‘society would finally develop into a political totality’.34 Here the authority 
of the sovereign people is not converted into a pouvoir constitué embodied in elected 
representatives, but remains grounded in citizens’ practice of self-determination. 
Habermas rejects both what he sees as the individualism of the liberal model and the 
holism of the republican model. He describes his discourse theory as looking to set a 
course between the two, according to which, although citizens are not portrayed as 
self-interested actors, the success of deliberative politics depends not on a citizenry 
acting as a collective whole but on the institutionalisation of democratic procedures.35 
These procedures – which include both formal processes and the free flow of 
information in the informal public sphere – ground a presumption that political 
decisions are reasonable and fair. Thus, Habermas believes, he can retain the 
republican ideal of popular sovereignty without submitting to a problematic holism: 
‘The “self” of the self-organizing legal community disappears in the 
subjectless forms of communication that regulate the flow of discursive 
opinion- and will-formation in such a way that their fallible results enjoy the 
presumption of being reasonable. This is not to denounce the intuition 
connected with the idea of popular sovereignty but to interpret it 
intersubjectively. Popular sovereignty, even if it becomes anonymous, retreats 
into democratic procedures and the legal implementation of their demanding 
communicative presuppositions only to make itself felt as communicatively 
generated power.’36 
  
                                                     
33 ‘Three Normative Models of Democracy’, at 2-3. 
34 Ibid., at 7. 
35 Ibid., p 6-10. 
36 Between Facts and Norms, p 301. 
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5.1.4 Reasons as Transmission-Belt: application discourse and the justification of 
judicial review 
Now, if the political judgments of communicatively-acting citizens are to be more 
than merely theoretically present in the law, the impact of citizens’ exercise of moral-
political agency must filter through from the legislation of general norms in the 
representative assembly into adjudication by the courts in particular cases. Habermas 
seeks to secure this connection by arguing that, in adjudicating individual cases, 
courts should limit themselves to constructing a coherent ordering of the reasons 
already ‘packaged in, and linked to, statutes’;37 they cannot look to justify norms that 
do not already find a place in the legal system. To explain what he means by this, 
Habermas adopts Günther’s distinction between justification and application 
discourses. The purpose of a justification discourse (the province of the legislature) is 
to determine whether we should accept a given norm as valid, without examining any 
particular fact-scenario, by considering whether we would accept it in a paradigm 
case. In an application discourse (the province of the courts), on the other hand, we 
determine whether a valid norm is appropriate in light of all relevant features of a 
particular situation. The two forms of discourse are presented as completely distinct: 
‘What is relevant to justification is only the norm itself, independent of an application 
to a particular situation… The judgment on the appropriateness of a norm does not 
refer to all application situations, but always only to an individual one.’38 
Günther has argued that application discourse requires that courts construct a 
coherent ordering of all valid norms, and thus they must presuppose that all valid 
norms ultimately constitute an ideal coherent system.39 Günther (and Habermas 
following him) thus largely adopts Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity, according to 
which a judge, when faced with a case that is not covered by a clear legal rule, should 
seek to find a coherent interpretation of principles that would justify the institutional 
                                                     
37 Ibid., p 192. 
38 Klaus Günther, The Sense of Appropriateness: application discourses in morality and law (J Farrell 
tr, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), p 37-8. 
39 Ibid., Part IV, chap 3. 
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history of the legal system.40 However, Habermas criticises Dworkin’s view that a 
judge should ‘reach his own opinion’41 on the best interpretation of the legal sources, 
describing it as ‘monological’.42 Instead, Habermas argues, the judge ‘must conceive 
of her constructive interpretation fundamentally as a common undertaking 
supported by the public communication of citizens’.43 Any judgment is thus 
provisional, ‘a coherent order of reasons constructed for the time being and exposed to 
ongoing critique’.44 As Günther has made clear, it is these reasons that are supposed 
to serve as the mode of transmission from the communicative power generated in 
democratic processes to the decision in the individual case.45 
Finally, we are able to come to Habermas’ defence of judicial review. Now, given 
Habermas’ stress on the importance of citizens’ reasoned deliberations on political 
issues, it is not obvious that judicial review should be justified by his theory. If laws 
gain their legitimacy by being enacted in accordance with a procedure that links 
legislative outcomes with ongoing public discourses, then why shouldn’t all 
legislative outcomes be thus legitimate? Habermas’ answer is that judicial review 
may serve to ensure that the system of rights necessary to secure the legal form and 
the democratic procedure is maintained. In reviewing legislation for compliance with 
the basic rights, Habermas says, the judiciary are not usurping the legislative role so 
long as they restrict themselves to applying those constitutional norms which have 
been given their content by the exercise of citizens’ public autonomy;46 i.e. so long as 
they engage only in application discourse: 
                                                     
40 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, chaps 2-4; Law’s Empire, chap 7. 
41 Law’s Empire, p 264. 
42 Between Facts and Norms, p 222. 
43 Ibid, p 224. 
44 Ibid, p 227 (emphasis in original). 
45 See Klaus Günther, ‘Legal Adjudication and Democracy: some remarks on Dworkin and 
Habermas’ (1995) 3 European Journal of Philosophy 36. 
46 See Between Facts and Norms, p 278-9; Jürgen Habermas, ‘A Conversation About Questions 
of Political Theory’, in René von Schomberg and Kenneth Baynes (eds.), Discourse and 
Democracy: essays on Habermas’s Between Facts and Norms (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2002), p 256. 
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‘The legitimating reasons available from the constitution are given to the 
constitutional court in advance from the perspective of the application of law 
– and not from the perspective of a legislation that elaborates and develops the 
system of rights in the pursuit of policies.’47 
This does not, however, entail judicial conservatism, indeed, according to Habermas, 
‘a rather bold constitutional adjudication is even required’.48 
Habermas does not insist that constitutional review must be undertaken by a court; 
he mentions, without considering in detail, other institutional possibilities, such as 
review by a special committee of the legislature. But he concludes that ‘pragmatic and 
legal-political considerations seem to support the institutional locus of authority as it 
exists in the Federal Republic [of Germany] and the United States’.49 The explanation 
for this is terse, but seems to be one of expertise: the judiciary specialises in the 
rational application of legal norms to particular situations and so naturally should be 
considered as the appropriate organ for the application of constitutional norms vis-à-
vis ordinary statutes. 
5.2 Citizenship as an Ethically Valuable Relationship 
In the previous chapter I endorsed Dworkin’s view that political communities are 
associative groupings analogous to families and groups of friends. The normative 
force of these relationships stems not from any voluntary act of will, but from their 
ethical value. Political communities, like families, friendship groups and so on, can 
(when they function well) enrich the lives of their members by allowing an extra 
dimension to their personhood. It is a constitutive feature of such groupings that 
members incur special obligations to one another: to be under such obligations is 
simply part of what it is to be, say, a friend, brother or citizen. Such a conception of 
political community is, I believe, compatible with a Habermasian conception of 
democracy – to say that a political community is ethically valuable is not to adopt the 
‘holist’ view that straightforwardly equates democratic will-formation with the 
                                                     
47 Between Facts and Norms, p 262. 
48 Ibid., p 280. 
49 Ibid., p 262. 
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expression of an authentic ethicopolitical self-understanding. However, in basing his 
defence of judicial review on ‘practical and legal-political considerations’, Habermas 
fails to take into account the symbolic effect that constitutional design can have on a 
political community. Despite the benefits that Habermas’ theory of democracy has 
over Dworkin’s, then, in his defence of judicial review he succumbs to a similar 
criticism. To bring this out, I shall discuss the idea that citizenship as an ethically 
valuable relationship in a little more detail, with a view to showing that it provides 
an attractive conception of political community. While Habermas’ account of 
‘constitutional patriotism’ might appear to be opposed to such a ‘republican’ notion, 
I argue that Habermas did not intend to rule out the idea that a nation’s historical 
traditions might contain something of ethical value. In his defence of judicial review, 
however, Habermas focuses solely on the rational processes of communicative action, 
thus neglecting the symbolic significance that constitutional forms have in 
constituting the political community. 
If my argument in chapter two is correct, then the ethical value of membership in a 
political community cannot conceptually be detached from the practice which 
constitutes such communities.50 This may give rise to a worry, since our political 
practice ascribes membership of political communities – i.e. the status of citizenship 
– on the basis of straightforward matters of fact. The boundaries of political 
communities, and the criteria upon which membership thereof is determined, have 
been set through a historically contingent and seemingly morally arbitrary process. 
There is no a priori reason why someone born in San Diego should be a US citizen and 
someone born in Tijuana a Mexican, nor why birth in San Diego should be a sufficient 
condition for citizenship, but not birth in Santiago de Compostela, Sankt Jakob in 
Defereggen, or St James’ Park. It might seem problematic for such contingencies to 
have a decisive role in determining the crucial moral issue of the nature and extent of 
our political rights and responsibilities. 
                                                     
50 See §2.1, above. 
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This worry might be ameliorated by reflecting on the fact that familial obligations are 
determined in a similar way. Not only does one not choose one’s family, but the 
content of one’s familial obligations are themselves determined by conventions that 
are historically contingent and socio-geographically local. In traditional Asian 
communities children owe deeper familial obligations, to a wider range of people 
than do those born into more individualist European or North American cultures. 
And in fact this is true of all obligation-generating associative groupings: what 
friends, business partners or trade union colleagues owe one another depends on 
conventions that might be very different in different places and different times. This 
might ameliorate the particular worry about political communities; but on the other 
hand, it might simply be thought to postpone the problem, with the doubt spreading 
from political to all associative obligations. For still the question arises: how can 
contingent historical facts create genuine duties? 
If values arise in the context of practices, we must accept that contingencies of time 
and place will affect both the kinds of obligation that we are under and the nature of 
what we have to do to fulfil our obligations. Practices are historically contingent 
phenomena. However, practices do not give rise to obligations by simple fiat of 
convention. Associative duties are not created by the sheer fact that we find ourselves 
in certain relationships, but arise by virtue of the value of those relationships, and of 
the practices that sustain and are sustained by them. So although we may be in thrall 
to historical contingency, we do not collapse into brute subjectivism.51 The Mafioso 
who claims that he is under obligations to fellow uomini d’onore has fallen into error: 
                                                     
51 By ‘subjectivism’ I mean the view that moral/ethical matters are determined by the opinion 
of the relevant actor, so that X ought to φ iff X believes he ought to φ, A is good for X iff X 
believes that A is good for X, and so on. I prefer this term to the more commonly-used 
‘relativism’, since my position is relativist in a sense: I claim that obligations and values are 
relative to the ethical life-world constituted by our various practices. It does not follow that 
no evaluative comparison may be made across different life-worlds; on the contrary, my 
argument relies on the claim that a life-world that lacked associative relationships would be 
ethically impoverished in comparison to our own. 
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the Mafia’s lack of respect for human life renders it incapable of generating genuine 
associative duties. 
I am relying, then, on a positive ethical claim: our statuses as family-members, 
friends, citizens, and so on constitute deep and important bonds to our fellow beings 
which enhance the quality of our lives. Furthermore, the fact that these bonds are non-
voluntary adds to their profundity.52 As Hardimon puts it: 
‘The wish for a social world in which all roles were contractual [i.e. voluntary] 
reflects a failure to appreciate the dimension of human social life that we, 
following Hegel, could call “substantial”: the ethical dimension constituted by 
deep and enduring, unchosen relationships. A life devoid of such attachments 
would be flatter, less full, less human than a life with such attachments. It 
would also be ethically impoverished: a form of life in which an important 
ethical dimension was lost.’53 
Although the idea that our obligations depend upon seemingly arbitrary matters of 
fact might seem unsatisfactory to the modern universalist temperament, we must 
recognise the truth in Geertz’s memorable observation that ‘man is an animal 
suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun’.54 Practice establishes a 
‘vocabulary of behavior’55 through which certain forms of action come to symbolise 
respect, concern, compassion, solidarity and so on, and others disrespect, aloofness, 
callousness, disloyalty, etc.. We would not be justified in acting as if this vocabulary 
simply did not exist. Dworkin gives the analogy of racial slurs:56 a word may have a 
                                                     
52 It might seem odd to describe friendship as ‘non-voluntary’, but it is true: I cannot make 
someone my friend by an act of will; I can make a friend unintentionally. 
53 Michael O Hardimon, ‘Role Obligations’ (1994) 91 Journal of Philosophy 333, at 353. 
Hardimon says that ‘role obligations… are not usefully thought of as a species of associative 
obligation… in Dworkin’s sense of the term’ (ibid., at 335). I do not understand why he feels it 
necessary to make this distinction: this disclaimer aside, he seems (to me at least) to have in 
mind a very similar idea, and in fact the article can usefully be read as an elaboration of the 
Dworkinian view. 
54 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: selected essays (rpt, London: Fontana Press, 
1993), p 5. 
55 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2011), p 315. 
56 Justice for Hedgehogs, p 315. Actually, I am not sure whether this is an analogy: it might better 
be seen as an application of the very same principle. But Dworkin describes it as such, and the 
matter is not too important for our purposes here. 
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literal meaning that is purely descriptive of skin colour or other physical characteristic 
and yet, by dint of use, have a figurative meaning which is derogatory and hateful. 
One cannot acquit oneself of responsibility for the insult caused by the use of such a 
term by pointing to the fact that the practice by which the derogatory meaning 
accrued was historically contingent and not of one’s own choosing. Similarly, the fact 
that moving your elderly parents into a care home might not signify a lack of familial 
attachment in California does not exonerate you of such a charge if you are from 
Calcutta. The historical contingency of associative groupings is not a threat to the idea 
of associative obligation, since it is by virtue of historically contingent factors that 
such groupings gain their very ethical significance. 
The ‘substantial ethical life’ of associative groupings might, however, come into strain 
with other values that we hold. Even in the case of the Mafioso we can observe a 
tension between genuine values. It would be a mistake to think of Cosa Nostra57 simply 
as a kind of rational bureaucracy dedicated to the pursuit of profit through criminal 
means.58 Rather it is, as Paoli has put it, a ‘ritual brotherhood’, grounded in an ethos 
of trust and solidarity in which acts of mutual assistance are carried out without the 
expectation of short-term reward.59 For a uomo d’onore, Mafia membership is an 
identity-constituting allegiance, which overrides all other ties. Indeed, evidence from 
clinical psychologists working with former Mafia members suggests that those who 
have left the Mafia often suffer an identity crisis characterised by confusion and a lack 
of a sense of purpose in life.60 So when a Mafioso is ordered to kill, there arises a 
conflict between the value of the life of the would-be victim and the value of the sense 
of community, dignity and purpose in life enjoyed by the would-be perpetrator. This 
                                                     
57 This is the name by which members of the Sicilian Mafia refer to their organisation. Meaning 
‘our thing’, it is itself indicative of the sense of community that pertains between members. 
58 This is the view that Donald R Cressey took of the American Mafia in Theft of the Nation: the 
structure and operations of organized crime in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1969). 
59 Letizia Paoli, Mafia Brotherhoods: organized crime, Italian style (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), p 17. 
60 Girolamo Lo Verso and Gianluca Lo Coco, ‘Working with Patients involved in the Mafia: 




is not to say that there is a conflict of obligation: as I said earlier, the gross immorality 
of the Mafia renders it incapable of being a source of genuine duties. It is clear what 
the Mafioso ought to do: he should repudiate the association even at great cost to 
himself. But there is a cost to himself: not just the obvious risk of reprisals, but the loss 
of a solidaristic commitment of great significance to his life. 
Other cases of tension between associative commitment and other values will present 
more difficult moral dilemmas. Consider, for example, the case of a young Indian 
woman who has ambitions to travel to the city to go to university, but whose father 
wants her to marry a local man and stay in the village to raise his children. She might 
find a conflict between her sense of fidelity to her family, on one hand, and what she 
feels is commanded by her own self-respect, on the other. This is not like the Mafia 
case: we can suppose both that her family is a source of ethical enrichment to her and 
that it is capable of generating moral obligations (her father loves her, he is not 
profoundly immoral, he has her best interests at heart, and so on). It might be that the 
right thing for her to do is to go to university, but, if she does, she will have cause to 
regret any consequential damage done to her family. There is nothing to regret, on 
the other hand, in the damage caused to the Mafia when the former gangster takes 
the decision to turn in his accomplices. 
A tension like this might amount to an out-and-out conflict of obligations: perhaps it 
is not possible for the woman to remain loyal to her family in a way that fully 
preserves her self-respect. It might, on the other hand, be possible to resolve the 
tension, if the woman is able to arrive at an attractive interpretation of her family 
obligations such that they do not forbid disobeying her father on this issue (or an 
attractive interpretation of self-respect such that acceding to her father’s wishes does 
not violate it). As I highlighted in chapter two, constructive interpretation is largely a 
pursuit of coherence between our various value commitments. Although there is no 
ex ante guarantee that such a project will succeed, nor can we say from the start that 
an attempt is doomed to failure. An innovative re-interpretation of her family 
obligations – even if it is one that her father himself would never accept – might be 
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able to reconcile her sense of loyalty to the family with her decision to go to 
university.61 
I think we should understand constitutional patriotism in this way: it is an attempt at 
a constructive interpretation of modern liberal democratic political communities so 
as to rescue them from the ‘ambivalent potential’ connected with the notion of the 
nation as a prepolitical cultural entity. While traditional interpretations have tended 
to support militarism, jingoism, racism even, Habermas believes that a ‘voluntary 
nation of citizens’62 may justify the allegiance of citizen to state in terms amenable to 
contemporary multiculturalism, while still retaining compatibility with our 
‘substantial ethical life’ that is tied up with the history, society and politics of existing 
nation-states.63 
Yet it is not clear exactly how much historical baggage Habermas would have us 
jettison. At times he talks as if acceptance of the legitimacy of the constitution could 
become the only source of political identity in modern democracies, displacing our 
historical traditions in their entirety.64 But this would be to throw the baby out with 
the bathwater since, as I have argued, it is the very non-voluntary nature of citizenship 
that renders it such a deep and important ethical bond. The fact that membership of 
a political community is typically passed on as a matter of familial inheritance is 
indissolubly entwined with the deep significance that citizenship has as a constitutive 
aspect of identity.65 Jus sanguinis is not simply a fact about how citizenship can be 
                                                     
61 Of course, this is not to say that there would still not be anything to regret in her decision to 
go to university: she might yet have cause to regret to pain her decision causes her father. But 
she would no longer view the decision as damaging to the family, i.e. the collective group of 
which she is a member. 
62 ‘The European Nation-State’, p 131. 
63 See, for example, ‘Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity’, p 261: 
‘identification with one’s own form of life and tradition is overlaid with a patriotism that has 
become more abstract’ (emphasis added). 
64 E.g.: ‘The consensus fought for and achieved in an association of free and equal persons 
ultimately rests only on the unity of a procedure to which all consent.’ (‘Citizenship and 
National Identity’, at 496 (emphasis in original).) 
65 On constitutive components of identity see Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: the making of 
the modern identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap 2. 
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acquired, it tells us something about the kind of association that a political community 
is. The inheritance of citizenship marks political community off as a non-optional 
association, projecting the idea that it is closer to family than to, say, a business 
partnership.66 It points to, and at the same time nourishes, an affective bond between 
citizens, a bond which cannot be reduced to shared acceptance of the legitimacy of 
the constitution. Furthermore, it is important that people who do not accept the 
legitimacy of the constitution may nevertheless be considered full members of the 
political community. Habermas would not make acceptance of the legitimacy of the 
constitution a criterion for the enjoyment of political rights; he would not, for 
example, deprive philosophical anarchists of the vote. Yet in the absence of the idea 
of a relationship that transcends the acceptance of particular validity claims, the 
source of such political rights seems mysterious. 
In fact I do not believe that Habermas intends for the historical traditions of nation-
states to be completely replaced by a rational acceptance of the liberal constitution. It 
is worth remembering that Habermas developed his conception of constitutional 
patriotism in the context of the so-called ‘historians’ debate’ about how historians, 
politicians and the general public in Germany ought to treat the Nazi period.67 
Habermas objected to the work of certain historians, such as Ernst Nolte, who 
                                                     
66 This connection was noted by Burke: ‘By a constitutional policy, working after the pattern 
of nature, we receive, we hold, we transmit our government and our privileges in the same 
manner in which we enjoy and transmit our property and our lives. The institutions of policy, 
the goods of fortune, the gifts of providence are handed down to us, and from us, in the same 
course and order… Thus, by preserving the method of nature in the conduct of the state, in 
what we improve we are never wholly new; in what we retain we are never wholly obsolete. 
By adhering in this manner and on those principles to our forefathers, we are guided not by 
the superstition of antiquarians, but by the spirit of philosophic analogy. In this choice of 
inheritance we have given to our frame of polity the image of a relation in blood, binding up 
the constitution of our country with our dearest domestic ties, adopting our fundamental laws 
into the bosom of our family affections, keeping inseparable and cherishing with the warmth 
of all their combined and mutually reflected charities our state, our hearths, our sepulchres, 
and our altars.’ (Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p 33-4.) Note that there is no ethnic essentialism here: Burke, a 
Protestant who described himself as an ‘Englishman’, was born in Dublin to a Catholic 
mother. 
67 See Jan-Werner Müller, Constitutional Patriotism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2009), p 26-32. 
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contested the uniqueness of Nazi crimes.68 Habermas saw such work as an attempt to 
put the horrors of the holocaust to one side in order to create a new, positive German 
identity grounded in a sanitised version of German history. He argued that a failure 
to properly face up to the past would make social cohesion impossible: ‘If we were to 
brush aside this [Nazi] legacy, our fellow Jewish citizens and the sons, daughters and 
grandchildren of all those who were murdered would feel themselves unable to 
breathe in our country.’69 He thus reached to the idea of constitutional patriotism not 
to discard all references to history, but as a means by which Germans might develop 
a coherent national identity out of the ruins of the Third Reich. History must be 
neither forgotten nor left unexamined, but rather ‘appropriated critically’,70 so that 
‘the overcoming of fascism forms the particular historical perspective from which a post-
national identity centered on the universalist principles of the rule of law and 
democracy understands itself’.71 
So when Habermas says that ‘the commitment of constitutional patriotism… must 
nourish itself on compatible cultural legacies’,72 I do not think that Habermas believes 
that this is important simply for reasons of empirical stability, i.e. that citizens will 
only be committed to upholding a liberal constitution if it somehow resonates with 
their national culture. Rather, the embeddedness of the constitution in existing 
‘cultural legacies’ ensures what we might call ‘stability for the right reasons’:73 a 
constitutional patriotism situated ‘in the horizon of the history of a nation’74 will be 
able to command citizens’ allegiance precisely because it preserves what is valuable 
about the nation’s historical traditions. The integrative force of communicative action 
                                                     
68 Habermas took particular exception to a feuilleton piece: Ernst Nolte, ‘Vergangenheit, die 
nicht vergehen will’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 June 1986. 
69 Jürgen Habermas, ‘On the Public Use of History’, in The New Conservatism, p 234. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Limits of Neo-Historicism’ (1996) 22 Philosophy and Social 
Criticism 1, at 33 (emphasis in original). 
72 ‘Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity’, p 173. 
73 I take the phrase from John Rawls, Political Liberalism (paperback edn, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), p xxxix. 
74 See p 108, n 24, above. 
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builds on, and does not entirely displace, traditional affective identifications.75 We 
therefore do not need to take Habermas to be making the implausible claim that ‘post-
traditional’ citizens would, could or should be linked with one another solely by 
shared acceptance of the validity of the constitution. 
However, once we make explicit the idea that affective identification with the polity 
is not merely an attitude which usefully serves stability, but is an aspect of a 
relationship which has noninstrumental ethical value, then Habermas’ focus on 
rational processes of communicative action starts to look excessively narrow. If we 
take the latter as building on, and not replacing, the ‘webs of significance’ in which 
existing understandings of citizenship are intertwined, then, when it comes to 
institutional design, we should expect the symbolic aspects of political institutions – 
our constitutional imaginaries – to play an important role. We need to consider what 
impact different institutional systems might have on the way in which citizens 
conceive of their relationships with one another, and thus on the ‘substantial ethical 
life’ of the political community. Habermas neglects this dimension of institutional 
design when he takes the question of judicial review to be answered by ‘pragmatic 
and legal-political considerations’.76 In fact symbolic considerations are relevant to 
questions of institutional structure just as they are to the question of how citizenship 
can be acquired. A constitutional design is not merely a mechanism for translating 
the communicative power of citizens into the administrative power of government, it 
also projects an ethical message: it tells us something about the kind of association 
that a political community is. 
At this point the arguments I made in the previous chapter about the symbolic status 
of courts and legislatures become pertinent: judicial review presents issues of 
fundamental rights as qualitatively different from, and in a sense superior to, matters 
of ‘ordinary politics’; legislative supremacy presents them as part-and-parcel of the 
collective self-government of the democratic people. I develop some of these claims 
                                                     
75 See p 120, n 63, above. 
76 See p 114, n 49, above. 
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further in chapter six; I shall not repeat them now. Before moving on, however, I 
would like to highlight the importance of another constitutional imaginary, without 
which Habermas’ theory would fail to make sense. This is the concept of 
representation: the idea that an individual or body may speak and act on another’s 
behalf. This notion cannot be reduced to purely rational terms, but to overlook it 
would be to miss a crucial element of the practice of democracy. Its significance raises 
a particular problem for judicial review. 
5.3 Who makes the Cut? The importance of representation 
As I discussed above, there is an irreducible gap between ideal consensus following 
uninhibited communicative action and any actual decision reached in imperfect real 
world procedures.77 No particular political decision can be determined, in advance, 
as it were, by communicative rationality. A cut needs to be made in the process of 
deliberation, and the timing of and place in which this cut is made will be decided by 
a particular individual or body who thereby enjoys a certain freedom from the 
communicative process. Of course this freedom is limited: the decision-maker will 
have to defend the particular decision reached with reasons which will then 
potentially be subject to public critique. But the liability of the decision-maker to give 
an account of its decision, or, indeed, the decision’s ‘presumption of being 
reasonable’,78 does not alter the fact that, had the decision been taken by a different 
individual or body, it could have been taken differently. The decision does not simply 
bubble up naturally from the ‘circulation of informal communication’;79 it is made by 
a particular person or group of people, who will have particular interests, value-
orientations, virtues and vices. 
Although this fact might sound obvious, it is somewhat obscured by the aquatic 
metaphors that Habermas invokes to describe the democratic process. Habermas 
                                                     
77 See p 106, above. 
78 See p 111, n 36, above. 
79 See p 105, n 15, above. 
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talks of communicative power ‘circulating’80 and passing through ‘sluices’,81 and of 
individual contributions to the process being ‘dissolved’.82 Such terms might be 
appropriate for a sociological model of a democratic process from the point of view 
of an external observer, but they hardly project a suitable image when seen from the 
perspective of the engaged citizen. It is not difficult to see how a citizen might have 
concerns about a democratic process presented in such terms. The imagery of 
‘circulation’ seems overly mechanistic, as if it were an attempt to camouflage the fact 
that the outcomes of the democratic process are in fact decisions by flesh-and-blood 
human beings. And from the point of view of an individual who doubts whether the 
democratic process really serves to respect his status as a moral agent, it would seem 
to reinforce, not ameliorate, the worry to suggest that his individual contribution to 
the political debate had been ‘dissolved’. 
Here I believe that we need the idea of representation to supplement the 
incompleteness of communicative rationality. My suggestion is that the ‘cut’ in the 
process of deliberation is not damaging to democracy insofar as it is made by a person 
or institution that represents the people as a self-governing political community. 
Representation is one of our most basic, and most important, constitutional 
imaginaries. More fundamental than democracy, it is a key constituent component of 
modern politics. It is the idea of representation that enables us to make sense of ‘the 
king’s two bodies’, i.e. the distinction between political rulers acting in a public 
capacity (acting as political rulers) and those same persons acting in a private 
capacity. It is part of the essence of the modern idea of politics that rulers rule in the 
name of the people; this is what enables us to distinguish political rule from, say, 
exercises of proprietary or contractual right, or the brute assertion of power.83 
                                                     
80 Between Facts and Norms, p 136, 183, 185. 
81 Ibid., p 170, 327. 
82 ‘Popular Sovereignty as Procedure’, in Between Facts and Norms, p 463-90, at p 486. 
83 It is on this basis that Hont has claimed that the Jacobin attack on representation was 
‘aimed at reversing the whole development of modern popular sovereignty’ (Istvan Hont, 
‘The Permanent Crisis of a Divided Mankind: “contemporary crisis of the nation state” in 
historical perspective’ (1994) XLII Political Studies 166, at 204, emphasis in original). 
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The need for a cut in the process of deliberation highlights the fact that representation 
is an inevitable feature of political government. Since political decisions must stand 
in the name of the people, but no particular decision can be unproblematically 
attributed to ‘the people’ as a whole, then every political decision amounts to a claim 
to represent the people.84 This is true regardless of the way in which the decision is 
made, whether it be an edict of an absolute monarch, legislation passed by assembly 
or the result of a popular referendum. 
While the basic notion of political representation is not tied to the idea of democracy 
as such, since the latter part of the seventeenth century a distinctively democratic 
form of representation has developed. A democratic representative represents the 
people in a special sense that goes beyond the basic political notion of ruling in the 
name of the people: she represents the people as a self-governing community. I shall 
develop this idea further in the next chapter;85 here I shall restrict myself to indicating 
how Habermas’ pragmatic treatment of the question of judicial review 
underestimates the significance of this idea of democratic representation. 
As Pitkin has shown, the relationship between a representative and those represented 
is a multi-faceted one.86 A representative acts for the represented, in that the former’s 
actions are, in a sense, ascribed to the latter; Pitkin calls this the ‘substantive’ aspect. 
A representative also stands for the represented, i.e. it is ‘the recipient or object of 
feelings, expressions of feeling, or actions intended for what it represents’.87 It is 
important to note that the relationship here is not one of correspondence: a 
representative stands for the represented in a particular respect, where the precise 
nature of this ‘standing for’ is determined by symbolic cues and requires a shared 
understanding as to how these cues are supposed to be read. These cues might take 
the shape of a kind of resemblance between representative and represented (a diverse 
                                                     
84 See Lindahl, ‘Sovereignty and Representation in the European Union’. 
85 See §6.2, below. 
86 See generally Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1967). 
87 Ibid., p 99. 
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Parliament might represent the diversity of the citizenry), but they need not (a 
monarch might represent the unity of the people). The former Pitkin calls ‘descriptive’ 
representation and the latter ‘symbolic’ representation.88  Finally, a representative 
must somehow be authorised to act on the behalf of the represented, and liable to be 
held to account; these aspects of representation Pitkin labels ‘formalistic’.89 
Habermas’ focus on processes of argumentation restricts his attention to the 
‘substantive’ dimension of ‘acting for’. He believes that democratic concerns about 
judicial review can be overcome so long as judges adopt an appropriately democratic 
self-understanding, according to which she ‘conceive[s] of her constructive 
interpretation fundamentally as a common undertaking supported by the public 
communication of citizens’.90 Yet while such a shift in judicial attitude might improve 
the deliberative quality of decisions, this does not resolve the overall question of 
whether the relationship between courts and citizens can be characterised as one of 
democratic representation adequate to allow courts to ‘close the gap’ between 
deliberation and decision in such a way that retains citizens’ political autonomy. To 
understand whether courts really can perform this representative role, we must also 
look at what courts ‘stand for’, from where they are taken to derive their 
authorisation, and to what they are liable to account. 
Of course, constitutional courts function as representatives in the basic political sense; 
we have no difficulty distinguishing between court rulings and assertions of brute 
power. Nevertheless, courts do not represent the demos in the same way as do 
legislative assemblies. Courts owe their popular legitimation to their association with 
a combination of political independence and technical expertise. Courts are seen as 
                                                     
88 I think Pitkin errs in considering ‘descriptive’ and ‘symbolic’ representation as two distinct 
categories of representation (ibid., chaps 5-6). The idea of a representative ‘standing for’ the 
represented always relies on symbolism; the fact that such symbolism might consist of a 
descriptive resemblance means that ‘descriptive “standing for”’ is best seen as a subcategory 
of ‘symbolic “standing for”’. 
89 Perhaps misleadingly, since authorisation need not be formally given, but might rather be 
(taken to be) the result of acquiescence. 
90 See p 113, n 43, above. 
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non-political venues, and judges as a kind of expert.91 In this respect they present a 
direct contrast to legislatures. Legislatures are seen as political venues par excellence, 
and legislators as generalists rather than experts, whose authorisation comes, of 
course, from the fact they are elected.92 This difference maps onto a distinction 
between two different senses of representation in the modern popular imagination: 
while legislatures represent the political agency of the people, courts represent the 
impartial rationality of the law. 
The idea that courts represent an abstract, rational ‘law’ is a deeply ingrained part of 
our constitutional imaginary; it cannot simply be shifted at will, and certainly cannot 
be changed unilaterally by judges adopting a different approach to adjudication. It is 
reinforced by a host of symbolically significant factors: the legalistic language of 
judicial decisions, the orientation to authoritative texts, the status of judges as a 
professional class, even the architecture of court buildings, courtroom design, judicial 
dress, the use of honorifics and so on. And while some of these features of courts 
might permit of relative simple change, others are more deeply intertwined with our 
very idea of what a court is. Although one is of course free to propose novel 
institutions that do not easily match up with our existing categories of constitutional 
form, if one opts to make use of an existing institution (for ‘pragmatic and legal-
political considerations’, or otherwise), one must accept that that institution will come 
charged with some existing meaning. Courts stand for, derive their authority from, and 
are accountable to not the self-governing people but the law. As such, they are poor 
candidates for the role of democratic representative. 
It might be thought that the distinction that Habermas draws between the justification 
and the application of norms obviates the need for courts to function as democratic 
representatives. Where courts restrict themselves to the application of constitutional 
                                                     
91 See my discussion of the ‘myth of legality’ at §4.4, above. 
92 Of course, legislators don’t tend to be ‘ordinary people’, indeed, they are often seen as 
comprising an elite expert class of their own. But this is generally taken as problematic: a 
departure from the proper role of the legislature. ‘Career politician’ is a term of abuse; I’ve 
never heard anyone criticised for being a ‘career judge’. 
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norms, then expecting them to represent the democratic citizenry in the way in which 
the legislature (the arena of justification) does might seem to be simply making the 
wrong comparison. The true analogy, the argument goes, is to the application of 
ordinary legal norms, and therefore to the everyday work of the courts in resolving 
legal disputes. Just as ordinary adjudication is not a task for democratic 
representatives, nor is constitutional adjudication. 
However, this argument overlooks a pertinent disanalogy between ordinary 
adjudication and constitutional judicial review. In ordinary adjudication, in applying 
legislative norms the court renders an interpretation of the law which the legislature 
is free to reject by passing a fresh enactment. The continuing political agency of the 
self-governing people is represented by the ability of the legislature to amend the law. 
In the case of judicial review, on the other hand, in applying constitutional norms the 
court renders an interpretation which is deliberately designed to be relatively 
immune to change by ordinary politics. The court therefore enjoys not only with the 
power to apply constitutional norms, but also the Kompetenz-Kompetenz to police the 
boundary between the application of existing norms and the justification of new ones. 
In the absence of any superior institution,93 the court becomes the body responsible 
for ‘making the cut’ in any debate about the proper content of the constitution. It must 
therefore meet the burden of representing the ongoing political agency of the 
democratic people. If (as I have argued) it is unable to do so, then its standing as 
‘guardian of the constitution’ will be a hindrance to democracy. 
When it is recognised that the idea of representation is needed to supplement the 
incompleteness of communicative rationality, and that, in the modern concept of 
democracy, it is the legislature which is taken to represent the people as a whole, then 
we can see that judicial review poses a threat to popular sovereignty. There is a risk 
that raising judicially-interpreted constitutional norms to a higher symbolic plane 
                                                     
93 Of course, we might think of a system in which there were a superior institution, for example 
there might be some kind of standing constituent assembly superior to both parliament and 
the courts. But in this thesis I am concerned only with the comparative merits of legislative 
versus judicial supremacy, not with potential alternative systems. 
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than the enactments of the principal representative body may represent a deliberate 
departure from the ongoing processes of public political debate, in favour of side-
constraints imposed by an epistemic elite. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In chapters three and four I argued that Waldron’s and Dworkin’s respective 
contributions to the judicial review debate lack sufficient consideration of the 
arguments in favour of the representative legislature as a distinctive constitutional 
arrangement. To an extent, Habermas’ account provides a much-needed change of 
focus. Habermas does not treat the legislature, even arguendo, as the best practical 
approximation of a plebiscite, but rather he views it as the ‘organized midpoint or 
focus of the society-wide circulation of informal communication’.94 
Habermas’ recognition of the central importance of the legislature is linked to his 
appreciation of the fact that political power does not lie, statically, in the hands of 
individuals, but rather is something which must be dynamically generated by citizens 
acting in concert. Habermas takes from Arendt the insight that concerted political 
action cannot take place in a vacuum, but requires structures to ensure that incipient 
energies do not simply dissipate. Representative processes thus cannot be seen 
simply as limiting or controlling the power of the self-governing people (protecting 
against ‘dangerous swings in public opinion’, as Dworkin puts it),95 since it is only 
through such processes that political power is created. Political power is generated 
by citizens interacting with political institutions; institutional structure therefore 
affects not only the ends towards which political power is directed, but the very shape 
that that power takes in the first place. 
However, Habermas’ model of power being transmitted through a series of more or 
less rational communicative interactions fails to pay adequate attention to the 
symbolic significance of political structures. Citizen identity is forged through 
                                                     
94 See p 105, n 15, above. 
95 Justice for Hedgehogs, p 393. 
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symbolic as well as through rational-communicative interactions. Our constitutional 
imaginaries imbue political institutions with meanings that cannot be captured in 
purely rational terms. As a consequence, different institutional systems will project 
different visions of the way in which citizens relate to one another and to the political 
community as a whole. 
This is not yet an argument in favour of legislative supremacy; it is merely a flag 
noting some relevant considerations which appear thus far to have been overlooked. 
To make good my thesis, I need to develop a substantive account of the conception of 
self-government that I see as inherent within the modern idea of representative 
democracy. I believe that a system of government by representative assembly is 
capable of constituting a political community in such a way as to express respect for 
the capacity of citizens to render their own judgments on political matters. In the next 
chapter I provide a fuller account of why I believe this to be so, and attempt to explain 
why the democratic vision implicit within the practice of representative government 









6. Synthesis: in defence of legislative supremacy 
In chapters three to five I have proceeded negatively, by criticising what I see as the 
shortfalls in the attempts made by Waldron, Dworkin and Habermas to answer the 
question of judicial review. In this chapter I mount the positive claim that a 
constitution based on legislative supremacy is, ceteris paribus, democratically superior 
to one that embraces judicial review. I argue that the practice of legislation by a 
representative assembly can serve to help integrate citizens into a political 
community which respects each citizen as a moral agent, but that its ability to do so 
is undermined where a system of judicial review is in place. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first looks to provide a little more detail 
on the noninstrumental value of democracy, a value I call ‘political autonomy’. My 
claim here is not that this is a novel theory of democracy, in fact quite the opposite: I 
think it is an idea that unites Waldron, Dworkin and Habermas. As I see it, the value 
of political autonomy has two limbs. Firstly, democracy provides self-government: rule 
by the people as a while. Secondly, democracy affords respect for citizens as equal 
moral agents. To illustrate the idea, I look to position this conception of political 
autonomy in relation to classic works in political theory, presenting it as an attempt 
at reconciliation between the theories of Rousseau and Kant. 
In the second section, I argue that the practice of legislation by representative 
assembly is particularly valuable in promoting the good of political autonomy. 
Firstly, I draw upon a range of sources, from medieval conciliarist theory, through 
the classic accounts of Burke, Tocqueville and Mill, to contemporary writers 
interested in themes of inclusion and recognition of difference, to argue that a 
representative assembly can help link persons together into a collective agent. 
Secondly, I argue that a well-functioning representative process has non-instrumental 
value in that it pays respect to citizens’ political judgments. I therefore argue that 
legislation is worthy of a deeper respect than would be the case if it were merely a 
compromise between equality of impact and quality of outcome. 
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In the final section I turn directly to the question of judicial review. I defend my 
concern with this issue against a recent argument by Allan that focusing on the merits 
and demerits of judicial review overlooks the way in which the judiciary are 
responsible for the protection of rights in both legislative supremacy and judicial 
review systems. Allan, I argue, misses the main thrust of this debate, which is 
primarily concerned with the symbolic, not the empirical, consequences of judicial 
review. A concern with the relative symbolic implications of legislative supremacy 
vis-à-vis judicial review requires us to shift our discussion to the more abstract terrain 
of constitutional imaginary. On this level I argue that, given the place that the 
judiciary hold in the popular imagination, placing the responsibility for policing the 
boundaries of the constitution into their hands will tend to promote a ‘negative’ 
conception of the constitution as a set of limits to political power, which carries with 
it inadequate versions of democratic agency and political community. Legislative 
supremacy, on the other hand, promotes a ‘positive’ conception of the constitution as 
a means of generating political power. Only the positive conception, I claim, is able 
to reconcile democracy with constitutionalism. I conclude by offering a reconstruction 
of the school of thought known as ‘political constitutionalism’, as espoused by the 
likes of Bellamy and Tomkins. Taken in its most persuasive light, I suggest, political 
constitutionalism should be seen as highlighting the link between, on one hand, an 
institutional design that gives the courts a prominent role in the resolution of 
constitutional disputes, and, on the other hand, the negative conception of 
constitution. Regardless of its empirical impact, judicial review symbolises a 
boundary being placed around the agency of the political community, thus 
undermining our commitment to the self-government that (I argue) affords citizens 
political autonomy. This gives us reason to support legislative supremacy. 
6.1 Political Autonomy 
6.1.1 The Noninstrumental Value of Democracy 
While discussing the theories of Waldron, Dworkin and Habermas, I have stressed 
two crucial features of democracy. The first is the idea that democracy provides self-
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government: rule by the people rather than rule by a particular individual or class. A 
necessary corollary of this view is that there must be some sense of who ‘the people’ 
are. As I put it in the introduction, a citizen who dissents from a political decision can 
only be expected to accept that he is nevertheless party to self-government if he has a 
sense that he belongs to a political community that transcends the particular decision 
he disagrees with.1 In order to explain how this is possible, we need an account of our 
political practices that moves beyond viewing them as instruments for the resolution 
of particular disputes or the promotion of particular principles. Politics must be seen 
as a kind of collective action: the government of the community as a whole over itself.2 
The second crucial feature of democracy is the respect that it affords citizens as equal 
moral agents. Implicit within the practice of democracy lies a particularly rich 
recognition of citizens’ capacity for making moral-political judgments. I contrasted 
this capacity with citizens’ capacity to will. While one can choose a course of action 
without any sense that it is choiceworthy, to make a judgment in favour of something 
is to evaluate it as worth pursuing. Democracy thus respects citizens not just as 
‘simple weighers’ but as ‘strong evaluators’.3 
I would now like to tie together some theoretical threads that have remained loose 
throughout the discussion so far. We can combine these two features of democracy – 
self-government and respect for moral agency – by identifying the noninstrumental 
value of democracy as political autonomy. 
                                                     
1 See p 13-4, above. 
2 Note that I am using a very different sense of collective action than that employed by Shapiro 
in his ‘Shared Agency Thesis’, which states that the law is the product of the shared activity 
of legal officials engaged in a project of social planning (Scott Shapiro, Legality (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2011), p 204-9). Firstly, Shapiro is not attempting to provide an 
account of democratic self-government (and thus his Shared Agency Thesis restricts the class 
of participants to legal officials; he does not attempt to explain how citizens can be party to 
the making of the law). Secondly, Shapiro bases his account of collective action on Bratman’s 
theory of ‘shared cooperative activity’, according to which collective action is built up out of 
individuals’ meshing intentions. Such a reductivist account is unable to account for the ethical 
significance of collective action (see p 79, above). 
3 I take this terminology from Charles Taylor, ‘What is Human Agency?’, in Human Agency 
and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p 23. 
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One enjoys political autonomy when one authentically identifies as a member of a 
self-governing political community that respects one’s status as a moral agent. I thus 
see political autonomy as arising from the successful resolution of the tension 
between unity and individuality. It avoids two forms of heteronomy that flow from 
distortion of the political community. On one hand, where the community 
disintegrates into an aggregation of discrete individuals, the law cannot be seen as 
the product of a collective subject: it is simply imposed by those who hold the levers 
of power. On the other hand, the community may become an oppressive totality that 
overwhelms each citizen’s individuality, so that citizens are governed by but no longer 
govern through the community. To avoid heteronomy, then, the political community 
must be capable of acting collectively while still respecting each individual citizen as 
a moral agent in his or her own right. 
While formulating political autonomy as the avoidance of particular forms of 
heteronomy is, I believe, an accurate way of setting out the challenge that would-be 
democratic communities face, we should not be deceived into thinking of political 
autonomy in purely negative terms. Political autonomy is not about preserving the 
autonomy that one would otherwise have enjoyed in a state of nature, it is a 
distinctive genus of autonomy which enriches the lives of individuals by allowing an 
extra dimension to their personhood: that of citizen, of zoōn politikon. It does not 
merely respect citizens’ ‘pre-political’ capacity for moral judgment, but makes 
possible a deepening of that capacity, since the shift from reasoning on a purely 
individual level (‘what ought I do?’) to reasoning as a member of a collective subject 
(‘what ought we do?’) represents a broadening of one’s moral horizons. Rousseau, in 
a characteristically expressive passage, put this point well: 
‘Although, in [the civil] state, he deprives himself of some advantages which 
he got from nature, he gains in return others so great, his faculties are so 
stimulated and developed, his ideas so extended, his feelings so ennobled, and 
his whole soul so uplifted, that, did not the abuses of this new condition often 
degrade him below that which he left, he would be bound to bless continually 
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the happy moment which took him from it for ever, and, instead of a stupid 
and unimaginative animal, made him an intelligent being and a man.’4 
Note that this is not to denigrate other, non-political concepts of autonomy, such as 
Kantian moral autonomy, or the ‘ethical’ autonomy enjoyed by a person with an 
authentic conception of what the good life means for her.5 We are not, as the likes of 
Constant and Berlin would have us believe, forced to make a choice between ‘the 
liberty of the ancients’ and ‘the liberty of the moderns’.6 We need not settle for a single 
exhaustive definition of autonomy, we are capable of enjoying different forms of 
autonomy alongside one another.7 The important point to recognise is that political 
autonomy is a value in its own right: a democratic republic is a non-instrumental – 
and irreducibly social – good. 
6.1.2 The Rousseauian and Kantian Conceptions of Political Autonomy 
I have described political autonomy as arising from the successful resolution of the 
tension between unity and individuality. Resolving this tension is not a 
straightforward theoretical task, as can be illustrated by looking at the way in which 
leading political philosophers have grappled with the issue. 
The idea that democracy secures political autonomy is a common theme in classic 
works of political theory. I have already mentioned Rousseau: it was political 
autonomy that he had in mind when he said that in an ideal republic each citizen ‘will 
obey himself alone, and remain as free as before’.8 In Rousseau’s model political 
                                                     
4 Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book I, chap viii. 
5 For the former see Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Part III; for a discussion of 
the latter see Lewis Hinchman, ‘Autonomy, Individuality, and Self-Determination’, in James 
Schmidt (ed.), What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-century answers and twentieth-century 
questions (Berkeley, University California Press, 1996). 
6 Benjamin Constant, ‘The Liberty of the Ancients compared with that of the Moderns’, in Ian 
Carter et al (eds.), Freedom: a philosophical anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007); Isaiah Berlin, 
Two Concepts of Liberty: an inaugural lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on 31 October, 
1958 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958). 
7 For one way of distinguishing between different forms of autonomy without viewing them 
as mutually exclusive alternatives, see Rainer Forst, ‘Political Liberty’, in John Christman and 
Joel Anderson (eds.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: new essays (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
8 Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book I, chap vi. 
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autonomy is secured by each citizen forming part of a collective sovereign that 
governs in accordance with the general will. Citizens are politically autonomous 
because they obey only a body of which they are a member and whose will is also 
their own will, so that ‘each in giving himself to all gives himself to none’.9 On this 
account, the whole activity of legislation is essentially a means for expressing the 
general will, which itself is ‘indestructible’10 and so exists quite apart from the 
uncertain outcome of particular votes. The general will should not be thought of as a 
kind of natural law detached from the minds of the citizens: Rousseau thought of the 
general will as a real, empirical will which citizens possess as a matter of 
psychological fact.11 Nevertheless, Rousseau felt that the general will will only come 
to the fore, so as to find embodiment in legislation, under certain (somewhat 
demanding) conditions, and Rousseau’s political theory should be seen as much as 
anything as an attempt to state what these conditions are. This is at heart a 
sociological thesis: that men will only truly unite and cooperate when the principles 
of The Social Contract are fulfilled. 
However, the conditions that Rousseau sees as necessary for the political community 
to govern itself in accordance with the general will are not attractive. In The 
Government of Poland, the citizen is described as ‘a mere cipher’, having imbibed a love 
of his fatherland with his mother’s milk.12 Everything in the life of the citizen is 
designed to bring him to a state of identification with the polis: a nationalist 
education,13 a shared ‘civic profession of faith’,14 censorship of the arts,15 and the 
institution of community festivals in which ‘the only pure joy is public joy’.16 As 
                                                     
9 Ibid.; see also Book II, chap iv. 
10 Ibid., Book IV, chap i. 
11 See Arthur M Melzer, The Natural Goodness of Man: on the system of Rousseau’s thought 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), chap 9. 
12 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Government of Poland (Willmoore Kendall tr, Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), p 19. 
13 The Government of Poland, chap 4. 
14 The Social Contract, Book IV, chap viii. 
15 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Letter to d’Alembert’, in Letter to d’Alembert and Writings for the 
Theater (A Bloom et al tr and ed, Lebanon: University Press of New England, 2004). 
16 Ibid., p 351. 
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Kendall puts it in his introduction to The Government of Poland, Rousseau ‘founds his 
political regime on a people who have been made more or less homogeneous through 
the inculcation of a national ethos’.17 The problem is clear: Rousseau does not attend 
to the second aspect of political autonomy. Rousseau’s political community is 
cohesive and self-governing, but does not respect each individual as a moral agent in 
his own right. 
Kant recognised this defect in Rousseau’s theory and attempted to set it right. Kant 
shared with Rousseau the conviction that political autonomy was of the goal of a 
republican government, and, like Rousseau, saw the key to realising it in the 
generality and publicity of the law. Kant’s republic would be governed by ‘a public 
law that determines for everyone what is to be rightfully permitted or forbidden him’, 
such a law being ‘the act of a public will’.18 However, allegiance to the law is not to 
be guaranteed by inculcation of a particular ethos, but rather by the use of reason: 
‘In every commonwealth there must be obedience under the mechanism of 
the state constitution to coercive laws… but there must also be a spirit of 
freedom, since each, in what has to do with universal human duties, requires 
to be convinced by reason that this coercion is in conformity with right, lest 
he fall into contradiction to himself.’19 
The law, by the employment of coercion, compels citizens to act in accordance with 
its dictates. But it does not compel citizens to believe that they are under a moral 
obligation to comply. Citizens are not externally compelled to reach this conclusion, 
but do so in the free exercise of their reason. So the law has a kind of dual existence. 
As a manifestation of external force, it does indeed coerce those who are disinclined 
to obey. But, from the point of view of pure practical reason, the obligation to obey 
                                                     
17 Willmoore Kendall, ‘Introduction’, in The Government of Poland, p xxxviii. See also Geraint 
Parry, ‘Thinking One’s Own Thoughts’, in Robert Wokler (ed.), Rousseau and Liberty 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). 
18 Immanuel Kant, ‘On the Common Saying: that may be correct in theory, but it is of no use 
in practice’, in Practical Philosophy (MJ Gregor tr and ed, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 8:294 (emphasis in original). See also Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 
(MJ Gregor tr, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Part II. 
19 Ibid., 8:305. 
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the law is not an external dictate but a conclusion which citizens reach of their own 
accord. 
The prerequisite for a citizen to be so ‘convinced by reason’ is the ‘spirit of freedom’. 
This entails not only the freedom to engage in inward reflection, but freedom of 
communication, since ‘the same external constraint which deprives people of the 
freedom to communicate their thoughts in public also removes their freedom of 
thought’.20 In marked contrast to Rousseau, Kant holds that one’s judgments can only 
be truly free when they are made in the context of an enlightened public culture with 
generally shared standards of public reasoning.21 If we undermine the public use of 
reason by intolerance or indoctrination, then all uses of reason are ultimately in 
jeopardy. But where I am able to determine for myself the legitimacy of the legal 
regime on the basis of public standards of rational justification, then, Kant says: ‘The 
law by virtue of which I regard myself as under obligation in every case proceeds 
from my own pure practical reason.’22 Therefore, Kant argues, in obeying the law 
citizens are following the commands of their own rational will, and so are politically 
autonomous. 
Unlike Rousseau, however, Kant has little to say about the process of legislation. His 
theory is therefore problematic in its treatment of the first aspect of political 
autonomy. Kant does not give the citizen any reason for viewing himself as the 
member of a political community as collective agent, i.e. as joint author of the law. A 
Kantian citizen might enjoy a form of autonomy, in that he obeys the law not out of 
physical compulsion but out of a genuine appraisal that it is normatively binding, but 
this is not the full political autonomy which comes from being a member of a 
community that collectively decides on its ends and its terms of association. He may 
be a free moral agent, but he is not yet a self-governing citizen. 
                                                     
20 Immanuel Kant, ‘What is Orientation in Thinking?’, in HS Reiss (ed), Kant: Political Writings 
(HB Nisbet tr, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p 247 (emphasis in original). 
21 On this see Onora O’Neill, ‘The Public Use of Reason’, in Constructions of Reason: explorations 
of Kant’s practical philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
22 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:417-8. 
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Rawls took the Kantian view a step further, claiming not only that the public use of 
reason would be able to convince all of the legitimacy of the law, but that over time it 
would be possible for all citizens of a democratic society to come to share a conception 
of justice from which the law could be seen to flow. Rawls initially took the view that 
this conception of justice would be premised upon a shared acceptance of the ethical 
value of autonomy.23 However, he later came to believe that citizens could not 
converge on this (or any) particular conception of the good without intolerable 
indoctrination (perhaps of the kind endorsed by Rousseau), and instead developed a 
conception of political autonomy that is ‘freestanding’ from ethical considerations. 
While retaining the view that citizens might come to share a conception of justice, in 
his later work this conception is the subject of an ‘overlapping consensus’ between 
individuals who endorse it for different reasons, i.e. from the perspectives of their 
own diverse ethical, religious or metaphysical doctrines.24 In both the ‘metaphysical’ 
and the ‘political’ versions, Rawls viewed democratic citizens as self-governing 
because they abide by such terms of cooperation that they would give to themselves.25 
As a proportion of his voluminous work as a whole, Rawls paid relatively little 
attention to institutional matters. Unlike Kant, however, he did insist that the 
principle of equal liberty required that the constitution of a well-ordered society be 
democratic. Yet in Rawls’ account democracy is of derivative value only, flowing 
from the principles of justice. Therefore, the constitution ‘is to be framed so that, of 
all the feasible just arrangements, it is the one more likely than any other to result in 
a just and effective system of legislation’.26 This lends Rawls’ conception of political 
autonomy a paradoxical air, since political autonomy turns out to be realised in a 
system calibrated to generate consensus over a particular conception of justice. 
Although Rawls is surely right to say that a democratic constitution must aim at 
                                                     
23 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, §78. 
24 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (paperback edn, New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), Lecture IV. 
25 A Theory of Justice, §85; Political Liberalism, Lecture II, §6. 
26 A Theory of Justice, §36. 
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justice,27 it does not follow that it must aim at a particular conception of justice. The 
moral capacity to which democracy pays respect includes the capacity to make an 
evaluation between competing conceptions of justice. A political system does not 
fully respect this capacity if it is designed from the outset to favour one conception of 
justice over the others.28 
6.1.3 The Path towards Reconciliation 
The three theorists whose work has been the subject of discussion in the preceding 
chapters can all be presented as engaged in attempts to resolve the opposition 
between the Rousseauian and the Kantian conceptions of political autonomy. This is 
most explicit with Habermas, who expressly presents his work as a reconciliation of 
the two schools of thought.29 Yet Dworkin’s attempt to ‘integrate’ individual and 
community,30 and Waldron’s intuition that a strongly individualist notion of liberal 
rights should be combined with an ‘ascending’ (as opposed to ‘descending’) model 
of authority,31 indicate close connections with the same project. 
While Habermas’ theory is a significant improvement upon the Rousseauian and 
Kantian views, it perhaps suffers from an excessive rationalism. In this respect (and 
perhaps surprisingly), Dworkin’s methodology could usefully come to Habermas’ 
aid, since it stresses attention to the shared background understandings that underlie 
our political values. However, despite the promise of his methodology, the use that 
Dworkin makes of our shared understandings is limited, since his interpretation is 
restricted to the symbolic significance of voting. In fact our constitutional imaginaries 
lend significance to a broader range of institutional phenomena, as Waldron’s work 
on the ‘dignity of legislation’ makes clear. 
                                                     
27 Political Liberalism, Lecture IX, §5. 
28 For a related criticism see Jürgen Habermas, ‘Reconciliation through the Public Use of 
Reason: remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism’ (1995) 92 Journal of Philosophy 109. 
29 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p 100-3. 
30 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Liberal Community’ (1989) 77 California Law Review 479, at 491-9. 
31 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, p 56. 
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Even in the fairest decision-making system, most citizens will find it difficult to 
perceive the effect of their individual agency on the output side of politics. We need 
the idea of representation to fill the gap. The very idea of democratic government – 
indeed, the idea of any government that is not sheer domination – relies upon a non-
rational (though not irrational) sense that those who make political decisions do so 
not as individuals but as representatives of the community as a whole. This creates a 
relationship between citizens and officials that transcends any particular issue or 
decision. However, not all possible senses of representation will signify democratic 
respect. The challenge is to find a form of relationship which enables decisions to be 
made in the name of the people as a whole, in such a way that is respectful to each 
individual citizen as a distinctive intellect in her own right. I believe that such a 
relationship can be found in our practice of legislation by representative assembly. 
Representative government can help integrate a pluralistic population into a 
community capable of collective self-government, while respecting individual 
citizens as agents capable of moral-political judgment. 
6.2 The Value of Representation 
6.2.1 The Integrative Function of Legislative Assemblies 
The idea that a representative relationship can help link persons together into a 
collective agent pre-dates modern democracy. For instance, it played a prominent role 
in the debate between conciliarism and papalism in the medieval Catholic Church.32 
Pope Innocent IV (1195-1254) had established the doctrine that cathedral chapters 
were persona ficta, whose collective agency was empowered by the fact that they had 
representatives (the bishops) who could act in their name. Without such 
representation they would be incapable of acting as a body in their own right. In 
challenging the authority of the Pope over that of the secular state, Marsilius of Padua 
(c.1275-c.1343) argued that those who represented a corporate agent must derive their 
authority from consent, to be found in the will of the valentior pars. During the Papal 
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Schism of 1378-1417, conciliarists looking to defend the authority of the Ecumenical 
Councils drew upon Marcilius’ arguments, claiming that the will of the valentior pars 
was to be found in the Councils’ decrees. Their papalist opponents countered in 
proto-Hobbesian vein by arguing that the unity of the church resulted from its 
subordination to a single head, that of the pope. It is worth noting that conciliarist 
arguments drew on formal, descriptive and symbolic aspects of the idea of 
representation: they claimed that the Councils were authorised by members of the 
Church by way of election, that, in its (relative) diversity, the Councils resembled the 
entire Christian community, and that the Council symbolised the essence of the wider 
Church.33 While the Pope could also claim to represent the Church in the symbolic 
sense, his claim to formal authorisation was weak, and his claim to descriptive 
resemblance even weaker. 
A similar development can be seen in the history of European parliaments. In parallel 
to the rise of the ecclesiastical conciliar movements, secular representative assemblies 
emerged all over Europe during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Originally, 
these parliaments were instruments of royal authority, functioning to ensure that 
centralised decisions could be reliably translated to the localities. But, as time passed, 
members of parliament gained an increasing awareness of parliament as a body 
distinct from that of the crown, and a sense of a duty to refer back to their constituents 
before taking binding decisions. By the sixteenth century, in England at least, 
parliamentarians were claiming that Parliament was capable of speaking for the 
nation as a whole,34 and this idea went on to form the basis of Parliament’s claim 
against Charles I. Again the descriptive aspect of representation was invoked, 
although it was taken further by Parker, who claimed that Parliament is not simply a 
miniaturised, map-like replication of the people, but rather an improvement on the 
original, transforming the bulky and clumsy mass of the public into a manageable 
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form.35 Note that this view was not presented as democratic; indeed, it was raised in 
opposition to Leveller demands for democratic reforms such as biennial parliaments, 
an increase in the number of MPs, equalisation in the size of parliamentary districts 
and universal male suffrage.36 
Parker’s line of thought probably reached its peak in the writings and speeches of 
Edmund Burke. Burke believed that it was important that Parliament contain 
members capable of voicing the concerns of all sectors of society, not for reasons of 
political equality, but because it was the only way in which society could be held 
together as a cohesive whole. For Burke, Parliament could at once provide recognition 
of the particularity of each ‘class or description of men’,37 while, through constructive 
deliberation between members, provide reassurance to each that they share in a 
common interest. Despite the diversity of the interests that persist in society, 
‘Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests… 
but… a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole.’38 A 
representative assembly can serve to harmonise the various interests within the 
nation, and the test of good government is whether it succeeds in keeping the whole 
together. 
It is tempting to be dismissive of Burke on account of his opposition to universal 
suffrage, his elitist epistemology and his conservative approach to political reform in 
general. This would, however, be a mistake. For Burke reminds us of three crucial 
points. Firstly, attachment to the political community cannot be based entirely on acts 
of individual consent, but requires also an affective dimension. Secondly, the 
workings of political institutions are to a large part governed by inherited traditions 
                                                     
35 Henry Parker, Observations upon some of his Majesties late Answers and Expresses (London: s.n., 
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36 See John Wildman, ‘An Agreement of the People for a Firm and Present Peace upon Grounds 
of Common Right and Freedom’, <http://www.constitution.org/eng/conpur074.htm>. 
37 Edmund Burke, ‘Letter to the Chairman of the Buckinghamshire Meeting’, in The Works of 
the Right Honourable Edmund Burke (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1856), Volume VI, p 162. 
38 Burke, ‘Speech to the Electors of Bristol’, in The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, 
Volume II, p 96 (emphasis in original). 
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that at once reflect and reinforce our constitutional imaginaries. Thirdly, a process of 
dialogue between people from different backgrounds can play an important socially 
integrative function. We can accept each of these points while still rejecting Burke’s 
elitism. 
The link between representative government and social integration becomes more 
overtly democratic in tone with Tocqueville’s classic Democracy in America, which is 
in large part an examination of the way in which political institutions affect the self-
understandings of citizens. Tocqueville recognised that well-functioning democratic 
institutions lead citizens to view their fates as intertwined, and so tend to draw them 
together in the pursuance of a common good.39 Tocqueville chiefly associated this 
phenomenon with participation in local affairs, which he saw flourishing in the 
United States in the 1830s. Yet he saw national politics as also playing an important 
role, with participation in local affairs and engagement with nation-wide issues 
mutually reinforcing one another. ‘In politics, men unite for great undertakings, and 
the advantage they derive from association in important affairs teaches them in a 
practical manner the interest they have in aiding each other in lesser ones.’40 This he 
linked to the democratic process as a whole, since ‘the electoral system brings together 
in a permanent manner a multitude of citizens who would always have remained 
strangers to one another’.41 
In like manner, Mill argued that representation of the various interests, as advocated 
by Burke, is inadequate to sustain a true political community. Instead he argued for 
universal suffrage, on the basis that an individual must engage in a degree of political 
participation in order to benefit from the enrichment of personhood associated with 
the status of citizenship.42 Without widespread political participation, a community, 
however otherwise well-governed, will tend to disintegrate into an aggregation of 
                                                     
39 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume II, Part 2, chap (iv). 
40 Ibid., Volume II, Part 2, chap (vii). 
41 Ibid., Volume II, Part 2, chap (iv). 
42 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), in particular chaps III and VIII. 
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individuals in which the ‘intelligence and sentiments of the whole people are given 
up to the material interests, and, when these are provided for, to the amusement and 
ornamentation, of private life’.43 Here he recognised the symbolic potential of the 
vote, something which Burke had neglected: ‘It is a great discouragement to an 
individual, and a still greater one to a class, to be left out of the constitution; to be 
reduced to plead from outside the door to the arbiters of their destiny, not taken into 
consultation within.’44 From this position it might be thought that Mill would 
advocate direct democracy, so as to maximise the potential for political participation 
for all. But he did not do so. In part this was because of a (surely well-grounded) fear 
that direct democracy would make for a low quality of legislation. But this practical 
reason was not the only one for endorsing representative government. Mill also saw 
a role for the legislative assembly that provided a principled reason for preferring 
representative over direct democracy. In a manner reminiscent of Burke, Mill saw that 
a representative assembly can function as the nation’s ‘Congress of Opinions’: an 
arena for the critical discussion of the opinion of every class in society.45 Adding the 
democratic element that Burke’s theory lacked gives this argument an extra 
dimension: that ‘those whose opinion is overruled, feel satisfied that it is heard, and 
set aside not by a mere act of will, but for what are thought superior reasons’.46 In 
other words, once we allow that the legislature should represent individuals not just 
as interest-bearers but as agents capable of political judgment in their own right, then 
legislative deliberation serves as a form of recognition of those who hold dissenting 
views, acknowledging that, although they have not prevailed, they are not simply to 
be cast aside, but are deserving at least of an audience and a reasoned response. 
Still, it might be asked why these considerations favour a representative assembly 
over other institutions that allow for popular participation. Indeed, it is often said that 
a particular strength of judicial review is that it enables any citizen to force 
                                                     
43 Ibid., p 32. 
44 Ibid., p 140 
45 Ibid., p 116. 
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government into a public arena to explain its actions, in reasoned terms, to him as an 
individual.47 One response to this might be that a representative legislature is more 
efficient than the courts in this regard: it provides a standing body of potential 
complainants from across all sectors of society, while courts rely on actions being 
raised by private individuals who may lack the requisite knowledge, expertise and 
funds to press their case effectively. Yet this response is inadequate, because it pits an 
idealised model of the representative legislature against a less-than-ideal model of 
courts. It is true that there are significant practical barriers to individuals bringing 
judicial review actions, but there are similarly such barriers to effective representation 
in the legislative arena. It will be a matter of empirical contingency which barriers are 
the more demanding, and therefore whether the courts or the legislature present a 
more efficient mechanism for a citizen to force government to explain its actions in 
terms directed to him as an individual. Such an argument cannot found a principled, 
ideal-theoretical case in favour of legislative supremacy. 
However, although parliament and the courts may both function as arenas for 
participating in politics and drawing a reasoned response from government, it would 
be wrong for us to view them as simply more or less efficient venues for doing this. 
For participation through the legislature is qualitatively different from participation 
by way of court action. Where a citizen takes legal action against the government, the 
two stand opposed to one another as claimant and defendant. In the typical case, the 
claimant must identify an individual right of his that has been violated; and while 
this requirement might be relaxed, for example by a broadening of standing rules, the 
general individualistic and adversarial orientation of courts is bound to colour the 
attitudes of participants in the proceedings. Court proceedings are designed around 
the expectation that claimants will present themselves as having been unlawfully 
prevented from pursuing their own individual (or perhaps group) interest, which 
conflicts with that of the defendant. The parties wield arms against one another, and 
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it takes an impartial judge to arbitrate between them. In a legislature, on the other 
hand, parties stand in a much more ambiguous relationship towards one another. In 
some senses they are adversaries, either because they are on the opposing sides in a 
particular debate or, more generally, because they are from opposing parties. 
However, and unlike litigants, they are also members of the same collegiate body. 
While the idea of conflicting interests is built in to court proceedings, the same is not 
true in legislative bodies. Indeed, as has been pointed out by figures as otherwise 
different as Burke and Habermas, the very practice of deliberation presupposes that 
there is a common interest towards which discussion is oriented. Furthermore, 
legislative decisions are made not by an impartial arbiter, but by the legislative body 
itself, so that in a legislative debate parties are at one and the same time both opposing 
one another and attempting to persuade one another. When a piece of legislation is 
passed, it represents not the success of A’s claim over B’s, but a (fallible and 
provisional) interpretation of the common good of the nation as a whole. 
In providing a ‘metatopical’48 space for deliberation (i.e. a space that is not tied to a 
particular issue or concern), a legislative assembly is capable of functioning as the 
focal point of public political debate, giving the various discourses ongoing in the 
‘weak publics’ of civil society a point of contact. This is particularly important in a 
multicultural society, in which the concerns of certain groups might not be 
immediately comprehensible to outsiders. As Young puts it: ‘Different groups and 
segments of the polity best talk across their difference through representatives who 
meet together and listen to one another, open to the possibility of changing their 
positions.’49 The Janus-faced position of representatives, at once both advocates and 
judges, allows them to function as what we might call ‘transformers’, turning the 
competing demands arising from diverse parts of society into interpretations of the 
common good, capable of being appreciated as such from various different 
viewpoints. In turn, the terms in which legislative deliberation is conducted will feed 
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back to the citizenry as a whole, encouraging them to see their own concerns and 
opinions in a different light by placing them in the context of a wider debate. Clearly 
this argument relies upon the idea that political identity is not a concrete ‘given’, but 
that a sense of belonging to a political community may develop over time through a 
process of debate and discussion. The point is not that this process will eventually 
give rise to a consensus between all groups in society, but that parties to ongoing 
disputes will see themselves as disagreeing over a common good; that is, as members 
of a community engaged in a joint project of self-government, rather than rival 
factions uneasily sharing the same piece of land. 
Again I should add the caveat that real-life legislatures do not tend to operate in this 
idealised way. The culture of politics in a given country might, for instance, be so 
adversarial that members of parliament are virtually indistinguishable from 
opposing parties in a case at the bar. This could be because of deep social divisions in 
society, or simply because opposing political parties have developed such a hostility 
towards one another that any moves towards consensus politics would be seen as 
betrayal of the party cause. Alternatively, parliamentarians might view themselves as 
representatives only of the partial interests of their constituencies, corporate backers, 
or other sectoral group. Where this is the case, legislative ‘deliberation’ will be no 
more than a bargaining procedure, in which outcomes represent the extant balance 
of power rather than any sense of genuinely common good. It is likely that one or 
both of these failings afflicts all real-world legislatures to some degree or another. But 
while the argument that legislatures play an integrative role in society clearly 
becomes weaker the less consensus-oriented legislative deliberation actually is, it 
does not straightforwardly follow that in societies with defective legislatures the 
social integration case for legislative supremacy50 disappears. Firstly, we need to bear 
in mind that the issue is comparative; the question is not whether the legislature is 
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perfect in the abstract, but how it performs in comparison to other institutions.51 That 
the legislature does not quite do what it is supposed to is not an argument for 
transferring its functions to another body unless we can be confident that that other 
body would perform them better. Secondly, even where a legislature is not providing 
an integrative role today, we need to consider whether changes to the legislative 
system (e.g. to the voting system, to party finance, to the rules governing deliberation, 
etc.) might allow it to do so in future. Only if such reforms are utterly impracticable 
does the argument fall off the table completely. Thirdly, we need to be on guard 
against creating what I called in chapter four a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’: if we 
construct a model that diminishes the respect owed to legislation by pointing to 
legislators’ self-interested behaviour, there is a risk that we thereby legitimate such 
behaviour. Finally, it should be noted that there is empirical evidence that the 
inclusion of members of historically disadvantaged groups in legislative bodies can 
shift the dynamics of legislative decision making towards a discursive, consensus-
oriented model.52 So while a degree of real-world scepticism is healthy, it doesn’t 
warrant us losing sight of our ideals. 
6.2.2 The Role of Legislatures in Respecting Judgment 
I have argued for a distinction between a conception of democracy based around 
respect for citizens’ wills and one premised on respect for citizens’ judgment, claiming 
that only the latter recognises the depth of citizens’ moral agency.53 The significance 
of this distinction has been highlighted in recent work by Urbinati, who has argued 
persuasively that a judgment-based conception should regard representative 
democracy not as a pragmatic concession to the impracticability of direct democracy, 
but as the first-best democratic solution.54 It should be clear that ‘representation’ here 
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requires more than formal processes for the election and authorisation of officials. 
Representation should be seen in dynamic terms, as ‘a comprehensive filtering, 
refining, and mediating process of political will formation’.55 Most theorists of 
democracy will acknowledge that such a process is likely to be of not inconsiderable 
instrumental value, and Urbinati would not dissent from that view. But Urbinati’s 
claim, which I am adopting here, goes further than this: procedures of representative 
democracy have noninstrumental value, since they are constitutive of a ‘form of 
political existence’ which allows for a deep recognition of citizens’ capacity for 
political judgment.56 
6.2.2.1 What is Judgment? 
I should briefly say a word about what I mean by ‘judgment’. I am using the term in 
a broad, non-technical sense – I would like so far as possible to remain agnostic with 
respect to philosophical debates in the ‘theory of judgment’.57 This is in part due to 
modesty of ambition: a philosophical account of the nature of judgment would be 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, a certain agnosticism is also called for by 
the nature of the matter in hand, for it is not the role of a theory of democracy to pin 
down every moving part ex ante.58 The precise nature of judgment that is the object of 
democratic respect ought itself to be something that is amenable to democratic debate, 
and not fixed by philosophical dictat. Nevertheless, my claim that representative 
government respects citizens’ judgment must of course rest on some account of 
judgment to make it an intelligible claim at all. There are certain features of judgment 
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58 I have therefore taken the same approach to the concept of judgment as to the concept of 
political autonomy, see p 6, above. Cf. my criticism of Rawls at p 141-2, above. 
153 
 
that I take to be central, and upon which my argument for the noninstrumental value 
of representative government rests.  
I have already stressed the most fundamental premise on which I am basing the 
distinction between will-based and judgment-based accounts of democracy: unlike 
the exercise of will, the exercise of judgment requires the agent to put his desires to 
the test, to consider whether what he wants is what he should want, whether his 
intentions, desires and ambitions and are noble or ignoble, just or unjust, and so on. 
To this we can add the two features of judgment that I highlighted in chapter three.59 
Firstly, judgments are not qualitatively equal entities: they may be certain or 
uncertain, tentative or settled, partial or comprehensive, and so on. They may be the 
product of prolonged reflection drawing on the resources of a time-honoured 
tradition of thought, or of the most perfunctory consideration. We should therefore 
not think of them as suitable for arithmetical aggregation. Secondly, judgment is 
essentially diachronic: it flows dynamically, shaping and reshaping in response to 
information received and ongoing deliberation. One cannot identify a specific point 
in time at which judgment ‘occurs’. 
A further premise is that the capacity for judgment is not something that an 
individual can possess in isolation. The ability to reach one’s own judgments is not a 
capacity that men and women are born with: it has to be developed, and its 
development relies upon the existence of a certain type of society. There must exist a 
vocabulary of judgment, which means that a culture of judgment must be embedded 
in common practices. To develop the capacity for judgment, agents must ‘live in a 
world in which there is such a thing as public debate about moral and political 
questions and other basic issues’.60 Kant was therefore right to say that ‘the same 
external constraint which deprives people of the freedom to communicate their 
thoughts in public also removes their freedom of thought’.61 Since a practice of public 
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communication is a pre-requisite for the capacity for judgment, judgment thus has an 
irreducibly intersubjective nature. 
The intersubjectivity of judgment takes on a particularly strong guise in the specific 
case of political judgment. As I noted in chapter four, the idea of popular self-
government relies entirely on the existence of a body of public opinion.62 While the 
capacity for any judgment relies upon the existence of discussion and intersubjective 
standards, political judgment requires a further sense that a certain domain is the 
common concern of all, a res publica. A political system based on the idea of respecting 
the capacity for political judgment must therefore provide a public space which is in 
principle open to the contributions of all. 
Respecting the capacity of judgment also necessitates an acknowledgment of 
fallibility, since to render a judgment is to hold oneself to standards that are not fully 
under one’s own control.63 One cannot mis-will, but one can misjudge. A conception 
of democracy that respects judgment cannot, therefore, throw itself whole-heartedly 
on the side of the political winners, declaring the losers to be simply ‘mistaken’.64 
Rather, our political institutions should be organised in such a way as to recognise 
the legitimacy of continuing critique. A democratic political system needs a way to 
symbolise the fact that while the views of some will for the time being prevail, theirs 
is not ipso facto to be taken as the last word. 
6.2.2.2 How do Legislatures Respect Judgment? 
Political judgment, then, is strongly evaluative, arithmetically inaggregable, 
diachronic, intersubjective, public and fallible. With these features in mind we can 
begin to see how representative democracy allows for citizens’ capacity for judgment 
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to be recognised and respected. This requires us to take a particular view as to the 
nature of political representation, one which does not fit within the frame in which 
the issue of representation is usually presented. 
On the voluntaristic view of popular sovereignty, political representation is the result 
of a consensual delegation of authority by the voters. Two possible conceptions of 
representation follow, in the shape of what Pitkin called ‘the mandate-independence 
controversy’.65 If we think that the periodic granting of consent in elections is 
sufficient for the retention of popular sovereignty, then we will be drawn to the idea 
that political representation involves the appointment of a group of specialists who 
will take care of the work of politics on behalf of the people, and thus to the 
‘independence’ (or ‘trustee’) approach. If, on the other hand, we believe popular 
sovereignty requires continual adherence to the will of the people, then will view the 
duty of the representative to follow the wishes of the people throughout his tenure, 
i.e. the ‘mandate’ (or ‘delegate’) approach. Based, as they are, on the voluntaristic 
view of popular sovereignty, both approaches offer a static conception of the 
relationship between representative and citizen. A delegate must take a series of 
‘snapshots’ of the citizenry (or perhaps of his particular constituency), one each time 
he votes in the assembly. Although these may be many in number, each of them is a 
static picture which has no necessary connection to any of the others. A trustee, on 
the other hand, is not forced to view the people in such static terms; indeed, it would 
be an inadequate way of fulfilling her task of promoting their interests. But her 
relationship with the people is nevertheless defined statically, by the periodic granting 
of electoral consent. Between elections she has no tie to the people at all; she is free to 
promote their interests as she sees best.  
Both the delegate and the trustee conception view legislation by representative 
assembly as a useful practical device, of perhaps quite considerable, but nevertheless 
merely instrumental, value. The delegate version views representative democracy as 
the closest approximation of direct democracy that is practicable under modern 
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circumstances. This view is contingent, and so liable to empirical contestation. 
Perhaps a monarch, steeped in the traditions of the community and able to engage in 
consultation with his subjects without the pressures of electoral competition, would 
be better equipped to approximate the outcomes of a series of plebiscites. Or perhaps 
it would turn out that direct democracy is not so impractical after all. Similarly, the 
trustee approach views the assembly as instrumentally valuable, since the citizens’ 
interest exists separately from and is defined without reference to the process of 
representation itself. The aim of promoting the citizens’ interest might in principle be 
more reliably realised by a plebiscitary democracy, an hereditary aristocracy, or a 
benign dictatorship. 
If we take democracy to be concerned with respecting citizens’ judgment, we will 
view both the trustee and the delegate approaches as unsatisfactory. Since judgment 
is diachronic, a representative looking to respect citizens’ judgment cannot view his 
relationship with his constituents in static terms, but rather must view representation 
as a dynamic process. It will accordingly not be adequate for him to view his 
relationship with citizens as defined by a delegation, or a series of periodic 
delegations, of authority. As Urbinati puts it: 
‘Contrary to votes on single issues (direct democracy), a vote for a candidate 
reflects the longue durée and effectiveness of a political opinion or a 
constellation of political opinions; it reflects citizens’ judgment of a political 
platform, or a set of demands and ideas, over time… when politics is 
scheduled according to electoral terms and the political proposals the 
candidate embodies, opinions create a narrative that links voters through time 
and makes ideological accounts a representation of the entire society, its 
aspirations and problems.’66 
Citizens’ opinions on various issues should not be taken as distinct from one another, 
as the delegate model proposes. Opinions form ‘an intricate fabric of meanings and 
interpretations’, they are not ‘dispersed atoms or accidental entities that magically 
appear in the minds of the voters’.67 Since opinions inhabit the realm of meaning, and 
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not of brute fact, we should approach them as we do social practices, by subjecting 
them to interpretation. A representative body should therefore aim to render a 
constructive interpretation of citizens’ opinions which transcends individuals’ views 
on this or that issue. Representation thus has the potential to provide the collective 
action of the political community with an integrity which a set of piecemeal 
aggregations of viewpoints would lack, while still remaining receptive to the broad 
currents of opinion in society.68 
The legislative assembly, as an institution, represents a distinctive approach to 
resolving the problem of the arithmetical inaggregability of political judgment. 
Through a combination of large numbers, diverse population and deliberative 
procedures, well-functioning legislative assemblies can bring together contributions 
from across society, playing them off one another in a process of critical discussion, 
without reducing them to the status of brute preferences to be statistically assimilated 
into a vector sum. When legislators come from different geographical regions, 
employment sectors and social classes, and have different cultural, ethnic and sexual 
identities, they will provide a diversity of opinion based on a wide range of 
knowledge and experience. Where it is unfeasible for each citizen to have an informed 
opinion on every political issue on which the community must reach a decision, 
representative assemblies are structurally well-placed to allow for specialisation (they 
can form specialist committees which hear evidence from experts and topical 
pressure groups) without becoming technocratic (the decision-maker remains the 
assembly as a whole). Diversity of ‘input’ can accordingly be combined with a high 
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quality of ‘output’. In fact, diversity provides an epistemic advantage. As Waldron 
puts it, ‘deliberation among the many is a way of bringing each citizen’s ethical views 
and insights… to bear on the views and insights of each of the others, so that they cast 
light on each other, providing a basis for reciprocal questioning and criticism and 
enabling a view to emerge which is better than any of the inputs and much more than 
a mere aggregation or function of those inputs’.69 The diversity of a representative 
assembly should thus serve instrumentally to enhance the substantive quality of 
legislation. Furthermore, the fact that the diversity of society is taken advantage of in 
this way is itself of noninstrumental value, since it expresses respect for the political 
judgments of those whose backgrounds are represented in the chamber.70 This helps 
to explain the perhaps slightly cryptic claim that I made in chapter two, that the final 
value of democracy is conditioned upon its own instrumentality.71 The fact that a 
diversity of viewpoints are combined in such a way as to improve the substantive 
quality of political decisions enhances the expressive significance of the process, as 
well as emphasising that the faculty to which respect is being paid is that of judgment 
and not the sheer ability to bear a preference or give consent. 
Finally, the indirectness of representative democracy serves to respect citizens’ 
capacity for judgment by projecting the idea that any given decision is only a fallible 
interpretation of the common good. The space between public political discussion 
and the exercise of political power allows ongoing processes of disagreement to be 
seen as benign; without this space, dissensus would be viewed as dangerous, 
potentially destructive of the political community. The separation of the public sphere 
from political power ‘silently transforms the ideal of a social order free from 
conflictual debate into an ideal of debate free from social conflict’.72 Defeat in the 
                                                     
69 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Aristotle’s Multitude’, in The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p 151. 
70 Of course, the corollary of this is that insofar as certain backgrounds are not represented in 
the chamber, this will signify a lack of respect to persons from those sectors of society. 
71 See p 23, above. 
72 Michael Warner, The Letters of the Republic: publication and the public sphere in eighteenth-
century America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p 46. 
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assembly is therefore not defeat tout court; a political decision is merely ‘a caesura in 
an ongoing discussion’.73 A process that encourages the publicity of a plurality of 
dissenting views can ‘represent[] the reservations we should have towards all 
political decisions as only temporary interpretations of the will of the people’.74 
Representative democracy thus symbolically recognises the fallibility of the status quo, 
the legitimacy, and indeed necessity, of ongoing dissent, and the potential of all 
citizens to contribute to the collective, ongoing process of political judgment. 
6.3 Legislative Supremacy Defended 
In this final section I argue that, since the legislative assembly represents the political 
autonomy of the self-governing people, judicial review will tend to signify a set of 
boundaries around the processes of self-government. By lowering the symbolic status 
of the legislature below that of the courts, it dilutes the values of integration and 
respect for judgment which I have claimed that representative legislative processes 
embody. Through its individualistic procedures, judicial review enervates the sense 
of collective agency. And by its elitist nature, it weakens the respect that is paid to 
citizens’ moral-political judgment. In order to perfect this argument, however, I need 
to say some more about the nature of legislative supremacy, since although it is a term 
in common currency in constitutional theory, we are not always given an adequate 
account of its meaning. 
6.3.1 Legislative Supremacy not a Political Fact 
If I am to defend legislative supremacy, I clearly have to give an intelligible account 
of what ‘legislative supremacy’ means. One simple view is that legislative supremacy 
(or ‘parliamentary sovereignty’, as it is sometimes called) is a straightforward 
political fact.75 Do the courts, as a matter of empirical fact, accept that legislative 
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enactments are binding upon them, regardless of their content? If so, we have a 
system of legislative supremacy; if not, we do not. 
However, although this definition may sound simple, it proves impossible to apply. 
How do we know, in advance of the situation transpiring, whether courts would 
apply a statute demanding the extermination of all blue-eyed babies or purporting to 
disestablish the Church of Scotland? And if in such a case a court did refuse to apply 
the enactment, how would we know whether this showed an that the legislature’s 
powers had always been subject to such limitation, or on the other hand whether a 
‘revolution’ had taken place?76 
Furthermore, on the ‘political fact’ account, legislative supremacy becomes a 
principle which no-one could sensibly endorse. The political fact account presents 
legislative supremacy as riding on a conditional claim something along the lines of: 
‘for all X, if the parliament enacts X, then the courts will apply X as law’. To claim that 
a legislature enjoys supremacy, on this account, is to make a counterfactual claim 
about how the courts would act in a range of hypothetical scenarios, including the 
bizarre nightmare case of an infanticidal parliament. To defend legislative supremacy 
would therefore be to claim that we should have as judges people who would, in the 
case of the baby-killing statute, apply it as law.77 And that is something that no 
humane person could rationally claim. 
We can imagine someone defending the ideal of legislative supremacy, on the 
political fact account, on the basis that is democratic. The argument would go 
something like this: ‘Parliament has better democratic credentials than do the courts, 
because it is elected and the courts are not. Therefore the courts should apply acts of 
Parliament rather than enforcing their own ideas about what morality requires or 
                                                     
76 Wade claimed that courts had the de facto power to change the basic rule of the legal system 
by way of ‘revolution’ (ibid., at 189). 
77 I can imagine an objection here which claims that the baby-killing statute would be law, but 
that because of its immorality judges ought not to apply it and instead lie about what the law 
requires. But this objection does not hold water. The political fact account equates the law with 
whatever is, as a matter of fact, applied by the courts. So it makes no sense on this account to 
say that judges could lie about what the law is. 
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what basic rights we have.’ But this argument only makes sense if we view 
‘democracy’ as an entirely procedural concept, so that we can equate the 
requirements of democracy straightforwardly with the decisions of an elected body, 
without making any normative demands upon the process. This is because, as soon 
as we make normative demands of the democratic process, some decisions are going 
to become ruled out. A decision to mandate the murder of blue-eyed babies would, I 
suggest, provide conclusive evidence that the decision-making process has failed to 
meet even minimal normative standards. So we can only suppose that it would be 
democratic to enforce such a statute if we think that democracy does not impose any 
normative demands upon the political decision-making process. And anyone who 
does think that about democracy is going to have an incredibly hard job defending it 
as an ideal. 
So the political fact approach renders legislative supremacy impossible either to 
apply as a descriptive label or to endorse as a normative ideal. If this was all that 
legislative supremacy could mean, then we would be best advised to abandon the 
concept altogether. This would resolve the judicial review debate almost by default. 
Indeed, if the political fact approach to legislative supremacy were correct, it would 
be remarkable that the judicial review debate existed at all. Opponents of judicial 
review would be defending the clearly indefensible. But even the supporters of 
judicial review would, I think, concede that the case against judicial review was at 
least vaguely arguable. So legislative supremacy must mean something other than 
the straightforward fact that the courts accept the bindingness of legislative 
enactments regardless of their content. 
I would like to suggest that we can only understand the meaning and value of 
legislative supremacy if we appreciate that it is bound up with a certain normative 
conception (or set of normative conceptions) of democracy. It is not something that 
can be observed as a brute fact, but rather a potential part of the practice of democracy 
which (as I argued in chapter two)78 can only be identified by way of interpretation. Of 
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course, your interpretation of democracy might lead you to reject legislative 
supremacy as an ideal. But even if you do, you will only be able to understand the 
judicial review debate if you see legislative supremacy as a (flawed, in your eyes) 
attempt to realise the value of democracy. We must therefore reject the political fact 
approach. In order to give an account of what legislative supremacy means we must 
leave the external viewpoint of the detached observer and adopt the internal 
viewpoint of the engaged interpreter. 
6.3.2 Is the Judicial Review Debate ‘Crude’? 
A candidate account of legislative supremacy, one that portrays it as a normative 
feature of the practice of democracy, has recently been put forward by Allan.79 
Looking particularly at the English constitution, Allan identifies legislative 
supremacy as ‘a general rule requiring obedience to statute’80 which is given shape 
by the interaction between various principles of the common law. These principles at 
once both justify and limit the power of Parliament. Allan reconciles legislative 
supremacy with the idea of limits on Parliament by stressing two points. Firstly, 
legislative supremacy only enables Parliament to govern through law, which is not to 
be equated with the mere will of the sovereign. Allan argues, not implausibly, that 
the idea of government through law imposes certain requirements on legislation, 
such as intelligibility, generality and prospectivity, so that, for example, ‘[a] bill of 
attainder derives no support from the doctrine of legislative supremacy… because it 
lacks even the form of a valid statute’.81 Secondly, the ‘basic values of freedom, justice, 
and legality’ justify a presumption that Parliament does not intend to violate 
fundamental rights.82 This is not an empirical estimation of the probable intention of 
parliamentarians, but rather an exercise in constructive interpretation that places the 
words of a legislative enactment in the context of the constitutional values that justify 
adherence to statute. Accordingly, he argues, we do not deny the supremacy of 
                                                     
79 TRS Allan, The Sovereignty of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
80 Ibid., p 137. 
81 Ibid., p 141 (emphasis in original). 
82 Ibid., p 168. 
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parliament by allowing courts to infer exceptions to statutory rules by reference to 
moral criteria. 
Allan calls his approach ‘common law constitutionalism’, and he advances it as a 
middle-ground between ‘constitutional judicial review, American-style,’ on one 
hand, and ‘unfettered parliamentary sovereignty’ on the other.83 With shades of 
Habermas, he says: ‘There is no inconsistency in insisting that fundamental 
freedoms… are integral parts of any legitimate regime, while at the same time 
recognising that their precise specification depends on positive law and thereby 
conceding scope for legislative initiative.’84 From the perspective of this middle 
ground, ‘the debate over the merits or demerits of strong judicial review begins to 
look somewhat crude’.85 Instead: 
‘What is most important is not the formal characterization of judicial review, 
but rather the manner in which courts determine the content of fundamental 
rights, on the one hand, while showing proper deference to the legislative role 
of furthering the public good within the broad limits of those rights, on the 
other.’86 
Allan lays down a formidable challenge to those who, like myself, want to argue that 
there is an important distinction between legislative supremacy and a system of 
judicial review. For it seems reasonable to suppose that, as a principle of statutory 
interpretation, legislation should wherever possible be interpreted so as to be 
consistent with fundamental rights. Similarly, if Parliament is to be sovereign as a 
legislator, it seems reasonable to suggest that some constraints are required in order 
for a purported enactment to qualify as law. If we accept these two points, then the 
cases in which we are faced with a rights-violating statute – that is, a statute which 
cannot be read in a rights-consistent way – may be rare indeed. Does this render the 
question of whether the courts should have authority to override statute relatively 
unimportant, ‘crude’ even? 
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There is a sense in which it does. Suppose we are told that in jurisdiction X courts 
enjoy the authority to disapply statutes that violate constitutional rights, whereas in 
jurisdiction Y they do not. What can we conclude, from this information, about the 
empirical impact that the judiciary has had upon rights-implementation in the two 
jurisdictions? The answer is: very little. The fact that courts in X enjoy the authority 
to disapply statutes does not tell us anything about the frequency or boldness with 
which they do so. And the fact that courts in Y lack this authority tells us nothing 
about the approach they take to statutory interpretation, which (as Allan makes clear) 
might involve frequent and substantial departure from the literal words of statutes in 
order to ensure compliance with constitutional rights (‘common law’ or otherwise). 
And these facts also tell us nothing about the broader interplay between courts and 
legislature: about whether, for example, the legislature in Y operates under a ‘chilling 
effect’ of potential court action, deliberately operating cautiously for fear of 
provoking the courts to depart from their existing permissive practice; or whether the 
courts in X adopt an approach of ‘deference’ to or ‘dialogue’ with the legislature, 
amending their judgments on constitutional rights so as to align them more closely 
with the legislature’s vision.87 So if the nature of our concern is the empirical impact 
that unelected judges have on state policy, then a focus on the question of judicial 
review is unwarranted. 
However, the persistence of the judicial review debate, among constitutional scholars 
who can scarcely be taken to be ignorant of the complexities of the relationship 
between courts and legislatures, suggests that there are concerns with something 
other than the empirical impact of judges. As I have been at pains to stress throughout 
this thesis, there is a vitally important symbolic dimension to constitutional design. 
Allan’s critique of the judicial review debate is reminiscent of my own criticism of 
Waldron in chapter three;88 Allan too attacks defenders of judicial review for 
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approaching it as if it were a stand-alone decision-making mechanism that could be 
analysed in abstraction from the rest of the political process. But Allan fails to see the 
real thrust of Waldron’s argument: its shortcomings aside, Waldron’s case against 
judicial review is primarily concerned with the symbolic, not the empirical, 
consequences of judicial review. As he puts it, the right to participation ‘has less to do 
with a certain minimum prospect of decisive impact and more to do with avoiding 
the insult, dishonour, or denigration that is involved’.89 Even if a system of judicial 
review and one of legislative supremacy were to work in empirically similar ways, 
they may well function quite differently on the symbolic level of insult, dishonour 
and denigration, a point which Allan seems to overlook. 
6.3.3 A Shift to the Level of Constitutional Imaginary 
A concern with the relative symbolic implications of legislative supremacy vis-à-vis 
judicial review requires us to shift our discussion from the relatively concrete level of 
judicial interpretation of statutes to the more abstract and somewhat nebulous terrain 
of constitutional imaginary. At this level, the interminability of the judicial review 
debate represents something of a crisis in the popular self-understanding of 
democratic citizens. This is scarcely a novel claim, but it bears repeating. On one hand, 
modernity brings with it the promise that free citizens will be subject to no higher 
authority – they will be subject to no law other than the law they give to themselves. 
On the other hand, the status of the citizen as a rights-bearing individual entails limits 
on government interference, even where government is seen as the embodiment of 
the popular will. The opposition between these two perspectives can at times make 
the competing sides in the judicial review debate appear to be simply contradicting 
one another by emphasising opposing horns in an irresolvable dilemma.90 
Where popular understandings lead to a stand-off, theorists have work to do. And so 
the philosophers, lawyers and political theorists that I have discussed in this thesis, 
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and many more besides, have attempted to construct theories explaining how the 
competing demands of democracy and human rights can be reconciled. Such theories 
combine interpretations of the problem – accounts of our practices – with 
prescriptions as to how our practices could be improved so as to further the values 
implicit within them. This is difficult work, not least because the various concepts 
that we employ in constitutional thinking form an intricate web such that an 
interpretation of one concept may have ‘knock-on effects’ on other concepts. The 
interrelatedness of concepts manifests itself on the purely theoretical level, where the 
adoption of a particular interpretation of a concept (say a purely negative conception 
of freedom) can effectively close the door to certain interpretations of other concepts 
(such as a civic humanist conception of democracy). But it also manifests itself on a 
more practical level, such as where a particular reform proposal (say a switch from 
election to sortition) would, if successfully implemented, lead to the withering away 
of a previously popular idea (such as the delegate conception of representation). So a 
theory may have certain unintended consequences as a result either of its abstract 
claims or of its institutional prescriptions (or both). Theorists looking to resolve an 
apparent dilemma therefore face the additional challenge of doing so in such a way 
as avoids undesirable unintended consequences. A conscientious attempt to resolve 
a particular problem might yet lead to a theory that distorts and devalues the practice 
as a whole. 
An example of this is the claim that I made in chapter four, where I argued that 
Dworkin’s defence of judicial review fails to consider the possibility that judicial 
review may lead to a distortion of a society’s conception of citizenship, by privileging 
the inferior ‘negative’ conception over the superior ‘positive’ one. This is not 
Dworkin’s intention,91 but is, I suggested, an unintended consequence of the 
implementation of Dworkin’s theory. In concluding this thesis I shall argue a further 
claim: that, given the place that the judiciary hold in the popular imagination, placing 
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the responsibility for policing the boundaries of the constitution into their hands will 
tend to have a detrimental knock-on effect on how we view the constitution. Judicial 
review promotes a ‘negative’ conception of constitution,92 which carries with it 
inadequate versions of democratic agency and political community. 
6.3.4 Two Conceptions of Constitution 
The negative conception of constitution views the constitution as a set of limits to 
political power: a law superior to the machinery of government. It has its roots in the 
social contract theory of the early-modern period, which postulated a set of rights as 
natural and pre-political, demarcating the private sphere of family life and civil 
society that ought to be free from government interference. It is therefore often 
associated with the negative conception of liberty as non-interference.93 However, 
despite the historical links, it would be wrong to define the negative conception of 
constitution analytically as adhering to a particular conception of liberty. It is not such 
an explicit theory: it operates more at the level of constitutional imaginary that, by 
lurking in the background, shapes the contours of much of our constitutional 
discourse. Its basic idea is, we might say, that the constitution is a fundamental law 
which sets out the boundaries within which political power is to be exercised.94 
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The positive conception, on the other hand, presents the constitution as literally 
constitutive of the political order.95 This is not to say that it denies that 
constitutionalism opposes unlimited power; as Sartori rightly points out, this would 
be to dissolve the distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional 
government altogether.96 But the positive conception conceives of the constitution as 
limiting political power not through the placing of ‘external’ boundaries, but through 
the construction of institutions that promote a culture of liberty and restraint.97 As 
Loughlin puts it: ‘Constitutions – and constitutional laws – are as much instruments 
in the ongoing business of state-building as they are constraints on the practices of 
government… the political order – the sense of political unity of the people – must 
precede the constitutional order understood as text.’98 
Another way of thinking of the distinction between the negative and the positive 
conceptions of constitution is that, while on the negative view constitutionalism is a 
means of limiting power, the positive view holds that constitutionalism is a means of 
creating power.99 The negative view thus takes the existence of political power as a 
given, with which constitutionalism must contend. The positive view has no such 
luxury: a constitutional theory that follows the positive conception must itself 
incorporate an account of how political power is created and maintained. The positive 
                                                     
95 Castiglione, ‘The Political Theory of the Constitution’, at 426-30; Loughlin, The Idea of Public 
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American Constitution was not to limit power but to create more power’. 
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conception is therefore more amenable to republican or discourse-theoretical views 
that maintain that political power is not something which is possessed by individuals 
but must continually be created by citizens acting in concert.100 If power is created by 
action, then the constitution must encourage political action even as it sets out to 
channel political power. The negative conception of constitution does not seem to 
leave space for this requirement. 
It should come as no surprise which conception I believe is the more adequate. The 
negative conception comes up short, I believe, for 3 reasons. Firstly, it is unrealistic to 
suppose that one could detach those features of a constitutional set-up which have 
the effect of limiting governmental action from those which have the effect of enabling 
it. As Morris-Jones puts it in his reply to Sartori, ‘the sharpness of distinction he calls 
for seems more than the substance of the matter will bear’.101 For example, Holmes 
argues that ‘gag rules’ – rules which remove certain matters from the political agenda 
– have the effect of empowering, not disabling government, by preventing it from 
being torn apart by interminable conflict over deeply divisive issues.102 The negative 
conception of constitution seems bound to view such empowerment as a side-effect 
of the constitutional rule, but this might well be a distortion, since the empowerment 
might plausibly be the more significant, or primarily desired, effect. Here we can see 
that the negative conception of constitution has a ‘static’ nature: it focuses on the 
immediate effect of the constitutional provision as and when it is explicitly invoked 
(it prevents discussion) and overlooks the persistent effect of its ongoing, and perhaps 
even unconscious, subsistence (it empowers government). 
Secondly, and more fundamentally, the negative conception relies upon a depiction 
of political power that is, in the final analysis, unintelligible. Portraying political 
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power as something distinct from the constitutional forms that limit it not only 
overlooks the double-edged nature of apparent limitations, it also overlooks the fact 
that the very idea of political power entails its channelling through constitutional 
forms. In the absence a constitutional structure, there would be no political power to 
limit. Where the first objection denies the empirical separability of political power and 
constitutional limits, this objection denies that they are even separable conceptually. 
We can only identify power as political, and thus as the appropriate subject of 
constitutional limitation, if we are also able to identify a political constitution through 
which the power passes. Political power and the constitution are thus co-original. 
Again we can see the link with the static/dynamic divide. The negative conception of 
constitution presupposes a kind of political power that can be (statically) presented 
as simply existing and standing in want of limitation. But this misses precisely what 
it is that makes such power political: its (dynamic) creation through constitutional 
forms.  
The final objection is most important for my present project.103 The negative 
conception of constitution depicts democratic government as standing in conflict with 
constitutionalism. In conceptualising the constitution as something that stands apart 
from political power, it presents it as containing the popular will within pre-political 
boundaries. But the popular will is not some organic, unmediated force which 
constitutionalism is forced to confront. The very idea of a democratic decision relies 
on the existence of some institutional form through which the ‘voice of the people’ 
can be expressed. If we accept the positive view that a constitution is a means of 
generating political power, then we need not view constitutionalism as the imposition 
of restraints on a sovereign people. Rather it is only through a constitution that the 
political power of the people could be recognised as such, and distinguished from 
mere personal, social or economic power. Constitutionalism, therefore, need not limit 
democracy. Properly conceived, it enables it. 
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6.3.5 ‘Political Constitutionalism’ 
Those who have followed recent debates in constitutional theory in the UK will find 
that the objections I have raised against the negative conception of constitutionalism 
have a familiar ring. The claim that the law of the constitution is not prior or superior 
to politics is a central (perhaps the central) assertion of a school of thought that has 
come to be known as ‘political constitutionalism’.104 The arguments of political 
constitutionalists, I believe, highlight an important symbolic feature in our 
constitutional imaginary: the role of law as a debate-stopper. It is this symbolic 
feature, I believe, that makes political constitutionalists rightly wary of clothing the 
basic principles of the constitution in the garb of law. In this respect I am in 
fundamental agreement with political constitutionalists. At the same time, however 
(and at the risk of over-generalisation), I feel that political constitutionalists have often 
failed adequately to articulate the importance of the symbolic aspects of constitutional 
design, eschewing the more inchoate level of constitutional imaginary in favour of 
(what they see as) the terra firma of a particular theory of political freedom. This, I 
believe, is a mistake; a mistake which has led them to misrepresent their opponents’ 
positions, and to fail to express what is truly distinctive and valuable about their own. 
In what follows, I shall focus my attention on the work of Bellamy, since he has made 
the most sustained critique of judicial review from a political constitutionalist 
perspective.105 
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As is common among political constitutionalists, Bellamy presents political 
constitutionalism as a contrast to legal constitutionalism.106 ‘Legal constitutionalism’, 
he says, ‘takes the prime task of constitutional government to be the placing and 
policing of various boundaries to politics.’107 He calls this ‘depoliticising the 
constitution’, and identifies two strategies through which legal constitutionalists try 
to achieve this.108 The first attempts to depoliticise substantively, as it were, by 
delineating a realm which is not to be touched by politics; such a realm is typically 
constituted by a set of ‘pre-political’ natural rights. The second depoliticises 
procedurally, by employing certain ‘apolitical’ procedures (such as judicial review), 
to resolve certain fundamental disagreements. Bellamy believes that these 
depoliticising strategies are doomed to be unsuccessful. Firstly, even if we agree 
philosophically that human beings enjoy a set of natural rights, there is no 
noncontestable way of defining their scope, and any attempt to define them is itself 
‘inextricably political’.109 Secondly, the recourse to apolitical procedures cannot 
succeed in resolving our disagreements, since different procedures will produce 
different kinds of outcome. We will therefore disagree about what constitutes a fair 
procedure; and this disagreement is, again, necessarily political in nature. In trying to 
constrain politics within an apolitical constitution, therefore, legal constitutionalism 
is attempting the impossible. At this point, Bellamy’s argument has striking 
similarities with the claims Waldron makes about the ineradicability of disagreement 
in the circumstances of politics, and it is not entirely clear what the claim about 
supposed ‘depoliticisation’ (as opposed to the mere resolution of disagreement) is 
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constitutionalism. Indeed, I would like to suggest that what truly unites political 
constitutionalists is an awareness, albeit perhaps an unconscious one, of the symbolic status 
of law in our constitutional imaginary and of the significance that this has for normative 
arguments about constitutional design. 
106 Political Constitutionalism, passim; see also Our Republican Constitution, chap 1. Gee and 
Webber describe the juxtaposition of political and legal constitutionalism as ‘a commonplace’ 
(‘What is a Political Constitution?’, at 273), although they themselves attempt a somewhat 
different approach. 
107 Ibid., p 145. 
108 Ibid., p 147-54. 
109 Ibid., p 149. 
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supposed to add. Indeed, if depoliticisation were impossible, as Bellamy claims, then 
it is difficult to see how political constitutionalism would be a distinctive 
constitutional ideal, rather than simply an unescapable fact. 
To make his positive claim, Bellamy makes a distinction between two philosophical 
theories of the political value of freedom. He associates legal constitutionalism with 
the ‘liberal’ view of freedom as non-interference, and political constitutionalism with 
the ‘republican’ conception of freedom as non-domination. Freedom as non-
interference is the view of freedom expressed by Berlin’s seemingly straightforward 
claim that ‘liberty… is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by 
others’.110 Pettit has famously objected to the non-interference view of freedom on the 
grounds that it is unable to account for the significance of the power of interference in 
cases where that power is not actually exercised.111 For example, suppose a slave has 
a beneficent master who, despite having the power to interfere gravely with her, 
nevertheless chooses to leave her more or less alone to act as she wishes. On the non-
interference account of freedom, we would be committed to the highly 
counterintuitive view that the slave enjoyed a significant degree of freedom. 
Pettit argues that the conception of freedom as non-domination is superior to the non-
interference view as it is able to avoid this undesirable conclusion. Pettit defines 
‘domination’ as the power to interfere with another’s set of options on an arbitrary 
basis, with ‘arbitrary’ interference being defined as interference which is not forced 
to track the interests of those affected according to their own judgments.112 Thus one 
may dominate without interfering: the beneficent slave-master still dominates his 
slaves since he possesses the capacity for arbitrary interference. And one may also 
interfere without dominating: Bellamy gives the example of Ulysses being bound by 
his sailors, on his own orders and in accordance with his perceived self-interest.113 
                                                     
110 Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, p 192. 
111 Philip Pettit, Republicanism: a theory of freedom and government (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), chap 2. 
112 Republicanism, p 107. 
113 Political Constitutionalism, p 159. 
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Bellamy parts company with Pettit, however, as to whether freedom as non-
domination is inhibited by a constitution that imposes legal boundaries around the 
power of an elected legislature. Pettit claims that, without constitutional guarantees 
to ensure that governmental power-holders track citizens’ common recognisable 
interests, a legislature will be a source of domination. This leads Pettit to endorse a 
system of constitutional judicial review.114 Bellamy, on the other hand, argues (again 
in Waldronian vein) that, in failing to respect citizens’ opinions in circumstances of 
disagreement, it is judicial review, and not the legislature, which poses the greater 
threat of becoming a dominating power. Bellamy postulates two criteria for a non-
dominating political procedure: firstly, that there exist no difference of status between 
citizens and decision-makers; and, secondly, that the reason the views of some 
citizens may count less than those of others cannot be because they hold the ‘wrong’ 
view and other the ‘right’ view.115 Constitutional courts, he says, do not meet these 
criteria, since judicial review ‘seems premised on an unjustified assertion that those 
on the bench are more equal than the rest’.116 Instead, ‘we need a process that treats 
all views as deserving equal respect in the authorising, if not literally the authorship, 
of the decision’.117 The process that he endorses is a parliamentary democracy, with 
universal suffrage, one-person-one-vote and competitive political parties.118 
It is curious that, having supposedly built his theory around the idea of freedom as 
non-domination, Bellamy ends up accepting, pretty much in its entirety, the 
argument of the ‘liberal’ Waldron as against the ‘republican’ Pettit. Indeed, I do not 
believe that Bellamy’s argument is supported at all by the conception of freedom that 
he takes to be its premise.119 I would suggest, instead, that we can only understand it 
                                                     
114 Republicanism, p 193. 
115 Political Constitutionalism, p 164. 
116 Ibid., p 166. 
117 Ibid., p 167. 
118 Ibid., chap 6. 
119 That is not to say that I think that adherence to the republican conception of freedom as 
non-domination necessitates acceptance of judicial review, only that Bellamy’s argument 
against judicial review does not rely on that conception of freedom. 
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if we see it as operating on the symbolic level by way of appeal to the shared 
background understandings that make up our constitutional imaginary. 
Insofar as Bellamy’s argument is essentially the same as Waldron’s, it is subject to the 
criticisms that I raised against Waldron in chapter three. I do not intend to repeat 
these criticisms here, but I will add that the apparent majoritarian implications of the 
argument from disagreement are all the more surprising when coming from a self-
professed republican. The argument from disagreement has majoritarian implications 
if we take citizens’ right to equal respect of their views to imply a right that all views 
should count equally in the decision-making process, and Bellamy’s argument seems 
to rely on precisely such a step. However, the majoritarian move is a profoundly 
individualistic one, which rules out the possibility of a collective decision that cannot 
be reduced to an aggregate of some set of individual decisions.120 But the possibility 
of a democratic decision being collective in this strong sense is a key tenet of 
republican thought, whether based on Pettit’s account of freedom as non-
domination,121 or on the more ‘positive’ account of freedom that I have endorsed 
under the name ‘political autonomy’. It does not follow from the fact that citizens’ 
views have been afforded equal weight that the ‘democratic losers’ are not dominated 
by the winners. It is only plausible to say that those who find themselves on the losing 
side in a democratic process nevertheless avoid domination if we can view the 
political community as a collective agent of which they are a member. So the 
introduction of republican freedom adds nothing to Waldron’s argument from 
disagreement; if anything, it gives us further reason to doubt it. 
If, however, we look beyond Bellamy’s explicit argument, it appears that he is 
reaching towards a different kind of objection to ‘legal constitutionalism’ that he does 
not quite fully articulate. He makes a number of comments about judicial review 
                                                     
120 See my discussion of Waldron in this regard, above… 
121 See Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: a republican theory and model of democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), p 132-46 and 280-92; and Philip Pettit and Christian List, 
Group Agency: the possibility, design and status of corporate agents (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), p 64-72. 
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being premised upon an inequality of status between citizens and judges. He tells us, 
for example, that ‘constitutional judicial review seems premised on an unjustified 
assertion that those on the bench are more equal than the rest’.122 This puts the point 
so crudely that it is tempting to dismiss Bellamy here as simply attacking a straw 
man.123 As Bellamy well knows, supporters of judicial review make no such claim. 
But Bellamy’s argument might be restated so as to make it more attractive. Perhaps 
Bellamy’s real point is that, regardless of the rational arguments that are used to 
support it, constitutional review symbolises an inequality of status between citizens 
and the judiciary. Shifting discussion to the level of symbolism might also help make 
some sense of Bellamy’s (and other political constitutionalists’) otherwise somewhat 
elusive claim that judicial review is a strategy for ‘depoliticising’ the constitution. 
Again it is tempting to dismiss Bellamy here on the grounds that supporters of 
judicial review do not necessarily claim that it is in any way an ‘apolitical’ practice or 
that it somehow presents a way for us to avoid having to make controversial political 
decisions.124 But perhaps Bellamy has a sense that, by sending certain issues for 
judicial resolution, judicial review might symbolise a removal of those issues from the 
political realm, regardless of the reasons that might be invoked in its favour. 
6.3.6 Political/Legal Constitutions and Positive/Negative Constitutionalism: distinct 
but related dichotomies 
Political constitutionalists such as Bellamy could, I believe, benefit from drawing 
more explicitly the link between, on one hand, the dichotomy between legal and 
                                                     
122 Political Constitutionalism, p 166. 
123 As does Lars Vinx, ‘Republicanism and Judicial Review’ (2009) 59 University of Toronto 
Law Journal 591. 
124 For example, Ronald Dworkin says: ‘Law… is deeply and thoroughly political. Lawyers 
and judges cannot avoid politics…’ (‘How Law is Like Literature’, in A Matter of Principle 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), p 146). He also tells us that judicial review ‘means that judges must 
answer intractable, controversial and profound questions of political morality that 
philosophers, statesmen and citizens have debated for many centuries, with no prospect of 
agreement’, and that ‘the rest of us must accept the deliverance of a majority of the justices, 
whose insight into these great issues is not spectacularly special’ (‘What the Constitution 
Says’, in Freedom’s Law: the moral reading of the American Constitution (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), p 74). 
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political constitutionalism and, on the other, the negative and positive conceptions of 
constitution discussed in the previous section. 
The two dichotomies are different in nature. The first is institutional: what defines a 
constitution as legal or political (or possibly both or neither) is the mechanisms that 
it employs for the resolution of constitutional disputes. The second is conceptual: the 
negative and positive conceptions of constitution depict not two different kinds of 
constitution but two different ways of thinking about what a constitution is. Political 
constitutionalists sometimes use the word ‘political’ in a way that elides this 
distinction. As I mentioned above, Bellamy describes depoliticisation as ‘impossible’ 
while at the same time seeming to rile against it. Yet, of course, if it were impossible, 
there would be nothing to rile against. But we can understand Bellamy here if we take 
his statement that depoliticisation is impossible to be not a defence of political 
constitutionalism, but an invocation of the positive conception of constitution. On the 
other hand, when he attacks depoliticisation, he is defending political 
constitutionalism as a particular kind of institutional set-up: depoliticisation is 
undesirable in the sense that legislatures, and not courts, should be the primary arena 
for the resolution of constitutional disputes.125 
If the two dichotomies are distinct from one another, what is the connection between 
them? The answer lies, I believe, in the interrelationship between our constitutional 
imaginaries and our constitutional design. 
In chapter two I gave the separation of powers as an example of a constitutional 
imaginary that is linked to a particular set of institutions; our concepts of legislative, 
executive and judicial power are inextricably tied up with our concepts of legislature, 
executive and judiciary.126 Central to that tripartite division are the concepts of law 
and politics. Again, there is an iterative relationship here: our understanding of what 
                                                     
125 Griffith is perhaps the source of this (possibly deliberate) elision of concepts. The ‘Political 
Constitution’ referred to in the title of his Chorley Lecture seems to be both a description of 
the peculiar nature of the UK constitution and a way of thinking about the nature of any 
constitution. 
126 See p 37-8, above. 
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law is is influenced by our political institutions, and our understanding of what 
legislatures, executives and courts are is influenced by our concept of law. And 
similarly with the concept of politics. We share, at the level of constitutional 
imaginary, a certain implicit understanding of what law and politics are, and this 
understanding cannot be completely detached from the particular institutions in 
which these practices take place. 
When we say, therefore, that the judiciary apply the law, we are saying something 
both about the nature of the judiciary and about the nature of law: the judiciary is that 
which applies law; law is that which is applied by the judiciary. In our constitutional 
imaginary, it is a short step (not quite an irresistible one) from saying that something 
is law to saying that the judiciary should apply it.127 And, similarly, it is a short step 
from saying that the judiciary ought to apply something, to saying that it is law. 
An important aspect of our understanding of law is its peremptory nature. By this I 
mean to say something both about the force of law and something about the nature of 
law. Firstly, although we do not all believe that there is an obligation to obey the law 
in all circumstances, there is a general background assumption that the law is, pro 
tanto at least, something to be obeyed. This assumption is stronger in certain 
circumstances, two of which are relevant here. Firstly, it is of particularly high 
importance that the government obey the law. This is a consequence of the rule of law 
(there are many different theories about the precise nature of the rule of law, but we 
share the perhaps somewhat vague idea that the government should obey the law at 
the level of constitutional imaginary – if the rule of law means anything at all, then it 
must at least mean that). Secondly, the obligation to obey the law is stronger when 
what one is confronted with is not a general legal rule, but a specific judicial ruling. 
For example, most theories of civil disobedience hold that even where disobedience 
is justified, disobedients must nevertheless submit themselves to the punishment that 
the legal system inflicts upon them ex post their protest.128 The idea that the obligation 
                                                     
127 For example, see the reasoning of Marshall CJ in Marbury v Madison (1803) 5 US 1. 
128 See, for example, Rawls, A Theory of Justice, § 55-9. 
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to obey a judicial ruling is stronger than the general obligation to obey the law is, I 
would submit, an integral part of our idea of what a judicial ruling is, i.e. what 
distinguishes it from any other statement about what the law requires. 
So law is peremptory in the sense that it carries with it the force of obligation, a force 
which bears particularly heavily (i) upon government and (ii) where the law takes the 
form of a particular judicial ruling. There is, furthermore, another, related but not 
identical sense of peremptoriness: judicial rulings are non-negotiable. As I put it above, 
law is a debate-stopper. Or, more precisely, a judicial ruling is a debate-stopper. 
Contrary to the impression sometimes given by political constitutionalists, we do not 
think that there is no meaningful debate to be had about the content of the law. But 
we do take a judicial ruling to signify the time for such debate to cease. It is the time 
to stop arguing and move on. Again, this is an integral part of what we take a judicial 
ruling to be, something that distinguishes it from other statements about law.129 
Taken together, these ingrained understandings entail that a judicial decision that a 
certain government action is unconstitutional will have a powerful signification. The 
fact that the decision has come from a court will inevitably tend to associate it with 
law. At the level of symbolic association (if nothing else) there will be a strong 
assertion of the idea that the decision must be followed and that, furthermore, it is 
time to stop arguing, and to move on. 
This, I believe, provides the link between the two dichotomies of legal/political and 
negative/positive conceptions of constitutionalism. Where the judiciary take the 
primary responsibility for the determination of constitutional issues, the constitution 
will come to be thought of as a species of law. Owing to powerful place of law and 
the judiciary in the popular imagination, judicial rulings that action is 
unconstitutional will tend to be seen as delineating the boundaries in which the 
‘political branches’ must operate. And so legal constitutionalism provides much 
                                                     
129 For simplicity I ignore here the prospect of appeal, although my point is not fundamentally 
affected by it. Even when a decision is appealable, it stands as res judicata unless and until it is 
actually appealed. And, of course, a chain of appeals has to end somewhere. 
180 
 
symbolic nourishment for the negative conception, and thus for a vision of 
constitutionalism that truncates the collective agency of the people by placing it 
within bounds which are not themselves presented as products of the practice of 
democratic politics. 
6.3.6 Legislative Supremacy as a Valuable Practice 
Contra Allan, then, there is an important distinction between a constitution that 
employs judicial review and one which embraces legislative supremacy. It is not so 
much a question of who gets the ‘last word’ – for no-one gets that – but a question of 
how we view the constitution. It puts it much too mildly to say that legislative 
supremacy is ‘a general rule requiring obedience to statute’.130 Rather, legislative 
supremacy is the practice of accepting the enactments of a representative assembly as 
the decisions of the people as a whole. This does not tell us how those enactments 
should be interpreted: that is a question for another day. Perhaps Allan is right that 
we should be prepared to depart from apparently plain words in order to protect 
‘basic values of freedom, justice, and legality’. But we need to be aware that there is 
an important distinction between interpreting a statute creatively and declining to 
apply that statute. For when courts embark upon the latter course, they lift the content 
of the constitution – and themselves as the constitution’s arbiters – onto a higher 
symbolic plane than the representative legislature. Regardless of its empirical impact, 
the decision will symbolise a boundary being placed around the agency of the 
political community, as represented by the legislature. 
I have argued that the decisions of a well-functioning legislature will be able to stand 
in the name of the political community in such a way that is respectful to each 
individual citizen as a distinctive intellect in her own right. This is an ambitious goal, 
and one which requires far more of the democratic process than merely competitive 
elections. It requires, as Habermas would put it, a communicative current connecting 
the continuing political debate in the ‘periphery’ of civil society to parliamentary 
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decision-making in the ‘center’.131 Representatives must view themselves not merely 
as delegates whose task is to discover their constituents’ antecedently-existing will, 
nor as trustees charged with the care of the nation, but as participants in a political 
discourse which requires them both to listen and to advocate, to follow and to lead, 
to persuade and to seek compromise. It is a complex role which requires attuned 
political judgment, and we cannot hope to set out in advance an algorithm for success. 
It is clear that my ideal requires far more than present institutions provide: far more 
responsiveness and candour from parliamentarians; far more engagement and civic-
mindedness from citizens; far more inclusiveness and egalitarianism from the system 
as a whole. But these are not transcendental requirements detached from the human 
condition. The demands that they make are implicit in our existing practice of 
democracy: a valuable tradition that provides the standards for its own criticism. 
Legislative supremacy can allow the law to be seen as the output of the political 
power of a self-governing people. In making this claim I do not fall prey to what Pettit 
calls ‘the fallacy of misplaced concreteness’, i.e. the idea that a collective agent must 
have a corporate mind located in a single body.132 My claim is not that legislative 
supremacy is conceptually required in order for the democratic state to act as a 
collective agent at all. A public limited company, for example, might act as a collective 
agent without there being any particular body which speaks for the company as a 
whole. My claim is that legislative supremacy symbolically strengthens the unity-in-
diversity of the political community, thus allowing its members to identify with it 
more strongly than could shareholders of a public limited company, or citizens of a 
decentred, ‘contestatory’ democracy.133 
Avoiding the fallacy of misplaced concreteness allows us to escape the idea that 
legislative enactments articulate ‘the will of the people’ in any essentialist sense. We 
need not see them as anything other than the product of a popular political discourse 
                                                     
131 See Between Facts and Norms, p 352-9. 
132 On the People’s Terms, p 224. 
133 The latter is Pettit’s conception of democracy, see On the People’s Terms, p 225-9. 
182 
 
through which citizens act, together, to try and govern themselves in a just and 
choiceworthy way. Legislation is an act of ‘the people’, in a sense which cannot be 
reduced to the acts of individual citizens. But just as collective action cannot be 
reduced to a set of individual actions, nor can it be entirely separated from them. As 
List and Pettit usefully put it, group actions ‘supervene’ on the contributions of its 
members.134 A consequence of this is that there is nothing contradictory or treacherous 
about citizens calling into question the justice, or even the legitimacy, of the laws that 
are passed by the legislature. In so doing they are only continuing the process that 
grants the legislature its legitimacy in the first place. Legislative supremacy respects 
citizens’ judgments (as opposed to their mere wills) by acknowledging not only their 
force but also their fallibility. 
A further consequence of the rejection of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness is that 
we reject the idea that legislative supremacy is to be equated with instilling 
sovereignty in the persons of the legislators. They have no special standing other than 
that they acquire and hold ex officio. So legislative supremacy is not to be interpreted 
as including the claim that we ought to make it relatively easy for the will of legislators 
(considered as flesh-and-blood individuals) to become the law of the land. The 
requirement is only that the judiciary is not raised symbolically above the legislature 
(considered as an institution). There are a number of possible mechanisms of restraint 
– most familiar are requirements of multiple stages of voting, committee scrutiny and 
of course bicameralism – which do not offend against this. The so-called ‘new 
commonwealth model of constitutionalism’135 has been deliberately designed to 
incorporate the benefits that a system of judicial review might provide without 
symbolically subordinating the legislature to the judiciary. So long as the use of 
                                                     
134 See List and Pettit, Group Agency, p 54-72. 
135 This is the name given by Gardbaum to the systems pioneered in Canada, New Zealand, 
the UK and Australia, which allow the courts to review legislation against a bill of rights, but 
(through mechanisms which vary slightly between jurisdictions) allow the legislation to 
remain in force notwithstanding a finding of a rights-violation. See Stephen Gardbaum, The 
New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: theory and practice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). 
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legislative override does not become taboo,136 this system does not offend against 
legislative supremacy as I see it. (Whether it is a useful system I think remains to be 
seen. Innovations such as this, that depart from the simple ideal types with which I 
have been working, require a much closer level of empirical scrutiny than I am able 
to provide.) 
In sum, my argument is that (i) the practice of legislation by a representative assembly 
can serve to help integrate citizens into a self-governing political community which 
respects each citizen as a moral agent, but (ii) judicial review undermines this 
democratic agency by representing external restrictions on the citizens’ collective 
political power. Judicial review presents constitutionalism as an external force that 
contains popular sovereignty within pre-political boundaries. This might be thought 
to be desirable if we view the will of the people as some organic, unmediated force 
along the lines of Rousseau’s general will. But if we embrace the positive conception 
of constitution, and avoid the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, then we do not need 
to rely on any such essentialised notion of popular sovereignty. The people form a 
collective agent through the political institutions that aim to both generate political 
power and to prevent power from being exercised tyrannically. And while political 
institutions are not concrete embodiments of ‘the people’, nor are they merely abstract 
principles. They are artefacts that we inherit from our forefathers, which carry with 
them certain understandings that we may endeavour to reform, but cannot recreate 
de novo. We need to consider the implications of these understandings, and not merely 
‘pragmatic and legal-political considerations’,137 when appraising constitutional 
design. At the level of constitutional imaginary, legislative supremacy can represent 
a commitment to a dynamic, reflexive self-government that affords citizens political 
autonomy. Judicial review, on the other hand, will tend to signify a set of boundaries 
around the processes of self-government, boundaries which are set by a procedure 
                                                     
136 For a suggestion that this may have become the case in Canada, see FL Morton, ‘The 
Political Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ (1987) 20 Canadian Journal 
of Political Science 31. 
137 Between Facts and Norms, p 262. 
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that is necessarily adversarial, individualistic and elitist. We therefore have, at least, 





7. Conclusion: visions of self-government 
I have argued that implicit within the practice of modern political democracy lies a 
valuable vision of self-government, that this vision is nourished by symbolic aspects 
of our political institutions, and that it may be damaged by a system of judicial review 
of legislation. The problem I have identified with judicial review cannot be reduced 
to the language of input and output legitimacy: the difficulty is not that judicial 
review is anti-majoritarian, nor that it necessarily fails to be conducive to the just 
resolution of constitutional disputes. The problem, I have argued, is that judicial 
review will have a deleterious impact on the way in which citizens envisage the 
political world; it promotes a narrative that depicts constitutionalism as standing at 
odds with democracy and which presents constitutional rights as belonging to a ‘pre-
political’ realm that is not the product of democratic agency. It accordingly dilutes the 
respect that democratic practices afford to citizens as self-governing moral-political 
agents. 
In this thesis I have attempted both to provide a useful perspective from which we 
can view the question of judicial review, and to mount an argument against judicial 
review from within that perspective. The latter of course relies on, but does not flow 
inexorably from, the former. A few caveats here are in order. Firstly, pointing out the 
symbolic significance of political institutions clearly does not grant a knock-down 
victory to those who oppose judicial review. One might, for instance, accept that 
democracy is dependent on symbolic nourishment from political institutions without 
believing that judicial review projects the constraining, negative conception of 
constitution with which I have associated it. Furthermore, my investigation has been 
restricted to a comparative assessment of two systems of constitutional design: 
judicial review versus legislative supremacy. There are, of course, other institutional 
possibilities, which might bring with them quite different democratic visions. Finally, 
nothing I say in this thesis should be construed as in itself an argument against novel 
attempts at constitutional experimentation. My aim is certainly not to glorify the 
British constitution as it is today, or as it was in 1971, or in 1885. Insofar as the 
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arguments presented here might contribute to a debate over constitutional change (or 
inertia) in the UK or elsewhere, I hope that they would serve to open up, rather than 
close down, potential areas of discussion.1 
Even for those who do not accept that judicial review has the kind of anti-democratic 
symbolic significance I claim it has, I would hope that this thesis might help to 
illuminate the current state of play of the judicial review debate. The trenchant attacks 
on judicial review mounted by political constitutionalists can appear puzzling if one 
views them as concerned about political outcomes (where is their empirical 
evidence?) or as premised on support for brute majoritarianism (why should we 
                                                     
1 Indeed, constitutional inertia in the UK today appears not to be an option. The UK 
constitution is presently, if not quite in a state of crisis, at least one of profound ‘unsettlement’ 
(Neil Walker, ‘Our Constitutional Unsettlement’ [2014] Public Law 529). The aftermath of the 
referendum on Scottish independence has exposed a lack of anything vaguely resembling a 
consensus over how the relationship between the four nations of the UK ought to be organised 
(Robert Hazell and Mark Sandford, ‘English Question or Union Question? Neither has easy 
answers’ (2015) 86 Political Quarterly 16). The Conservative Party’s manifesto commitment to 
repeal the Human Rights Act 1998 has raised an assortment of questions about the 
constitutional propriety of their doing so (Colm O’Cinneide, ‘Human Rights, Devolution and 
the Constrained Authority of the Westminster Parliament’, UK Constitutional Law Blog, 4 
March 2013 <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org>; Cormac Mac Amhlaigh, ‘A Referendum on the 
Repeal of the Human Rights Act? Why not?’, UK Constitutional Law Blog, 25 May 2015 
<http://ukconstitutionallaw.org>). An election result in 2015 which saw two parties (UKIP and 
the Liberal Democrats) with a combined share of 20.5% of the vote gain only 1.4% of the seats 
has reignited a debate over electoral reform (‘The Guardian view on the lessons of the 2015 
election: change the voting system or break up the UK’, Editorial, The Guardian, 1 June 2015; 
Andrew Grice, ‘General Election 2015: Sixty per cent of people want voting reform, says 
survey’, The Independent, 5 May 2015). And then there is of course the question of EU 
membership, on which the government has promised a referendum in 2017. 
 
Taken together these issues highlight a lack of any widespread sense that the UK constitution 
is the result of the collective agency of the British people. This is clearly a problem from the 
perspective of the conception of political autonomy that I have outlined in this thesis. I would 
suggest that we need to focus on the question of which reform process would best energise and 
engage the British public so that they take their constitutional future to be in their own hands. 
Here the constitutional conventions recently held in Iceland and Ireland may prove a 
promising template. (For discussion, see Iseult Honohan, ‘What can the UK learn from the 
Irish constitutional convention?’, Our Kingdom <www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom>, 8 
October 2014; Silvia Suteu, ‘Constitutional Conventions in the Digital Era: lessons from 
Iceland and Ireland’ (2015) 38 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 251; 
and Alan Renwick, After the Referendum: options for a constitutional convention (London: 
Constitution Society, 2014).) 
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support that?). I believe that we can understand the intensity with which such attacks 
have been launched when we appreciate that clashes about, say, the historical record 
of judicial rights-protection, or about the best way to create a ‘culture of rights’, or 
about the extent to which courts can function as an arena for democratic participation, 
are best seen as skirmishes in a much broader conflict between competing political 
world-views. The explicit introduction of the symbolic dimension might help the 
debate generate less heat and more light. 
* * * 
The caveats I have mentioned might lead the reader to question the strength of my 
thesis. If other democratic visions are possible, then isn’t my argument simply a 
contingent one? If so, does that not mean that the question of judicial review must be 
addressed on a country-by-country basis, in accordance with the prevailing 
understandings in each jurisdiction?2 
I answer ‘yes’ to the first question, but ‘no’ to the second. My thesis is certainly 
contingent: there is nothing logically, conceptually or historically necessary about the 
constitutional imaginaries on which I have premised my argument, and there is 
nothing to say that all societies today inevitably share in them.3 Nevertheless, I do not 
believe that we can only proceed on a country-by-country basis, since I believe that 
our constitutional imaginaries – our notions of citizenship, representation, law, 
politics and so on – are sufficiently widespread and robust as to form the basis of 
what we might call the modern western political form of life. While there might be 
difficult borderline cases (Japan? Russia? Turkey?) the constitutional imaginaries I am 
dealing with essentially form the backdrop for political life in western democracies. 
Remember that constitutional imaginaries are less precise, and more fundamental, 
                                                     
2 For an argument along these lines see Cormac S Mac Amhlaigh, ‘Putting Political 
Constitutionalism in its Place’, University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper Series 
No. 2015/02. 
3 C.f. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p 161: ‘It is at least an open interpretive question… 
whether the concept of democracy alive in the rhetoric of liberal societies is the same concept 
as the one deployed in so-called people’s democracies.’ 
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then constitutional theories. It is true that the prevailing constitutional theory in many 
modern western democracies holds, contrary to what I have argued here, that judicial 
review is not damaging to democracy. This thesis challenges such theories head on, 
by putting forward a competing interpretation of the same practice, premised on the 
same constitutional imaginaries. 
An example may serve to illustrate the prevalence and robustness of shared 
understandings about constitutional forms. Take the changes in the French 
constitution that occurred in the second half of the twentieth century.4 According to 
orthodox French constitutional theory, le droit (legal rights, obligations and 
principles) is the servant of la loi (positive law), so that the aim for a legal code is to 
cover for all eventualities and thereby to reduce the role of the judge to that of 
‘operator of a machine’.5 The idea that vague constitutional provisions could be taken 
to represent a ‘higher law’ and thus be used to invalidate particular lois was therefore 
traditionally anathema. Within this orthodox picture, there were nevertheless two 
competing constitutional traditions. The governing tradition in the First, Second and 
Third Republics was Jacobinism, according to which the representative legislature is 
the embodiment of the democratic people and is therefore capable of amending the 
constitution by simple majority vote. Jacobinism thus opposed any form of 
constitutional review, whether undertaken by the judiciary or by a non-judicial body. 
During the Napoleonic periods, however, a form of non-judicial constitutional review 
existed. Bonapartist ideology was based on the supremacy of the president, and thus 
did not oppose the placing of limits around legislative authority. 
The Constitution of the Fifth Republic was intended to institute a kind of neo-
Bonapartism, by shifting power from Parliament to the executive.6 It made a 
                                                     
4 I take my account of this history from Alec Stone, The Birth of Judicial Politics in France: the 
Constitutional Council in comparative perspective (New York : Oxford University Press, 1992), 
chaps 1-4. 
5 John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: an introduction to the legal systems of Western 
Europe and Latin America (3rd edn, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), p 47. 
6 Didier Maus, ‘La Constitution Jugée par sa Pratique: réflexions pour un bilan’ (1984) 43 
Revue Française de Science Politique 875. 
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distinction between la loi and le règlement, with the province of Parliament restricted 
to the former. A Constitutional Council was set up to police the settlement, with the 
intention that it would be a ‘watchdog on behalf of executive supremacy’.7 The 
Constitutional Council was initially seen as a political body rather than a judicial one. 
There is no requirement that members have any legal training, and it was originally 
composed entirely of politicians supportive of the government. From 1959 to 1970, 
the Council basically served the executive’s wishes as against Parliament, granting 
Prime Ministers effective ability to block Parliament’s power of initiative.8 This began 
to change following 1971, when, in a landmark decision, the Council first took the 
view that it was empowered to examine whether bills submitted to it are compatible 
with constitutional rights, despite the lack of any clear constitutional mandate to do 
so, or even any enumeration of rights in the 1958 Constitution.9 Thereafter the Council 
cast off its overt deference to the executive and began to conduct a robust system of 
constitutional review. 
The interesting point to note here is that the Council’s growth in confidence coincided 
with a shift in elite perception of the Council, with the view that it is a political entity 
being replaced with the opinion that it is a kind of court. According to the traditional 
French paradigm, all courts [juridictions] must be composed of judges and engaged in 
settling concrete disputes brought by real-life litigants and following fixed, legal 
procedures – features which the Council lacks.10 Yet by the end of the 1970s, 
consensus had been reached among public law specialists that the Council ought to 
be considered a court.11 The old paradigm was swept away: the term juridiction 
constitutionnelle came to specify an institution charged with the power to determine, 
                                                     
7 Jack Ernest Shalom Hayward, Governing France: the one and indivisible republic (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), p 139; see also Didier Maus (ed), Textes et Documents sur la 
Pratique Institutionelle de la Ve République (Paris: La Documentation Franc ̧aise, 1978). 
8 The Birth of Judicial Politics in France, p 64. 
9 Constitutional Council Decision No. 71-44 DC, 16 July 1971. 
10 The Birth of Judicial Politics in France, p 96. 
11 See Marcel Waline, ‘Préface’, in Louis Favoreu and Loïc Philip (eds), Les Grandes Décisions 
du Conseil Constitutionnel (2nd edn, Paris: Sirey, 1991), p xi-xx. 
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in a definitive manner, the content and applicability of constitutional law – thus 
embracing the Constitutional Council perfectly.12 
Armed with this new understanding as to its status, the Council began to justify its 
expanding role by stating, in its decisions and elsewhere, that its work was judicial 
and not political in nature.13 At the same time, the Council’s output became more 
‘legalistic’ in nature: its decisions lengthened and developed into a more technical 
jurisprudence. Stone has interpreted this as a deliberate strategy on the part of the 
Council to entrench its new-found position as guardian of the Constitution.14 
Deliberate or no, it seems to have had a strong legitimating role in the eyes of the 
French political establishment.15 Legal scholars have rallied to the defence of the 
Constitutional Council, presenting its decisions as based on legal and not political 
reasoning.16 Elite attitudes to judicial review have accordingly shifted, from 
‘unmitigated hostility to virtually unanimous support’.17 
The example of the French Constitutional Council shows the strength of the notions 
of law and court in the modern constitutional imaginary. By associating itself with the 
                                                     
12 The Birth of Judicial Politics in France, p 96-7. 
13 In Decision No. 74-54 DC, 15 January 1975, the Council stated that ‘la Constitution ne confère 
pas au Conseil constitutionnel un pouvoir général d'appréciation et de décision identique à 
celui du Parlement, mais lui donne seulement compétence pour se prononcer sur la conformité 
à la Constitution des lois déférées à son examen’ (para 1); and in Decision No. 85-197 DC, 23 
August 1985 it stated that ‘l'objet de ce contrôle est non de gêner ou de retarder l'exercice du 
pouvoir législatif mais d'assurer sa conformité à la Constitution’ (para 20). Most dramatically, 
in August 1986 it released a press statement in response to attacks made on it by government 
ministers, in which it publicly asserted its political neutrality: ‘The Constitutional Council, 
having taken notice of the recent declarations concerning it, recalls that it possesses according 
to the constitution the judicial mission to verify the constitutionality of laws which have been 
referred to it. It refuses therefore to participate in the present debate, which is inherently 
political.’ (quoted in The Birth of Judicial Politics in France, p 100 (Stone’s emphasis)). 
14 ‘These statements are evidence that the Council recognised and actively sought the 
legitimating power of legal discourse and judicial function.’ (The Birth of Judicial Politics in 
France, p 100). 
15 As evidenced by the constitutional amendment of 23 July 2008 which significantly 
broadened the potential role of the Constitutional Council, by allowing it to conduct a posteriori 
review of legislation upon referral from the Court of Cassation or Council of State. 
16 See, for example, the comments of Robert, Vedel and Favoreu cited by Stone, The Birth of 
Judicial Politics in France, p 104. 
17 Ibid., p 115. 
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trappings of law, the Council was able to gain widespread acceptance of its review 
functions. The remarkable thing is that the idea of law as non-political, impartial 
reason was able to legitimate the practice of constitutional review in the absence of 
any express constitutional mandate and even in a political culture traditionally hostile to 
the idea of judicial review. Modern constitutional imaginaries provided a familiar point-
of-entry for arguments in favour of an expanded role for the Council. But in order to 
take advantage of such arguments, the Council had to present itself as an apolitical 
court. It is doubtful whether it would enjoy the popular legitimacy to carry out its 
expanded role were it still widely viewed as a political body. The French example 
shows, I believe, that even where constitutional theories that are opposed to judicial 
review are prevalent, broader constitutional imaginaries are such that placing formal 
limits around the power of the legislature will be apt to project judicial supremacy 
and the negative conception of constitutionalism. It was the strength of the symbols 
of law and the courts that rendered non-judicial constitutional review an unstable 
arrangement. 
* * * 
There are numerous moving parts in this thesis, and so some recapitulation might be 
useful. Firstly, the strength of my claim about the symbolic significance of institutions 
should be emphasised. My claim is not merely that symbolic factors affect the actions 
of political actors, or the beliefs of citizens (although these are important phenomena). 
It is deeper than that: symbolic factors affect the very meaning of political actions. It is 
only because of what political institutions symbolise that their actions are capable of 
being the kind of actions that they are. 
The symbolic significance of political institutions is deeply embedded within a shared 
vision of political life. This vision draws upon certain conceptual schemata that we 
take for granted, schemata which I have labelled our ‘constitutional imaginaries’. Our 
constitutional imaginaries provide us with the vocabulary upon which our very 
ability to have meaningful discussions about constitutional matters depends. This 
vocabulary is inextricably linked to the institutional forms with which we are familiar; 
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one does not, for example, have a sufficient grasp of what legislation is unless one 
knows what a legislature is. Political institutions are thus a constitutive element of 
our political world. 
Note that my references to symbolism should not be taken as suggesting either futility 
or manipulation. The idea that, say, parliamentary debates are ‘symbolic rituals’ 
might be thought to imply scepticism (they don’t really achieve anything) if not an 
outrightly critical stance (they are a side-show designed to divert attention away from 
where the real action lies). But that would be to overlook the fact that, in Holmes 
words, ‘we live by symbols’.18 Although we might criticise an empty gesture, or a 
rigged election, as ‘purely symbolic’, the criticism attacks not symbolism per se, but 
only the attempt to use symbols in a disingenuous, fraudulent way. The meanings 
symbolically expressed by political practices have genuine significance for our lives, 
just as do the meanings expressed in a round of applause or a chilling silence, a 
thoughtful gift or a missed anniversary, a kiss or a slap in the face, a promise, an 
apology, a word of forgiveness, a spell in the pillory, sexist abuse on Twitter and an 
award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. To point to the symbolism of an event 
or practice is not to downplay its significance. 
Of course, it is not enough that we merely point to the fact that democratic practices 
and political institutions carry symbolic resonance; in order to understand democracy 
we must have a sense of precisely what it is that democracy symbolises. I have 
proffered the idea that democracy honours political autonomy, by enabling citizens to 
view one another as engaged in a joint project of self-government while expressing 
respect for each individual’s capacity to render political judgments. This conflicts 
with the classical view that democracy is to be associated with government by 
consent, although, I have argued, it is a view that may be broadly be accepted by 
mainstream political philosophers after the ‘deliberative turn’,19 whether they are on 
                                                     
18 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., ‘John Marshall’, in Collected Legal Papers (rpt, New York: Peter 
Smith, 1952), p 270. 
19 See John S Dryzek, ‘Introduction: the deliberative turn in democratic theory’, in Deliberative 
Democracy and Beyond: liberals, critics, contestations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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‘team L’ (taking their lead from some form of neo-Kantianism), or ‘team C’ (deriving 
inspiration from Aristotle and/or Hegel).20 The shift from a focus on consent to a focus 
on judgment explains, I believe, the widespread preference for representative over 
plebiscitarian democracy even among those, such as Waldron and Habermas, who 
fiercely oppose any kind of epistemic paternalism. Respecting each citizen’s capacity 
for judgment requires an inclusive politics, but this should not be confused with the 
simplistic idea that political decisions should follow ‘the will of the majority’. No such 
will exists, and if it did, we should treat it as an object of suspicion, not celebration. 
Respecting citizens as political agents requires paying honour to their capacity to 
render judgments, not merely their capacity to will; the former capacity being deeper 
than the latter. Acts of will possess a certain bruteness: they are synchronic, occurring 
in a particular moment in time, and do not permit of qualitative variation. Judgments, 
on the other hand, are essentially diachronic, they do not simply occur in a scintilla 
temporis but flow continually, and are scalar in nature, permitting of different depths. 
A theory of democracy that respects citizens as agents capable of political judgment 
cannot, therefore, concern itself only with static mechanisms whereby consent is 
given (i.e. voting), rather it must attend to the dynamic processes of judgment-
formation. Arguments for plebiscitarian as well as interest-group theories of 
democracy tend to overlook the will/judgment distinction. Once it is noted, 
arguments in favour of a representative democracy as a first-best democratic option 
begin to look persuasive, if we see the legislature as a body oriented towards the 
pooling of the judgment of citizens from different sections of society through a 
deliberative reasoning process. Here Waldron’s recognition of the ‘dignity of 
legislation’ should lead him to question the static, vote-centric methodology he 
employs to attack judicial review. 
The idea of self-government presupposes the existence of a political community that 
can act in concert. Government by the people requires the joint action of the people, 
in a sense that cannot be reduced to some function of the actions of each individual 
                                                     
20 See Taylor, ‘Cross-Purposes’, in Philosophical Arguments, p 181. 
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citizen. This is not as mysterious a notion as it might sound. Examples of irreducibly 
collective action abound in everyday life: two friends take a stroll together, a group 
of decorators paint a house, a back four play the offside trap, a pair of lumberjacks 
saw a log, an orchestra plays a symphony. In none of these cases can the behaviour 
of any individual be explained without reference to the behaviour of the others with 
whom he is engaging. The most obvious political example is the vote. Yet, in order 
for citizens to feel that they are engaged in an ongoing project of self-government, the 
political community must transcend any given instance of collective action. Again, 
we need to see democracy as a dynamic process: what goes on in between elections 
is equally important as the elections themselves. 
This sense of democratic self-government can only thrive when citizens adopt a 
particular attitude towards politics. They must aim not merely to maximise 
satisfaction of their individual preferences, but to pursue a common good. In this 
respect political communities are like families and friendship groups, which also 
transcend particular collective actions by virtue of shared solidaristic attitudes. 
Dworkin takes this principle as the basis of an argument in support of judicial review: 
since a failure to treat members of the community with equal concern and respect will 
tend to corrode the bonds of citizenship, judicial review, by guarding against such 
failures, can help to maintain the democratic community as such. But once we 
appreciate the symbolic role that political institutions play, we cannot satisfy 
ourselves with examining only whether judicial review or legislative supremacy is 
likely to lead to more just decisions. While judicial review might effectively guard 
against certain kinds of inegalitarian decisions, legislative supremacy might 
nevertheless be more effective at promoting a democratic civic ethos. Here Habermas’ 
recognition of the way in which the relationship between citizens is shaped through 
the practice of politics is instructive. Yet we need to go beyond Habermas’ approach 
of viewing constitutional design as a means for translating the ‘communicative 
power’ of citizens into the ‘administrative power’ of government. As well as allowing 
for the transmission of rational arguments, our institutional design also projects an 
ethical message: it tells us something about the kind of association that our political 
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community is. Through inclusive and reasoned elaboration of a public opinion that is 
oriented towards a common good, legislatures can project the idea that the political 
community is collectively self-governing. 
The question of judicial review is important, then, not so much because of the 
empirical factors at stake, but because of what a system of judicial review symbolises. 
If the political agency of the people is represented by the deliberations and 
enactments of the legislative assembly, then judicial review will signify a set of limits 
being placed around that agency: limits imposed by a law which is in a sense ‘pre-
political’. This conception of constitutional law presents constitutionalism and 
democracy as standing in essential conflict, as if the ‘will of the people’ were some 
organic force which needs to be contained within safe boundaries. 
There is a more attractive vision of self-government available to us. This vision 
recognises that the political community does not exist prior to the constitutional 
structures through which it expresses itself, and hence that these structures serve to 
generate, and not simply to limit, political power. It believes that democracy requires 
paying respect to citizens’ judgment, which means not unleashing wild and 
dangerous forces, but constructing institutional forms through which wisdom and 
insight can be pooled. Of course constitutional design is not everything, and there are 
plenty of potential pitfalls that might stand in the way of realising the values implicit 
within our institutional system. But in looking to avoid these pitfalls, we should not 
lose sight of our ideals. Wrapped up in our practice of democracy we can find an 
ambitious vision wherein an autonomous people rules over itself. This vision is 
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